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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THREE ESSAYS ON DUAL-CLASS STOCK STRUCTURE 
by 
Olesya Lobanova 
Florida International University, 2013 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Suchismita Mishra, Major Professor 
 Dual-class stock structure is characterized by the separation of voting rights and 
cash flow rights. The departure from a common “one share-one vote” configuration 
creates ideal conditions for conflicts of interest and agency problems between controlling 
insiders (the holders of voting rights) and remaining shareholders. The owners of voting 
rights have the opportunity to extract private benefits and act in their personal interest; as 
a result, dual-class firms are often perceived to have low transparency and high 
information asymmetry.  
 This dissertation investigates the quality of information and the information 
environment of firms with two classes of stock. The first essay examines the quality of 
information by studying accruals in dual-class firms in comparison to firms with only one 
class of stock. The results suggest that the quality of accruals is better in dual-class firms 
than in single-class firms. In addition, the difference in the quality of accruals between 
firms that abolish their dual-class share structure by unification and singe-class firms 
disappears in the post-unification period. The second essay investigates the earnings 
informativeness of dual-class firms by examining the explanatory power of earnings for 
returns.  The results indicate that the earnings informativeness is lower for dual-class 
 vii 
 
firms as compared to single-class firms. Earnings informativeness improves in firms that 
unify their shares. The third essay compares the level of information asymmetry between 
dual-class firms and single-class firms. It is documented that the information environment 
for dual-class firms is worse than for single-class firms. Also, the finding suggests that 
the difference in information environment between dual-class firms and single-class firms 
disappears after dual-class stock unification.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE QUALITY OF ACCRUALS IN DUAL-CLASS FIRMS 
1.1. Introduction 
 On May 18, 2012, Facebook Inc. goes public and causes lots of buzz in the 
investment community around the globe. The company issues two classes of shares with 
different voting and cash flow rights. This ownership configuration brings forth renewed 
interest in dual-class share structure among investors and renewed concerns among 
corporate governance experts. Many questions are raised about this dual-class share 
structure; how does this structure affect shareholders, firm performance, stock returns, 
and firm governance? Finance literature investigates dual-class share structure and 
provides some insights into how dual-class share structure functions. But nevertheless, 
many questions remain unanswered.  
 Dual-class firms have typically two classes of stock.  The “inferior” class has little 
or no voting rights and the “superior” class has a disproportionally larger number of votes 
per share. The segregation of cash flow rights and voting rights creates ideal conditions 
for conflicts of interest, agency problems, and private benefit extraction by the holders of 
voting rights. Dual-class stock structure may stoke information asymmetry between 
controlling insiders with voting rights and the rest of shareholders. Previous studies 
suggest that companies with dual-class structure exhibit a poor quality of earnings 
(Francis, Schipper, and Vincent, 2005) and voluntarily release less information compared 
to single-class firms (Tinaikar, 2006). This lower quality of earnings may be due to 
accrual management. 
  On the other hand, managers with voting rights have the incentive to disclose 
more information to attract investors and reduce the perception of low credibility and 
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information asymmetry (Warfield, Wild and Wild, 1995). Dual-class share structure also 
reduces the likelihood that managers are replaced since outside investors have no voting 
rights. Essentially, dual-class share structure creates a long-term employment contract for 
the holders of voting rights. In effect, this encourages them to concentrate on the firms 
long-term rather than short-term goals (e.g. meeting analysts’ forecasts or expectations, 
or showing positive growth trend or profitability) (Nguyen and Xu, 2010). Following this 
conjecture, managers with voting rights would have less incentive to manipulate 
earnings.  
Thus, different incentives drive the behavior of controlling insiders and 
consequently influence the quality of publicly available accounting information. This 
essay examines the quality of accruals in dual-class firms in comparison to firms with 
only one class of shares in order to draw some conclusions on which incentives dominate 
the behavior of owners of voting rights. 
 I document lower levels of discretionary accruals in dual-class firms compared to 
single-class firms. This result implies that firms with two classes of stock engage in less 
earnings managements (measured by absolute abnormal accruals). In addition, I show 
that after dual-class companies unify their shares, the difference in the level of 
discretionary accruals between newly unified and singe class firms disappears. Thus, I 
find no evidence that controlling insiders have incentives to manipulate earnings. These 
results are relevant for shareholders of dual-class firms, other market participants, and 
regulators. 
1.2. Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
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Dual-class structure segregates voting rights and cash flow rights and thus 
exacerbates the problem of the separation of ownership and control. One of the earliest 
works to examine the conflicts of interest that arise as a result of a separation of 
ownership and control is by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Their study suggests that the 
controlling managers may pursue their own interests which may not be aligned with the 
interests of outside shareholders. Dual-class structure is a perfect example of this 
separation and misalignment of interests between controlling insiders (who hold the 
voting rights) and the rest of shareholders. 
In one of the earliest study on dual-class structure, DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
(1985) examine a sample of 45 U.S. common stocks with separate voting (superior) and 
non-voting (inferior) classes. They document a high level of family involvement in firms 
with dual-class structure. They also find that managers of dual-class firms have a greater 
interest in holding voting shares rather than cash flow rights shares. A theoretical study 
by Grossman and Hart (1988) examines “the optimality” of a “one share-one vote” share 
structure. They derive scenarios where deviations from a “one share-one vote” structure 
can be favorable to stockholders. Their findings imply that if dual-class share structure 
implementation provides benefits, such as lower cost of capital, a firm should be able to 
establish a dual-class type of structure.  
 The growing popularity of firms with two classes of common stocks leads to an 
intuitive question: what are the determinants of the decision to implement dual-class 
structure? Lehn, Netter, and Poulsen (1990) investigate firm characteristics around dual-
class recapitalizations. Their findings suggest that firms with high growth prospects are 
more likely to adopt dual-class structure. Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001) add to the 
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literature by focusing on the determinants of dual-class structure at IPO time. They 
examine stocks with restricted voting rights listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange by way 
of a logit regression and find that a firm controlled by a family before an IPO has a higher 
probability of adopting dual-class structure at IPO time. Therefore, the type of controlling 
stakeholder affects the likelihood of going public with two classes of common stock. 
One of the most recent and comprehensive studies on the determinants of dual-
class structure is by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010). They identify several key factors 
that increase the probability of a firm implementing a dual-class status; these factors 
include a person’s name in the name of the company at the time of an IPO, a company in 
the media industry, and the number of firms in the same industry.  
The quality of accounting information in firms with separate voting and cash flow 
rights is examined by Fan and Wong (2002). They study a sample of East Asian firms 
and show that concentrated ownership characterized by divergence from a “one share-one 
vote” principal is associated with a lower quality of earnings informativeness. In line with 
this research, Francis, Schipper, and Vincent (2005) focus on the quality of accounting 
information in a sample of U.S. dual-class firms. They find that earnings are less 
informative in dual-class firms compared to single-class firms. Jiraporn (2005) also 
documents a higher level of earnings management in dual-class firms. On the other hand, 
Nguyen and Xu (2010) show that the level of absolute discretionary accruals is higher for 
single-class firms than that for dual-class firms implying that dual-class firms engage in 
less earnings management activities than single-class firms. 
  A theoretical model introduced by Chemmanur and Jiao (2012) suggests that 
dual-class firms will unify their stocks when firm performance post IPO is poor, industry 
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maturation is reached, and changes in management occur. The model also implies that 
unification has a positive effect on operating performance. In addition, Dittmann and 
Ulbricht (2008) find a positive and significant increase in firm value after the unification 
of German dual-class stocks. Among other empirical works on dual-class unification, is a 
study by Maury and Pajuste (2011). They examine dual-class unifications in seven 
European countries and focus on identification of determinants and consequences of 
unification. Particularly, they document that private control benefits are negatively 
related to the decision to unify dual-class stocks. The implication is that dual-class firms 
which offer the smallest private benefits to the holders of voting rights are most likely to 
return to a “one share-one vote” structure. In addition, high growth opportunities and a 
severe need for external capital increase the likelihood of unification. Maury and Pajuste 
also investigate the effects of unification on firm value and find that firm value increases 
as a result of unification.  The impact of unification on liquidity and cost of capital is 
investigated by Ehrhardt, Kuklinski, and Nowak (2005). They employ a sample of 
German dual-class firms that abolish dual-class structure during the 1997 to 2003 time 
period. They document improved liquidity or lower bid-ask spreads, a decreased cost of 
capital, and an increased firm value as a result of unification. 
 However, literature on the unification of U.S. dual-class stocks is scarce. Smart, 
Thirumalai, and Zutter (2008) identify 37 U.S. firms that abolish dual-class structure and 
perform an event study of the effects of unification on cumulative abnormal returns. They 
show a positive and significant market reaction to the announcement of dual-class 
unification. Also, Howell (2009) investigates a sample of 61 unified U.S. stocks and do 
 6 
 
not find a significant change in firm value as result of unification. He documents a 
positive impact of unification on the stocks’ liquidity.  
 Based on prior studies, I state the following research hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The level of abnormal discretionary accruals is lower in dual-class stocks 
than in single-class stocks. 
Hypothesis 2: There is no difference in the level of abnormal discretionary accruals 
between unified stocks and single-class stocks. 
1.3. Data and Sample Selection 
I examine four different samples of dual-class firms. The “original sample” 
consists of 385 firms (1,754 firm-years) with two classes of stock.1 The sample period 
runs from 1994 to 2002. In order to be included in the sample, a firm must exhibit dual-
class share structure for at least two years during the time period from 1994 to 2002. This 
list of dual-class firms includes U.S. listed companies and excludes utilities (two digit 
SIC code from 40 to 49) and financial companies (two digit SIC code between 60 and 
69). 
The “extended sample” builds upon the “original sample”. I manually examine 
each dual-class firm’s 10-K annual report for years 2003 to 2009. I identify 132 dual-
class stocks (1,446 firm-years) from the original sample that maintain dual-class share 
structure beyond 2002. To be included in the sample, a firm must exhibit dual-class share 
structure for at least two years during the time period from 1994 to 2002 and at least one 
year from 2003 to 2009.  
                                                            
1 I thank Dr. Andrew Metrick for providing me with this data 
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The “restricted sample” consists of 87 dual-class firms (1,035 firm-years) that 
maintain dual-class share structure for the entire period from 1995 to 2009. To be 
included in the sample, a firm must exhibit dual-class share structure for each and every 
year from 1995 to 2009. 
The “unification sample” consists of firms that unified their shares. I initially 
identify 65 firms that unify their shares by examining dual-class firms’ proxy statements 
from 1994 to 2009. After deleting firms with missing data, the unification sample 
includes 44 firms (251 firm-years). The sample is partitioned into a pre-unification period 
and post-unification period. The year of unification is deleted. Furthermore, I collect all 
accounting variables to measure discretionary accruals from the COMPUSTAT database. 
I winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% and 99% level. 
1.4. Methodology 
1.4.1. Measures of Discretionary Accruals: Cross-Sectional Modified Jones Models 
There are several accrual-based models that serve to detect earnings management. 
One of the earliest models is developed by Healy (1985). The purpose of this model is to 
compare the mean of total accruals (scaled by lagged total assets) across different periods 
in which earnings are predicted to be managed upwards (the estimation period) or 
downwards. The mean of total accruals from the estimation period is assumed to be the 
measure of nondiscretionary accruals. DeAngelo (1986) develops a model in which a first 
difference in total accruals is computed. This difference is assumed to have an expected 
value of zero under the null hypothesis of no earnings management. Both, the Healy and 
DeAngelo models assume that total accruals serve as a proxy for nondiscretionary 
accruals and that the nondiscretionary accruals are constant over time. DeAngelo’s model 
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suggests that any changes in total accruals reflect changes in discretionary accruals. Jones 
(1991) proposes an extended version of DeAngelo’s model, removing the assumption of 
constant nondiscretionary accruals. Therefore, the adjusted model assumes that changes 
in nondiscretionary accruals occur because of changes in economic conditions. Jones 
decomposes total accruals into two components: discretionary and nondiscretionary. The 
nondiscretionary component is a normal component while the discretionary component 
reflects earnings management. Jones original model assumes that the relation between 
nondiscretionary accruals and the explanatory variables is stationary. Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney (1995) propose a modified version of Jones model where they include the 
change in accounts receivable. This model differs from Jones original model because it 
assumes that all changes in credit sales in the event period (a period in which earnings 
management is hypothesized) result from the managers’ manipulations of earnings. 
Larcker and Richardson (2004) propose a modification to measure discretionary accruals. 
They include cash flows from operations in order to control for a firm’s performance and 
book-to-market ratios to control for expected growth in operations. 
These models of discretionary accruals are heavily tested. For instance, DeFond 
and Jiambalvo (1994) examine the abnormal accruals in firms that report debt covenant 
violations in annual reports using time-series and cross-sectional versions of Jones model. 
Both models perform well detecting manipulations. 
I construct four measures of discretionary accruals using Modified Jones 
(MJones) Models. Following Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998), Kothari, Leone, and 
Wasley (2005), and Barua et al. (2010), I estimate the first model defined as: 
 Model 1: 
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0 1 2
-1 -1 -1
-1it it it
it
it it it
TCA REV AR
Assets Assets Assets
β β β εΔ Δ= + + +                                                        
(1)
 
 
 
where: 
 TCAit it it it it it itCA CL Cash StDebt TP DepM= Δ − Δ − Δ + Δ + Δ − total current accruals 
in year t  
 ∆CAit =change in current assets for firm i between year t-1 and year t 
 ∆CLit=change in current liabilities for firm i between year t-1 and year t 
 ∆Cashit=change in cash/cash equivalents for firm i between year t-1 and year t 
 ∆StDebtit=change in debt included in current liabilities for firm i between year t-1 
and year t 
 ∆TPit=change in income taxes payable for firm i between year t-1 and year t 
 DepMit=depreciation and amortization expense for firm i in year t 
 Assetsit-1=total assets for firm i in year t-1 
  ∆REVit=change in sales revenues for firm i between year t-1 and year t 
 ∆ARit=change in accounts receivable 
The prediction errors represent the level of discretionary current accruals. They are 
computed using the coefficients estimated by running an ordinary least squares regression 
specified in equation (1) and are defined as: 
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TCA REV ARACCRUAL
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β β β
− − −
Δ − Δ
= − − −
  
                                      
(2)
 
Prior literature suggests (e.g., Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998); Bradshaw, Richardson, 
and Sloan (2001)) that managers have greater flexibility and control over current accruals 
compared to long-term accruals. Therefore, Model 1 employs the measure of total current 
accruals to estimate discretionary current accruals   
 However, in order to maintain comparability with other literature on discretionary 
accruals, I also employ three Modified Jones models of discretionary long-term accruals 
in which I use total accruals defined as:  
it it itTA NI OCF= −                                                                                                             
(3) 
where: 
 NIit= net income for firm i in year t 
 OCFit= operating cash flows for firm i in year t 
Following Defond and Jiambalvo (1994), and Nguyen and Xu (2010), I estimate the 
following equation: 
 Model 2:
   
1 2 3
1 1 1 1
1it it it
it
it it it it
TA REV PPE
Assets Assets Assets Assets
β β β ε
− − − −
Δ
= + + +
                                                
(4) 
where  
 
PPEit= firm i’s year t gross property, plant and equipments 
 11 
 
Other variables definitions are identical to those previously described above. 
Discretionary accruals are computed using estimated coefficients from equation (4) as 
follows: 
1 2 3
1 1 1 1
1it it it
it
it it it it
TA REV PPEACCRUAL
Assets Assets Assets Assets
β β β
− − − −
Δ
= − − −
  
                                
(5)
 
 Following Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998), 
and Barua et al. (2010), I also estimate model three as: 
 
 
 Model 3:
   
0 1 2 3
1 1 1 1
1it it it it
it
it it it it
TA REV AR PPE
Assets Assets Assets Assets
α β β β ε
− − − −
Δ − Δ
= + + + +
                              
(6) 
All variables are the same as defined above. Many prior studies estimate model three 
without an intercept but Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) argue that the inclusion of 
the intercept serves as an additional control for heteroscedasticity and that the residuals 
are more symmetric. The residuals from equation (6) are calculated as: 
0 1 2 3
1 1 1 1
1ˆ ˆ ˆˆit it it itit
it it it it
TA REV AR PPEACCRUAL
Assets Assets Assets Assets
α β β β
− − − −
Δ − Δ
= − − − −
              
(7)
 
 Larcker and Richardson (2004) add the book-to-market ratio (BM) and operation 
cash flow (CFO) to model 3. This updated model controls for expected growth in 
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operations as well as extreme levels of firm performance. They show that this updated 
model has better performance detecting earnings management. Thus, following Larcker 
and Richardson (2004), I also estimate the following model as: 
 Model 4:
                                                                                                                                           
 
                                    
(8) 
 
where: 
 CFOit= firm i’s year t operating cash flows 
BMit= firm i’s year t book value of common equity over the market value of equity 
Other variables are the same as defined above.  
 
 
The residuals from the model represent discretionary accruals and are calculated as:     
       
                      
(9)
 
 
 
In all four models, I take the absolute value of discretionary accruals because I am 
only interested in the magnitude of accruals manipulation. A higher measure of the 
absolute value of the variable ACCRUAL reflects more earnings management for that firm. 
0 1 2 3
1 1 1 1
4 5
1 1
1it it it it
it it it it
it it
it
it it
TA REV AR PPE
Assets Assets Assets Assets
CFO BM
Assets Assets
β β β β
β β ε
− − − −
− −
Δ − Δ
= + + + +
+ + +
0 1 2
1 1 1
3 4 5
1 1 1
1it it it
it
it it it
it it it
it it it
TA Sales ARACCRUAL
Assets Assets Assets
PPE CFO BM
Assets Assets Assets
β β β
β β β
− − −
− − −
Δ −Δ
= − − − −
− − −
  
  
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1.4.2. Measures of Discretionary Accruals: Cross-Sectional DD and McDD Models 
Dechow and Dichev (DD) (2002) propose a novel approach to measure the 
quality of accruals. Jones et al. (2008) show that the DD model performs well. Following 
the Dechow and Dichev (2002) methodology, I estimate the following regression: 
Model 5:  
1 1
0 1 2 3
1 1 1 1
it it it it
it
it it it it
WC CFO CFO CFO
Assets Assets Assets Assets
β β β β ε− +
− − − −
Δ
= + + + +                               
(10) 
where: 
 ∆WCit= change in working capital from year t-1 to year t= 
(∆AR+∆Inv+∆AP+∆IT+∆OA)
 
 AR=accounts receivable 
 Inv=inventory 
 AP=accounts payable 
 IT=income taxes 
           OA =other assets and liabilities (net change) 
 CFO=cash flow from operations  
The residuals from equation (10) represent the measure of discretionary accruals and are 
computed as follows: 
1 1
0 1 2 3
1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆit it it it
it
it it it it
WC CFO CFO CFOACCRUAL
Assets Assets Assets Assets
β β β β− +
− − − −
Δ
= − − − −
                      
(11) 
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In addition, following Barua et al. (2010), I also estimate the following regression based 
on the DD model: 
 Model 6:
   
1 1
0 1 2 3
1 1 1 1
it it it it
it
it it it it
TCA CFO CFO CFO
Assets Assets Assets Assets
β β β β ε− +
− − − −
= + + + +                                       
(12)
        
where TCA (Total Current Accruals) scaled by lagged total assets is used as the 
dependent variable. 
Discretionary accruals are calculated using estimated coefficients from equation (12):      
1 1
0 1 2 3
1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆit it it it
it
it it it it
TCA CFO CFO CFOACCRUAL
Assets Assets Assets Assets
β β β β− +
− − − −
Δ
= − − − −
                      
(13)                           
The residuals from equation (13) represent the level of discretionary accruals. 
 McNichols (2002) improves the DD model by adding ∆REV and PPE variables 
and shows that this model is better at measuring discretionary accruals than the original 
DD model.  
 
Therefore, I also estimate the following model: 
 Model 7: 
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1 1
0 1 2 3
1 1 1 1
4 5
1 1
it it it it
it it it it
it it
it
it it
WC CFO CFO CFO
Assets Assets Assets Assets
REV PPE
Assets Assets
β β β β
β β ε
− +
− − − −
− −
Δ
= + + + +
Δ
+ + +                                         ( 
14) 
 I also use TCA as the dependent variable in model 8 following Barua et al. 
(2010): 
 Model 8: 
1 1
0 1 2 3
1 1 1 1
4 5
1 1
it it it it
it it it it
it it
it
it it
TCA CFO CFO CFO
Assets Assets Assets Assets
REV PPE
Assets Assets
β β β β
β β ε
− +
− − − −
− −
Δ
= + + + +
Δ
+ + +                                           
(15) 
The residuals from both models serve as measures of discretionary accruals. In all four 
models, I take the absolute value of the variable ACCRUAL as I am only interested in the 
magnitude of the discretionary accruals and not in the direction of earnings management. 
 All eight models of discretionary accruals are estimated cross-sectionally by two-
digit SIC industry and year. I require at least six firms in the same two-digit SIC industry 
to run ordinary least squares regression. 
1.4.3.Matching Procedure 
 I follow two matching procedures between dual-class and single-class firms. The 
first matching procedure, named “main control”, is performed by matching each dual-
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class firm company to a portfolio of single-class companies in the same industry (based 
on a two digit SIC code) and in the same fiscal year. The second matching procedure is 
termed “narrow control” and is based on a one-to-one match principal. Each dual-class 
firm is matched to one single-class firm based on industry (measured by a two digit SIC 
code), fiscal year, and size (measured by taking natural logarithm of price multiplied by 
shares outstanding). 
1.4.4. Tests of Significance: Univariate Analysis 
 In order to test for the difference between levels of discretionary accruals of dual-
class companies and matching single-class companies, I perform t-test for the difference 
in means and non-parametric Wilcoxon sum rank test for the difference in medians. 
 The t-test is performed to test the following null hypothesis: 
 H0:  
 The alternative directional hypothesis states that dual-class stocks’ discretionary 
accruals (in absolute terms) are lower than single-class stocks’ discretionary accruals: 
H1 : dual singleμ μ<   
In order to test this hypothesis, the t-value is calculated as follows: 
dual single
2 2
dual singleX X
X X
s s
t −
+
=                                                                                                              
(16)  
dual singleμ μ=
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 Where dualX  is the average of discretionary accruals of dual-class stocks, and 
singleX is the average of discretionary accruals of matching single-class stocks. While 
2 2
dual single
,X XS S represent the squares of the standard error of the averages. 
 If the null hypothesis is true, then the t-statistic follows a Student’s t-distribution 
with (n1+n2-2) degrees of freedom, where n1 is the sample size of dual-class firms and n2 
is the sample size of single-class firms, respectively. I then compare an obtained t-value 
with a tabled one-tail critical value. If the absolute value of an obtained t-value is greater 
that the critical value, I conclude that the average of discretionary accruals in dual-class 
stocks is significantly lower than the average of discretionary accruals in single-class 
stocks. This would  imply a better quality of accruals for firms with two classes of shares. 
 I also perform a non-parametric Wilcoxon sum rank test to test if the median of 
the differences in discretionary accruals between dual-class firms and single-class firms 
is greater than zero. The null hypothesis is the following: 
H0: dual-single 0
Diffθ =  
 Where dual-single
Diffθ  represents the median of the differences between dual-class 
firms’ discretionary accruals and single-class firms’ discretionary accruals. 
The alternative directional hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: dual-single 0
Diffθ <  
 If the obtained Z-statistic is equal to or less than the tabled one-tailed critical 
value, then I can conclude that the median of the differences between dual-class and 
single-class discretionary accruals is less than zero. This suggests that dual-class firms 
have a higher quality of accruals. 
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 In addition, I apply the difference-in-difference approach to examine the change 
in differences between unified firms and single-class firms in the pre-unification period 
and the post-unification period. First, I calculate the difference in discretionary accruals 
between dual-class firms and single-class firms in the pre-unification period. Second, I 
calculate the difference in discretionary accruals between unified firms and single-class 
firms in the post-unification period. Then, I test whether the difference in the pre-
unification is statistically significant different from the difference in the post-unification 
period.  
1.4.5. Regression Models 
 Based on Jiraporn (2005), I construct the first regression model to test the 
hypothesis that dual-class firms have a higher quality of accruals compared to single-
class firms. I employ eight different measures of discretionary accruals based on the 
Modified Jones models (MJones), Dechow and Dichev (DD) model, and McNichols 
(McDD) model described above. The following regression is estimated using panel data: 
Regression #1:
0 1 2 3 4 1
5 6 7
( ) /it it it it it it
it it it
ACCRUAL Ln TotalAssets DebtRatio BM EBIT Assets
Salesgrowth DUAL Loss
−
= + + + + +
+ + + +
α α α α α
α α α ε
      
(17) 
 I use several firm-specific control variables such as size (log of Total Assets), 
profitability (EBIT ratio), financial distress (Debt ratio), and LOSS (a dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 if earnings are negative and zero otherwise). I also use Salesgrowth 
and BM (book-to-market ratio), in order to control for growth. I employ a dual-class 
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dummy variable, DUAL, which is equal to 1 if a firm is a dual-class, and is equal to 0 
otherwise.  
 I am interested in the coefficient on the dummy variable DUAL. A negative and 
statistically significant coefficient implies that the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals in dual-class firms is smaller than in single-class firms. This means that the 
quality of accruals is better in firms with two classes of shares compared to single-class 
companies.  
 As a robustness check, I also estimate the following regression which includes 
capital expenditures (CAPXit/Assetsit-1) as a control variable: 
Regression #2: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 1
5 1 5 6 7
( ) /
/
it it it it it it
it it it it it
ACCRUAL Ln TotalAssets DebtRatio BM EBIT Assets
CAPX Assets Salesgrowth DUAL Loss
α α α α α
α α α α ε
−
−
= + + + + +
+ + + + +
      
(18) 
 
 I predict a negative sign on Ln(Total Assets) based on Dechow and Dichev 
(2002), who find that smaller firms have lower quality of accruals. I also expect to find a 
positive coefficient on Debt Ratio as prior literature suggests that firms with higher debt 
constraints tend to manage earnings in order to meet debt covenants. Menon and 
Willliams (2004) document a negative relationship between book-to-market ratio and 
discretionary accruals, and a positive relationship between sales growth and discretionary 
accruals. Thus, I expect to find a negative coefficient on BM and a positive coefficient on 
Salesgrowth and a positive coefficient on CAPX/Assets. Dechow and Dichev (2002) show 
that firms with poor performance exhibit lower quality of accruals. Hence, I expect to 
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document a negative coefficient on EBIT ratio and a negative coefficient on Loss dummy 
variable. 
1.5. Results 
1.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Tables 1.1 through 1.4 present summary statistics for the four samples used in the 
analysis of discretionary accruals. Table 1.1 shows results for the original sample of dual-
class firms with the two single-class control groups: main control (Panel A), and one-to-
one control (Panel B). The p-values for the tests of difference in means and medians are 
displayed in the last two columns of each panel.  Dual-class firms in the original sample 
have less shares outstanding (43.28), smaller sales (1,281.60), and a smaller market 
capitalization (1,922.83) compared to single-class firms on average. In addition, dual-
class firms on average have higher leverage, higher past growth, higher debt ratio, and 
higher book-to-market ratio than single-class firms. 
 Table 1.2 reports summary statistics for the extended sample. The means and 
medians of most variables are similar to those values from the original sample of dual-
class firms. Panel B shows the results for a one-to-one control between dual-class firms 
and single-class firms. Dual-class firms have similar size, EBIT ratio, return on assets 
(ROA), earnings, and cash flow from operations (CFO) compared to single-class firms. 
 Table 1.3 presents summary statistics for the restricted sample. The restricted 
sample is represented by dual-class firms that are larger in size, have larger market 
capitalization, total assets, earnings, and operating cash flows than dual-class firms in the 
original sample. These firms maintain dual-class share structure for the entire 1995 to 
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2009 period and it is logical that these dual-class firms are larger and more financially 
sound than firms in the original sample. 
 Summary statistics for the unification sample is given in Table 1.4. Panel A and 
Panel B present the results for the pre-unification sample while Panel C and Panel D 
provide the summary statistics for the post-unification sample. The pre-unification 
sample of dual-class firms has similar characteristics to the original sample of dual-class 
firms. After unification, dual-class firms have more shares outstanding (an increase from 
43.14 to 126.33), have larger sales (an increase from 1,646.47 to 2,920.89), higher total 
assets (an increase from 1,376.01 to 3,039.42), more leverage (an increase from 0.18 to 
0.23), higher earnings (an increase from 35.67 to 89.77), and larger cash flows from 
operations (CFO) (an increase from 74.81 to 268.75) compared to pre-unification. 
1.5.2. Discretionary Accruals 
 Table 1.5 through Table 1.8 present results for the univariate analysis of 
discretionary accruals computed in eight different ways. The results of the t-test for the 
difference between means (dual minus single) and the results of Wilcoxon sum rank test 
for the difference between medians are given in the last two columns of each table. 
 The analysis of discretionary accruals for the original sample is reported in Table 
1.5. Panels A and C present the discretionary accruals based on MJones models. Using all 
four models and the two matching procedures, I confirm that the mean and median 
differences between dual-class firms and single-class firms are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Panel B and D show the results of discretionary accruals 
estimated from the DD and McDD models. I find more evidence supporting my 
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hypothesis that discretionary accruals in dual-class firms are lower than in single-class 
firms. 
 Table 1.6 presents univariate analysis of accruals for the extended sample while 
Table 1.7 shows the results for the restricted sample of dual-class firms. Both tables 
document lower discretionary accruals for dual-class firms implying better quality of 
accruals in firms with two classes of shares. 
 The analysis of discretionary accruals for the unification sample is given in Table 
1.8. The differences in mean and median between dual-class firms and single-class firms 
are negative and statistically significant in the pre-unification and post-unification periods 
when the main control is used as the matching procedure. However, when dual-class 
firms are matched to single-class firms based on a one-to-one matching principal, the 
differences in means and medians between discretionary accruals of dual-class firms and 
single-class firms in the post-unification period are not statistically significant. This 
implies that the quality of accruals in dual-class firms after unification is the same as in 
single-class firms. In addition, Table 1.8 shows that discretionary accruals of dual-class 
companies, on average, increase after unification. For instance, Panel A, Model 1, 
documents a mean of 0.0457 for discretionary accruals of dual-class firms pre-unification 
while Panel B, Model 1, shows a mean of 0.0688 for discretionary accruals of dual-class 
firms post-unification. 
 The results of the difference-in-differences approach are presented in Table 1.8, 
Panel E.  For instance, the average discretionary accruals for dual-class firms in the pre-
unification period are 0.0457, while the post-unification period shows discretionary 
accruals of unified firms at 0.0688. That is a positive increase of 0.0232 from the pre-
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unification to the post-unification period which is statistically significant at 1% level. 
Model 2 through Model 4 suggests the same increase in the level of discretionary 
accruals for firms that unified their shares. In addition, Model 2 suggests that the 
difference of the differences between dual-class firms and single-class firms in the pre-
unification period and the post-unification period is negative and statistically significant 
which implies that the difference between the level of discretionary accruals of unified 
firms and single-class firms in the post-unification period is smaller than the difference 
between the level of discretionary accruals of dual-class firms and single-class firms in 
the pre-unification period. 
1.5.3. Regression Analysis 
 Results of the regression analysis using the original sample are given in Table 1.9. 
My main interest lies in the coefficient on DUAL, which is equal to one if a firm is a 
dual-class firm and is equal to zero for a single-class firm. I document statistically 
significant negative coefficients on DUAL in all regressions with the MJones models. The 
coefficients on the other variables all have the same signs as predicted. Regressions for 
the DD and McDD models display less conclusive results since the dummy coefficient 
for some models is not statistically significant. 
 Table 1.10 documents regression results for the extended sample and Table 1.11 
for the restricted sample. In most cases, the coefficient on DUAL is negative and 
statistically significant. This result suggests that dual-class firms exhibit a higher quality 
of accruals. 
 Results for the unification sample are given in Table 1.12. The signs on the 
coefficients of the control variables are as predicted. The coefficient on ln(Total Assets) is 
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negative which implies that smaller firms are associated with higher discretionary 
accruals (lower quality). The coefficient on Debt ratio is positive implying that firms 
with higher debt engage in more earnings manipulation. The coefficient on BM is 
negative while the coefficients on sales growth (Salesgrowth) and capital expenditures 
(CAPX/Assetsit-1) are positive and consistent with prior literature. In addition, the 
coefficients on EBIT ratio and Loss are negative implying firms with poor performance 
are associated with higher levels of discretionary accruals (lower level of accruals 
quality). The coefficient on DUAL is negative and statistically significant in the pre-
unification period. In the post-unification period, the coefficient on DUAL becomes 
positive but not statistically significant. The implication of these results is that the 
difference in discretionary accruals between newly single (ex dual) class firms and 
matching single-class firms disappears after unification. 
1.6. Conclusions 
In order to raise capital to finance company growth yet keep concentrated control, 
some firms separate cash flow rights and voting rights by issuing stocks with two classes: 
superior class (with voting rights) and inferior class (with no or little voting rights). This 
divergence of voting rights and cash flow rights creates suitable testing grounds for many 
compelling financial theories. For instance, prior studies document that this separation 
has a direct effect on the credibility of accounting information (Francis, Schipper, and 
Vincent, 2005). In this study, I investigate the quality of accruals in dual-class firms and 
the changes in the level of discretionary accruals after dual-class firms exit this structure 
by unifying shares. I employ eight models of discretionary accruals to measure earnings 
management in dual-class firms. I investigate four different samples of dual-class firms 
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and use two matching procedures to match dual-class to single-class firms for a 
comparative analysis. I document a lower level of discretionary accruals in dual-class 
firms compared to single-class firms. In addition, I find the quality of accruals 
deteriorates in the post-unification period. My results imply that controlling managers of 
dual-class firms engage in less earnings management. One explanation for such results is 
that the holders of voting rights in dual-class companies have fewer incentives to 
manipulate accruals since voting rights provide them with protection and independence 
from other shareholders and the market. Possibly, managers with voting rights are less 
concerned about stock price and short–term performance benchmarks and concentrate 
more on long-term goals and lasting company success.  
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics 
The table presents summary statistics for the original sample of dual-class firms and matching single-class firms. Panel A shows the results for the original 
sample based on year and industry matching procedure (Main Control). Panel B presents the results for the original sample based on year, industry, and size 
matching procedure (One-to-One Control). SHARES is the number of shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year t. SALES is total sales from 
COMPUSTAT at the end of fiscal year t. MCAP is the number of shares outstanding multiplied by fiscal year-end price plus the difference between total 
assets and total common equity at the end of fiscal year t. ASSETS is a firm’s total assets from COMPUSTAT at the end of fiscal year t. SIZE is number of 
shares outstanding multiplied by price at the end of year t. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long term debt to total assets at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
PASTGROWTH is book-to-market ratio in prior year t-1. SALESGROWTH is total sales for fiscal year t scaled by total sales in fiscal year t-1. NOA is net 
operating asset scaled by sales for fiscal year t-1. DEBT RATIO is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. EBIT/ASSETS is earnings before interest and 
taxes for fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the end of fiscal year t-1. BM is the ratio of book value of equity to market value. ROE is return on equity 
measured as income before extraordinary items in year t scaled by total stockholder’s equity in year t. ROA is return on assets measured as earnings before 
extraordinary items in year t scaled by total assets. EARNINGS is net income at the fiscal year-end. CFO is cash flow from operations at fiscal year-end. The 
p-values for t-test to test the difference between means and p-values for Wilcoxon sum rank test to test the difference between medians are given in the last 
two columns of each panel. MM stands for millions. MM$ stands for millions of dollars.  
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Panel A: Original Sample: Main Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
Test of 
Diff 
between 
Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of  
Diff 
between 
Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank 
test  
SHARES (MM) 43.28 9.48 20.20 43.10 64.06 6.97 15.71 44.20 <.0001 <.0001 
SALES (MM$) 1,281.60 183.62 509.00 1,247.45 1,732.67 50.84 209.34 906.23 0.0001 <.0001 
MCAP (MM$) 1,922.83 196.43 685.47 1,704.53 3,247.07 73.59 290.08 1,396.97 <.0001 <.0001 
ASSETS (MM$) 1,186.34 159.23 474.89 1,207.66 1,718.73 49.88 191.90 849.44 <.0001 <.0001 
SIZE 5.67 4.41 5.76 6.86 5.27 3.64 5.05 6.71 <.0001 <.0001 
LEVERAGE 0.24 0.07 0.22 0.36 0.21 0.05 0.17 0.31 <.0001 <.0001 
PASTGROWTH 0.76 0.53 0.75 0.97 0.68 0.45 0.67 0.89 <.0001 <.0001 
SALESGROWTH 1.13 0.99 1.07 1.18 1.20 0.98 1.10 1.27 <.0001 <.0001 
NOA 1.01 0.59 0.80 1.13 1.03 0.55 0.77 1.12 0.2614 0.0470 
DEBT RATIO 0.55 0.40 0.54 0.67 0.53 0.37 0.53 0.67 0.0243 0.0034 
EBIT/ASSETS 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.15 <.0001 <.0001 
BM 0.79 0.55 0.78 1.01 0.71 0.48 0.70 0.92 <.0001 <.0001 
ROE 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.15 -0.06 -0.05 0.08 0.15 <.0001 <.0001 
ROA 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.17 <.0001 0.0003 
EARNINGS (MM$) 34.11 0.10 11.70 47.21 68.26 -2.42 3.61 30.81 <.0001 <.0001 
CFO (MM$) 87.12 4.62 29.55 98.11 159.00 0.21 10.00 71.25 <.0001 <.0001 
# OF OBS 1,754 24,070   
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Panel B: Original Sample: One-to-One Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
Test of  
Difference 
between 
Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of 
Difference 
between 
Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Media
n 
Q3 t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank 
test  
SHARES (MM) 43.28 9.48 20.20 43.10 51.89 9.00 22.18 45.82 0.0026 0.0638 
SALES (MM$) 1,281.60 183.62 509.00 1,247.45 1,406.64 146.91 500.08 1,235.83 0.1870 0.3517 
MCAP (MM$) 1,922.83 196.43 685.47 1,704.53 1,883.47 179.85 646.47 1,667.39 0.7689 0.3104 
ASSETS (MM$) 1,186.34 159.23 474.89 1,207.66 1,197.19 130.27 399.67 1,038.74 0.8995 0.0096 
SIZE 5.67 4.41 5.76 6.86 5.67 4.44 5.79 6.86 0.9885 0.9600 
LEVERAGE 0.24 0.07 0.22 0.36 0.24 0.09 0.22 0.35 0.6042 0.4401 
PASTGROWTH 0.76 0.53 0.75 0.97 0.70 0.50 0.70 0.91 <.0001 <.0001 
SALESGROWTH 1.13 0.99 1.07 1.18 1.18 0.99 1.08 1.24 <.0001 0.0096 
NOA 1.01 0.59 0.80 1.13 0.93 0.52 0.74 1.04 0.0020 <.0001 
DEBT RATIO 0.55 0.40 0.54 0.67 0.56 0.42 0.56 0.69 0.0309 0.0213 
EBIT/ASSETS 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.15 0.7387 0.2159 
BM 0.79 0.55 0.78 1.01 0.73 0.52 0.72 0.93 <.0001 <.0001 
ROE 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.15 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.15 0.0622 0.8217 
ROA 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.4819 0.0188 
EARNINGS (MM$) 34.11 0.10 11.70 47.21 33.03 -1.68 9.01 41.90 0.8172 0.0146 
CFO (MM$) 87.12 4.62 29.55 98.11 101.01 3.61 25.89 102.29 0.0493 0.8230 
# OF OBS 1,754  1,754    
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Table 1.2 Summary Statistics: Extended Sample 
The table presents summary statistics for the extended sample of dual-class firms and matching single-class firms. Panel A shows the results based on year 
and industry matching procedure (Main Control). Panel B presents the results based on year, industry, and size matching procedure (One-to-One Control). 
SHARES is the number of shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year t. SALES is total sales from COMPUSTAT at the end of fiscal year t. MCAP is the 
number of shares outstanding multiplied by fiscal year-end price plus the difference between total assets and total common equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
ASSETS is a firm’s total assets from COMPUSTAT at the end of fiscal year t. SIZE is number of shares outstanding multiplied by price at the end of year t. 
LEVERAGE is the ratio of long term debt to total assets at the end of fiscal year t-1. PASTGROWTH is book-to-market ratio in prior year t-1. 
SALESGROWTH is total sales for fiscal year t scaled by total sales in fiscal year t-1. NOA is net operating asset scaled by sales for fiscal year t-1. DEBT 
RATIO is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. EBIT/ASSETS is earnings before interest and taxes for fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the end of 
fiscal year t-1. BM is the ratio of book value of equity to market value. ROE is return on equity measured as income before extraordinary items in year t 
scaled by total stockholder’s equity in year t. ROA is return on assets measured as earnings before extraordinary items in year t scaled by total assets. 
EARNINGS is net income at the fiscal year-end. CFO is cash flow from operations at fiscal year-end. The p-values for t-test to test the difference between 
means and p-values for Wilcoxon sum rank test to test the difference between medians are given in the last two columns of each panel. MM stands for 
millions. MM$ stands for millions of dollars. 
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Panel A: Extended Sample: Main Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of 
Difference 
between 
Mean  
 
Test of 
Difference 
between 
Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean 
 Diff 
t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank 
test  
SHARES (MM) 44.18 10.35 22.07 50.41 92.85 8.73 22.50 62.51 -48.68 -7.55 <.0001 
SALES (MM$) 1,435.53 252.53 707.50 1,595.13 2,351.08 66.69 296.64 1,297.99 -915.50 -5.22 <.0001 
MCAP (MM$) 2,189.24 248.17 940.37 2,374.54 4,398.78 103.12 463.13 2,194.96 -2,209.50 -6.35 <.0001 
ASSETS (MM$) 1,331.03 213.29 658.93 1,646.82 2,395.21 67.89 291.68 1,323.83 -1,064.20 -6.03 <.0001 
SIZE 5.99 4.72 6.18 7.25 5.66 3.99 5.55 7.17 0.33 5.65 <.0001 
LEVERAGE 0.21 0.08 0.20 0.32 0.21 0.05 0.17 0.31 0.01 1.58 0.1145 
PASTGROWTH 0.79 0.56 0.77 0.99 0.67 0.45 0.66 0.88 0.11 13.91 <.0001 
SALESGROWTH 1.07 0.99 1.06 1.14 1.18 0.99 1.09 1.25 -0.11 -9.73 <.0001 
NOA 0.97 0.61 0.81 1.13 1.06 0.57 0.80 1.16 -0.09 -3.74 0.0002 
DEBT RATIO 0.52 0.39 0.52 0.64 0.53 0.37 0.52 0.67 -0.01 -2.09 0.0363 
EBIT/ASSETS 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.04 8.04 <.0001 
BM 0.80 0.56 0.79 1.01 0.70 0.47 0.68 0.90 0.10 12.29 <.0001 
ROE 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.14 -0.04 -0.05 0.08 0.16 0.10 6.11 <.0001 
ROA 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.17 0.04 8.47 <.0001 
EARNINGS (MM$) 56.37 2.40 20.75 69.19 113.29 -2.82 5.34 49.56 -56.91 -4.57 <.0001 
CFO (MM$) 119.73 10.54 51.55 140.36 236.10 0.78 16.88 116.10 -116.40 -5.9 <.0001 
# OF OBS 1,446  36,411     
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Panel B: Extended Sample: One-to-One Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of 
Difference 
between 
Mean  
 
Test of 
Difference 
between 
Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Media
n 
Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean 
Diff 
t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank 
test  
SHARES (MM) 44.18 10.35 22.07 50.41 63.49 11.49 29.24 60.69 -19.31 -5.16 <.0001 
SALES (MM$) 1,435.53 252.53 707.50 1,595.13 1,687.63 209.83 657.89 1,756.53 -252.10 -2.42 0.0156 
MCAP (MM$) 2,189.24 248.17 940.37 2,374.54 2,397.33 255.82 910.94 2,432.17 -208.10 -1.39 0.1650 
ASSETS (MM$) 1,331.03 213.29 658.93 1,646.82 1,627.57 171.48 575.48 1,488.03 -296.50 -2.95 0.0032 
SIZE 5.99 4.72 6.18 7.25 5.97 4.77 6.15 7.22 0.02 0.27 0.7907 
LEVERAGE 0.21 0.08 0.20 0.32 0.24 0.09 0.22 0.34 -0.02 -3.40 0.0007 
PASTGROWTH 0.79 0.56 0.77 0.99 0.71 0.51 0.69 0.90 0.08 6.99 <.0001 
SALESGROWTH 1.07 0.99 1.06 1.14 1.13 0.98 1.07 1.20 -0.06 -6.30 <.0001 
NOA 0.97 0.61 0.81 1.13 0.92 0.55 0.76 1.03 0.05 2.13 0.0332 
DEBT RATIO 0.52 0.39 0.52 0.64 0.57 0.42 0.56 0.68 -0.05 -6.11 <.0001 
EBIT/ASSETS 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.89 0.3719 
BM 0.80 0.56 0.79 1.01 0.72 0.53 0.71 0.91 0.07 6.47 <.0001 
ROE 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.15 0.06 3.96 <.0001 
ROA 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.00 0.76 0.4480 
EARNINGS (MM$) 56.37 2.40 20.75 69.19 48.71 -0.80 14.65 57.22 7.66 1.20 0.2312 
CFO (MM$) 119.73 10.54 51.55 140.36 131.34 5.70 40.48 133.97 -11.61 -1.31 0.1889 
# OF OBS 1,446  1,446     
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Table 1.3 Summary Statistics: Restricted Sample 
The table presents summary statistics for the restricted sample of dual-class firms and matching single-class firms. Panel A shows the results based on year 
and industry matching procedure (Main Control). Panel B presents the results based on year, industry, and size matching procedure (One-to-One Control). 
SHARES is the number of shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year t. SALES is total sales from COMPUSTAT at the end of fiscal year t. MCAP is the 
number of shares outstanding multiplied by fiscal year-end price plus the difference between total assets and total common equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
TOTAL ASSETS is a firm’s total assets from COMPUSTAT at the end of fiscal year t. SIZE is number of shares outstanding multiplied by price at the end 
of year t. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long term debt to total assets at the end of fiscal year t-1. PASTGROWTH is book-to-market ratio in prior year t-1. 
SALESGROWTH is total sales for fiscal year t scaled by total sales in fiscal year t-1. NOA is net operating asset scaled by sales for fiscal year t-1. DEBT 
RATIO is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. EBIT/ASSETS is earnings before interest and taxes for fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the end of 
fiscal year t-1. BM is the ratio of book value of equity to market value. ROE is return on equity measured as income before extraordinary items in year t 
scaled by total stockholder’s equity in year t. ROA is return on assets measured as earnings before extraordinary items in year t scaled by total assets. 
EARNINGS is net income at the fiscal year-end. CFO is cash flow from operations at fiscal year-end. The p-values for t-test to test the difference between 
means and p-values for Wilcoxon sum rank test to test the difference between medians are given in the last two columns of each panel. MM stands for 
millions. MM$ stands for millions of dollars. 
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Panel A: Restricted Sample: Main Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of 
Difference 
between 
Mean  
 
Test of  
Difference 
between 
Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean 
Diff 
t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank 
test  
SHARES (MM) 49.42 12.69 26.88 56.72 97.22 8.97 23.46 65.28 -47.79 -5.98 <.0001 
SALES (MM$) 1,616.47 353.09 853.97 1,769.10 2,398.74 65.90 295.89 1,306.79 -782.30 -3.70 0.0002 
MCAP (MM$) 2,506.90 349.01 1,198.25 2,799.86 4,607.77 105.04 484.48 2,294.29 -2,100.90 -4.90 <.0001 
ASSETS (MM$) 1,543.38 284.23 813.70 1,883.90 2,488.75 69.00 301.51 1,376.81 -945.40 -4.37 <.0001 
SIZE 6.31 5.15 6.46 7.49 5.71 4.02 5.61 7.22 0.60 8.80 <.0001 
LEVERAGE 0.21 0.09 0.20 0.31 0.21 0.05 0.17 0.31 0.01 0.92 0.3600 
PASTGROWTH 0.77 0.54 0.76 0.96 0.67 0.44 0.66 0.88 0.10 9.87 <.0001 
SALESGROWTH 1.07 0.99 1.06 1.13 1.17 0.98 1.09 1.24 -0.10 -7.68 <.0001 
NOA 1.00 0.62 0.83 1.17 1.09 0.58 0.82 1.19 -0.09 -2.84 0.0045 
DEBT RATIO 0.51 0.39 0.51 0.63 0.53 0.37 0.52 0.67 -0.02 -3.23 0.0013 
EBIT/ASSETS 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.04 7.69 <.0001 
BM 0.77 0.55 0.76 0.97 0.69 0.47 0.68 0.89 0.08 8.32 <.0001 
ROE 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.14 -0.04 -0.05 0.08 0.16 0.11 5.64 <.0001 
ROA 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.17 0.04 7.82 <.0001 
EARNINGS (MM$) 66.31 5.04 29.48 84.38 118.88 -3.13 5.26 50.65 -52.56 -3.36 0.0008 
CFO (MM$) 138.98 18.32 72.52 180.92 246.54 0.82 17.37 121.30 -107.60 -4.42 <.0001 
# OF OBS 1,035 33,098    
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Panel B: Restricted Sample: One-to-One Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of 
Difference 
between 
Mean  
 
Test of 
Difference 
between 
Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean 
 Diff 
t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank 
test  
SHARES (MM) 49.42 12.69 26.88 56.72 73.91 16.92 33.42 74.39 -24.48 -4.96 <.0001 
SALES (MM$) 1,616.47 353.09 853.97 1,769.10 1,994.61 294.09 836.14 2,063.00 -378.10 -2.83 0.0047 
MCAP (MM$) 2,506.90 349.01 1,198.25 2,799.86 2,828.39 391.64 1,121.24 3,139.88 -321.50 -1.71 0.0880 
ASSETS (MM$) 1,543.38 284.23 813.70 1,883.90 1,912.70 274.27 711.17 1,912.89 -369.30 -2.84 0.0046 
SIZE 6.31 5.15 6.46 7.49 6.29 5.13 6.40 7.48 0.02 0.27 0.7852 
LEVERAGE 0.21 0.09 0.20 0.31 0.24 0.10 0.23 0.34 -0.03 -3.77 0.0002 
PASTGROWTH 0.77 0.54 0.76 0.96 0.70 0.51 0.69 0.88 0.07 5.29 <.0001 
SALESGROWTH 1.07 0.99 1.06 1.13 1.13 0.98 1.07 1.20 -0.06 -4.89 <.0001 
NOA 1.00 0.62 0.83 1.17 0.94 0.55 0.77 1.05 0.07 2.27 0.0231 
DEBT RATIO 0.51 0.39 0.51 0.63 0.57 0.43 0.57 0.69 -0.07 -7.39 <.0001 
EBIT/ASSETS 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.89 0.3746 
BM 0.77 0.55 0.76 0.97 0.71 0.52 0.70 0.89 0.06 4.80 <.0001 
ROE 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.16 0.07 3.75 0.0002 
ROA 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.00 0.67 0.5052 
EARNINGS (MM$) 66.31 5.04 29.48 84.38 58.09 -0.48 20.43 73.07 8.22 1.00 0.3179 
CFO (MM$) 138.98 18.32 72.52 180.92 154.42 9.87 53.28 154.86 -15.45 -1.38 0.1670 
# OF OBS 1,035 1,035    
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Table 1.4 Summary Statistics: Unification Sample  
The table presents summary statistics for the unification sample of dual-class firms and matching single-class firms. Panel A shows the results based on year 
and industry matching procedure (Main Control) for the pre-unification period. Panel B presents the results based on year, industry, and size matching 
procedure (One-to-One Control) for the pre-unification period.  Panel C shows the results based on year and industry matching procedure (Main Control) 
and for the post-unification period. Panel D presents the results based on year, industry, and size matching procedure (One-to-One Control) for the post-
unification period.  SHARES is the number of shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year t. SALES is total sales from COMPUSTAT at the end of fiscal 
year t. MCAP is the number of shares outstanding multiplied by fiscal year-end price plus the difference between ASSETS and total common equity at the 
end of fiscal year t. ASSETS is a firm’s total assets from COMPUSTAT at the end of fiscal year t. SIZE is number of shares outstanding multiplied by price 
at the end of year t. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long term debt to total assets at the end of fiscal year t-1. PASTGROWTH is book-to-market ratio in prior 
year t-1. SALESGROWTH is total sales for fiscal year t scaled by total sales in fiscal year t-1. NOA is net operating asset scaled by sales for fiscal year t-1. 
DEBT RATIO is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. EBIT/ASSETS is earnings before interest and taxes for fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the 
end of fiscal year t-1. BM is the ratio of book value of equity to market value. ROE is return on equity measured as income before extraordinary items in 
year t scaled by total stockholder’s equity in year t. ROA is return on assets measured as earnings before extraordinary items in year t scaled by total assets. 
EARNINGS is net income at the fiscal year-end. CFO is cash flow from operations at fiscal year-end. The p-values for t-test to test the difference between 
means and p-values for Wilcoxon sum rank test to test the difference between medians are given in the last two columns of each panel. MM stands for 
millions. MM$ stands for millions of dollars. 
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Panel A: Pre-Unification: Main Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of 
Difference 
between 
Mean  
 
Test of 
Difference 
between 
Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean  
Diff 
t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank test  
SHARES (MM) 43.14 15.12 23.66 39.21 67.16 7.48 16.86 45.62 -24.02 -1.70 0.0886 
SALES (MM$) 1,646.47 167.94 493.22 988.83 1,523.62 43.86 183.75 821.98 122.80 0.35 0.7272 
MCAP (MM$) 2,144.94 279.04 873.98 1,514.59 3,171.78 73.06 287.15 1,356.34 -1,026.80 -1.26 0.2093 
ASSETS (MM$) 1,376.01 149.05 537.57 1,058.74 1,532.28 45.11 171.34 779.28 -156.30 -0.44 0.6600 
SIZE 6.19 5.29 6.29 6.97 5.32 3.72 5.13 6.72 0.87 5.04 <.0001 
LEVERAGE 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.30 0.19 0.03 0.14 0.28 0.00 -0.10 0.9212 
PASTGROWTH 0.60 0.41 0.61 0.83 0.64 0.40 0.62 0.86 -0.04 -1.58 0.1134 
SALESGROWTH 1.22 1.03 1.12 1.28 1.20 0.98 1.10 1.28 0.02 0.55 0.5843 
NOA 1.06 0.52 0.76 1.11 0.96 0.55 0.77 1.08 0.09 1.51 0.1317 
DEBT RATIO 0.49 0.38 0.50 0.61 0.52 0.34 0.51 0.66 -0.03 -1.27 0.2054 
EBIT/ASSETS 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.18 0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.14 0.06 3.41 0.0007 
BM 0.62 0.40 0.60 0.86 0.67 0.43 0.66 0.89 -0.06 -2.10 0.0354 
ROE 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.16 -0.11 -0.10 0.07 0.15 0.11 1.62 0.1052 
ROA 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.21 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.05 3.26 0.0011 
EARNINGS (MM$) 35.67 3.91 18.85 51.89 52.34 -4.25 2.53 27.53 -16.67 -0.83 0.4062 
CFO (MM$) 74.81 1.81 26.51 101.32 134.35 -0.63 7.34 59.62 -59.54 -1.72 0.0853 
# OF OBS 251 15,132     
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Panel B:Pre-Unification: One-to-One Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of 
Diff 
betwee
n Mean 
 
Test of 
 Diff 
between 
Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean 
Diff 
t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank test 
SHARES (MM) 43.14 15.12 23.66 39.21 53.61 14.39 27.25 60.10 -10.47 -1.42 0.1569 
SALES (MM$) 1,646.47 167.94 493.22 988.83 1,316.70 244.84 675.11 1,277.55 329.80 0.82 0.4150 
MCAP (MM$) 2,144.94 279.04 873.98 1,514.59 2,241.52 343.39 969.49 1,861.31 -96.58 -0.20 0.8408 
ASSETS (MM$) 1,376.01 149.05 537.57 1,058.74 1,278.36 188.33 562.37 1,401.35 97.64 0.27 0.7892 
SIZE 6.19 5.29 6.29 6.97 6.18 5.17 6.24 6.95 0.01 0.06 0.9488 
LEVERAGE 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.30 0.22 0.11 0.21 0.34 -0.04 -2.21 0.0277 
PASTGROWTH 0.60 0.41 0.61 0.83 0.64 0.43 0.61 0.86 -0.04 -1.15 0.2494 
SALESGROWTH 1.22 1.03 1.12 1.28 1.23 1.02 1.10 1.28 0.00 -0.04 0.9710 
NOA 1.06 0.52 0.76 1.11 1.09 0.51 0.75 1.16 -0.03 -0.25 0.8001 
DEBT RATIO 0.49 0.38 0.50 0.61 0.55 0.42 0.55 0.70 -0.06 -2.57 0.0106 
EBIT/ASSETS 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.18 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.17 0.01 0.40 0.6889 
BM 0.62 0.40 0.60 0.86 0.66 0.45 0.65 0.88 -0.04 -1.34 0.1797 
ROE 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.17 0.01 0.09 0.9281 
ROA 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.21 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.19 0.00 0.29 0.7750 
EARNINGS (MM$) 35.67 3.91 18.85 51.89 29.10 1.28 16.50 49.74 6.58 0.48 0.6291 
CFO (MM$) 74.81 1.81 26.51 101.32 92.29 9.58 46.12 110.15 -17.47 -0.95 0.3414 
# OF OBS 251 251    
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Panel C: Post -Unification: Main Control 
 UNIFIED 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of 
Diff 
between 
Mean  
 
Test of 
Diff 
between 
Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Media
n 
Q3 Mean 
Diff 
t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank 
test  
SHARES (MM) 126.33 25.97 42.52 120.53 129.92 12.08 30.63 82.96 -3.60 -0.17 0.8649 
SALES (MM$) 2,920.89 433.88 935.97 2,148.02 2,765.41 68.79 326.33 1,548.15 155.50 0.33 0.7429 
MCAP (MM$) 5,705.91 894.12 1,756.99 4,834.22 5,582.02 126.52 586.38 2,918.75 123.90 0.12 0.9012 
ASSETS (MM$) 3,039.42 499.68 1,101.01 2,770.90 3,071.57 78.84 356.70 1,712.41 -32.14 -0.06 0.9510 
SIZE 7.00 6.18 7.10 7.96 5.97 4.31 5.90 7.48 1.03 7.47 <.0001 
LEVERAGE 0.23 0.07 0.16 0.32 0.19 0.03 0.14 0.28 0.04 3.46 0.0005 
PASTGROWTH 0.64 0.45 0.64 0.84 0.65 0.42 0.63 0.86 -0.02 -0.77 0.4442 
SALESGROWTH 1.08 0.98 1.08 1.17 1.15 0.97 1.08 1.22 -0.07 -2.89 0.0039 
NOA 1.24 0.65 0.90 1.22 1.07 0.61 0.85 1.20 0.18 3.24 0.0012 
DEBT RATIO 0.54 0.38 0.52 0.63 0.51 0.34 0.50 0.65 0.03 1.88 0.0600 
EBIT/ASSETS 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.13 0.07 5.48 <.0001 
BM 0.66 0.46 0.65 0.84 0.68 0.45 0.66 0.88 -0.02 -1.09 0.2763 
ROE 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.14 -0.05 -0.08 0.07 0.15 0.08 1.81 0.0702 
ROA 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.06 5.40 <.0001 
EARNINGS (MM$) 89.77 3.85 32.65 103.87 142.17 -6.19 5.07 61.41 -52.41 -1.38 0.1687 
CFO (MM$) 268.75 28.80 103.06 244.70 296.77 0.75 20.69 148.53 -28.02 -0.50 0.6203 
# OF OBS 152 13,502    
 39 
 
 
 
Panel D: Post-Unification: One-to-One Control 
 UNIFIED 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of 
Diff 
between 
Mean  
 
Test of 
Diff 
between 
Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean 
Diff 
t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank 
test  
SHARES (MM) 126.33 25.97 42.52 120.53 170.26 26.81 50.73 125.23 -43.93 -1.65 0.1001 
SALES (MM$) 2,920.89 433.88 935.97 2,148.02 3,011.02 404.82 1,097.09 2,680.30 -90.13 -0.16 0.8692 
MCAP (MM$) 5,705.91 894.12 1,756.99 4,834.22 6,031.78 787.39 1,829.58 4,746.93 -325.90 -0.26 0.7947 
ASSETS (MM$) 3,039.42 499.68 1,101.01 2,770.90 3,400.93 468.49 1,099.69 2,744.20 -361.50 -0.66 0.5104 
SIZE 7.00 6.18 7.10 7.96 7.00 6.14 7.10 7.88 0.00 0.01 0.9957 
LEVERAGE 0.23 0.07 0.16 0.32 0.20 0.05 0.18 0.29 0.03 1.75 0.0809 
PASTGROWTH 0.64 0.45 0.64 0.84 0.63 0.41 0.63 0.82 0.01 0.32 0.7490 
SALESGROWTH 1.08 0.98 1.08 1.17 1.14 1.00 1.09 1.21 -0.06 -2.60 0.0096 
NOA 1.24 0.65 0.90 1.22 1.07 0.58 0.83 1.31 0.18 1.88 0.0612 
DEBT RATIO 0.54 0.38 0.52 0.63 0.52 0.38 0.50 0.64 0.02 1.07 0.2843 
EBIT/ASSETS 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.01 0.99 0.3225 
BM 0.66 0.46 0.65 0.84 0.65 0.46 0.63 0.84 0.00 0.16 0.8735 
ROE 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.14 -0.02 0.01 0.09 0.16 0.04 0.92 0.3586 
ROA 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.01 0.68 0.4967 
EARNINGS (MM$) 89.77 3.85 32.65 103.87 128.29 1.14 38.80 123.55 -38.52 -0.89 0.3750 
CFO (MM$) 268.75 28.80 103.06 244.70 335.21 26.77 88.56 261.20 -66.46 -1.08 0.2788 
# OF OBS 152 152     
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Table 1.5 Univariate Analysis of Accruals: Original Sample 
This table provides the results of univariate analysis of absolute discretionary accruals (ACCRUAL) calculated using four different MJones Models, two 
different DD models, and two McDD models. The p-values for t-test to test the difference between means and p-values for Wilcoxon sum rank test to test the 
difference between medians are given in the last two columns of each panel.  The symbols *, **, and *** stand for statiscial significance based on two-sided 
tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Original Sample: Main Control: MJones Models 
 Dual=1,754 Single=24,070 Test of Difference between Mean 
(Dual-Single) 
Test of Difference between Median 
ACCRUAL Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean Diff t-statistics p –value 
(t-test) 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
(p-value) 
Model 1 0.0620 0.0646 0.0425 0.0801 0.0908 0.0504 -0.0181 -8.20* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 2 0.0624 0.0691 0.0396 0.0820 0.0958 0.0508 -0.0196 -8.42* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 3 0.0628 0.0656 0.0431 0.0809 0.0917 0.0506 -0.0182 -8.15* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 4 0.0574 0.0618 0.0385 0.0769 0.0843 0.0495 -0.0195 -9.50* <.0001 <.0001 
 
Panel B: Original Sample: Main Control: DD and McDD Models 
 Dual=639 Single=7,963 Test of Difference between Mean 
(Dual-Single) 
Test of Difference between Median 
ACCRUAL Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean Diff t-statistics p –value 
(t-test) 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
(p-value) 
Model 5 0.0342 0.0360 0.0236 0.0477 0.0504 0.0316 -0.0135 -6.64* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 6 0.0301 0.0326 0.0199 0.0407 0.0436 0.0269 -0.0107 -6.05* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 7 0.0505 0.0526 0.0340 0.0655 0.0690 0.0432 -0.0150 -5.36* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 8 0.0425 0.0461 0.0289 0.0534 0.0562 0.0353 -0.0109 -4.78* <.0001 <.0001 
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Panel C: Original Sample: One-to-One Control: MJones Models 
 Dual Single Test of Difference between Mean 
(Dual-Single) 
Test of Difference between Median 
ACCRUAL Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean Diff t-statistics p –value 
(t-test) 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
(p-value) 
Model 1 0.0620 0.0646 0.0425 0.0693 0.0808 0.0439 -0.0073 -3.13* 0.0018 0.0329 
Model 2 0.0624 0.0691 0.0396 0.0716 0.0861 0.0446 -0.0091 -3.58* 0.0004 0.0023 
Model 3 0.0628 0.0656 0.0431 0.0700 0.0814 0.0446 -0.0072 -3.07* 0.0022 0.0508 
Model 4 0.0574 0.0618 0.0385 0.0663 0.0728 0.0433 -0.0090 -4.13* 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Panel D: Original Sample: One-to-One Control: DD and McDD mdoels 
 Dual=639 Single=639 Test of Difference between Mean 
(Dual-Single) 
Test of Difference between Median 
ACCRUAL Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean Diff t-statistics p –value 
(t-test) 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
(p-value) 
Model 5 0.0342 0.0360 0.0236 0.0375 0.0394 0.0250 -0.0033 -1.78*** 0.0759 0.1497 
Model 6 0.0301 0.0326 0.0199 0.0324 0.0360 0.0220 -0.0023 -1.39 0.1644 0.4716 
Model 7 0.0505 0.0526 0.0340 0.0579 0.0651 0.0349 -0.0074 -2.49** 0.0131 0.0092 
Model 8 0.0425 0.0461 0.0289 0.0469 0.0558 0.0280 -0.0044 -1.71*** 0.0885 0.1579 
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Table 1.6 Univariate Analysis of Accruals: Extended Sample 
Panel A: Extended Sample: Main Control: MJones Models 
 Dual=1,446 Single=36,411 Test of Difference between Mean 
(Dual-Single) 
Test of Difference between Median 
ACCRUAL Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean Diff t-statistics p –value 
(t-test) 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
(p-value) 
Model 1 0.0512 0.0537 0.0357 0.0743 0.0836 0.0470 -0.0231 -10.42* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 2 0.0519 0.0557 0.0343 0.0765 0.0882 0.0472 -0.0246 -10.52* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 3 0.0515 0.0542 0.0358 0.0749 0.0843 0.0473 -0.0234 -10.49* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 4 0.0487 0.0505 0.0334 0.0715 0.0776 0.0464 -0.0228 -11.09* <.0001 <.0001 
 
Panel B: Extended Sample: Main Control: DD and McDD Models 
 Dual=456 Single=9,106 Test of Difference between Mean 
(Dual-Single) 
Test of Difference between Median 
ACCRUAL Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean Diff t-statistics p –value 
(t-test) 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
(p-value) 
Model 5 0.0296 0.0312 0.0204 0.0461 0.0488 0.0303 -0.0166 -7.19* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 6 0.0265 0.0299 0.0175 0.0400 0.0422 0.0263 -0.0134 -6.72* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 7 0.0447 0.0453 0.0310 0.0626 0.0659 0.0412 -0.0179 -5.72* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 8 0.0379 0.0411 0.0250 0.0517 0.0543 0.0346 -0.0138 -5.35* <.0001 <.0001 
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Panel C: Extended Sample: One-to-One Control: MJones Models 
 Dual=1,446 Single=1,446 Test of Difference between Mean 
(Dual-Single) 
Test of Difference between Median 
ACCRUAL Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean Diff t-statistics p –value 
(t-test) 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
(p-value) 
Model 1 0.0512 0.0537 0.0357 0.0606 0.0653 0.0408 -0.0094 -4.33* 0.0000 0.0001 
Model 2 0.0519 0.0557 0.0343 0.0635 0.0708 0.0414 -0.0116 -5.02* 0.0000 0.0000 
Model 3 0.0515 0.0542 0.0358 0.0609 0.0658 0.0408 -0.0094 -4.29* 0.0000 0.0002 
Model 4 0.0487 0.0505 0.0334 0.0580 0.0593 0.0401 -0.0094 -4.73* 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Panel D: Extended Sample: One-to-One Control: DD and McDD Models 
 Dual=456 Single=456 Test of Difference between Mean 
(Dual-Single) 
Test of Difference between Median 
ACCRUAL Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean Diff t-statistics p –value 
(t-test) 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
(p-value) 
Model 5 0.0296 0.0312 0.0204 0.0344 0.0383 0.0234 -0.0049 -2.25** 0.0247 0.0854 
Model 6 0.0265 0.0299 0.0175 0.0280 0.0321 0.0188 -0.0014 -0.78 0.4364 0.9150 
Model 7 0.0447 0.0453 0.0310 0.0533 0.0591 0.0349 -0.0085 -2.75* 0.0061 0.0152 
Model 8 0.0379 0.0411 0.0250 0.0404 0.0455 0.0252 -0.0025 -1.02 0.3099 0.3636 
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Table 1.7 Univariate Analysis of Accruals: Restricted Sample 
Panel A: Restricted Sample: Main Control: MJones Models 
 Dual=1,035 Single=33.098 Test of Difference between Mean 
(Dual-Single) 
Test of Difference between Median 
ACCRUAL Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean Diff t-statistics p –value 
(t-test) 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
(p-value) 
Model 1 0.0457 0.0474 0.0315 0.0745 0.0841 0.0470 -0.0289 -11.00* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 2 0.0466 0.0491 0.0324 0.0769 0.0889 0.0473 -0.0303 -10.91* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 3 0.0459 0.0480 0.0312 0.0751 0.0847 0.0473 -0.0292 -11.04* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 4 0.0428 0.0439 0.0282 0.0716 0.0777 0.0464 -0.0288 -11.88* <.0001 <.0001 
 
Panel B: Restricted Sample: Main Control: DD and McDD Models 
 Dual=305 Single=7,345 Test of Difference between Mean 
(Dual-Single) 
Test of Difference between Median 
ACCRUAL Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean Diff t-statistics p –value 
(t-test) 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
(p-value) 
Model 5 0.0253 0.0277 0.0170 0.0449 0.0475 0.0298 -0.0196 -7.16* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 6 0.0214 0.0246 0.0147 0.0390 0.0417 0.0255 -0.0176 -7.32* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 7 0.0395 0.0455 0.0261 0.0610 0.0641 0.0402 -0.0215 -5.79* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 8 0.0322 0.0407 0.0198 0.0508 0.0535 0.0339 -0.0186 -5.98* <.0001 <.0001 
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Panel C: Restricted Sample: One-to-One Control: MJones Models 
 Dual=1,035 Single=1,035 Test of Difference between Mean 
(Dual-Single) 
Test of Difference between Median 
ACCRUAL Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean Diff t-statistics p –value 
(t-test) 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
(p-value) 
Model 1 0.0457 0.0474 0.0315 0.0578 0.0631 0.0377 -0.0121 -5.03* 0.0000 0.0000 
Model 2 0.0466 0.0491 0.0324 0.0606 0.0674 0.0396 -0.0140 -5.47* 0.0000 0.0000 
Model 3 0.0459 0.0480 0.0312 0.0583 0.0639 0.0385 -0.0124 -5.08* 0.0000 0.0000 
Model 4 0.0428 0.0439 0.0282 0.0557 0.0579 0.0392 -0.0129 -5.83* 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Panel D: Restricted Sample: One-to-One Control: DD and McDD Models 
 Dual=305 Single=305 Test of Difference between Mean 
(Dual-Single) 
Test of Difference between Median 
ACCRUAL Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean Diff t-statistics p –value 
(t-test) 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
(p-value) 
Model 5 0.0253 0.0277 0.0170 0.0308 0.0319 0.0224 -0.0055 -2.58** 0.0104 0.0151 
Model 6 0.0214 0.0246 0.0147 0.0251 0.0294 0.0168 -0.0037 -1.87*** 0.0626 0.2172 
Model 7 0.0395 0.0455 0.0261 0.0474 0.0533 0.0330 -0.0078 -2.21** 0.0279 0.0120 
Model 8 0.0322 0.0407 0.0198 0.0372 0.0448 0.0233 -0.0050 -1.74*** 0.0829 0.0956 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 
 
Table 1.8 Univariate Analysis of Accruals: Unification Sample 
Panel A: Pre-Unification: Main Control: MJones Models 
 Dual=251 Single=15,132 Test of Difference between Mean 
(Dual-Single) 
Test of Difference between Median 
ACCRUAL Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean Diff t-statistics p –value 
(t-test) 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
(p-value) 
Model 1 0.0457 0.0441 0.0324 0.0753 0.0881 0.0471 -0.0297 -5.32* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 2 0.0478 0.0440 0.0336 0.0786 0.0954 0.0475 -0.0308 -5.11* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 3 0.0456 0.0445 0.0318 0.0758 0.0884 0.0475 -0.0302 -5.40* <.0001 <.0001 
Model 4 0.0444 0.0455 0.0308 0.0718 0.0778 0.0472 -0.0273 -5.55* <.0001 <.0001 
 
Panel B: Post-Unification: Main Control: MJones Models 
 Dual=152 Single=13,502 Test of Difference between Mean 
(Dual-Single) 
Test of Difference between Median 
ACCRUAL Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean Diff t-statistics p –value 
(t-test) 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
(p-value) 
Model 1 0.0688 0.0778 0.0451 0.0777 0.0648 0.0563 -0.0088 -1.67*** 0.0956 0.0080 
Model 2 0.0696 0.0790 0.0439 0.0785 0.0671 0.0559 -0.0089 -1.63 0.1042 0.0121 
Model 3 0.0689 0.0786 0.0443 0.0785 0.0658 0.0568 -0.0096 -1.78*** 0.0755 0.0041 
Model 4 0.0635 0.0715 0.0425 0.0768 0.0636 0.0558 -0.0133 -2.56** 0.0104 0.0012 
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Panel C: Pre-Unification: One-to-One Control: MJones Models 
 Dual=251 Single=251 Test of Difference between Mean 
(Dual-Single) 
Test of Difference between Median 
ACCRUAL Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean Diff t-statistics p –value 
(t-test) 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
(p-value) 
Model 1 0.0457 0.0441 0.0324 0.0593 0.0734 0.0337 -0.0137 -2.70* 0.0074 0.1344 
Model 2 0.0478 0.0440 0.0336 0.0680 0.0879 0.0370 -0.0202 -3.56* 0.0004 0.0180 
Model 3 0.0456 0.0445 0.0318 0.0597 0.0749 0.0335 -0.0141 -2.73* 0.0068 0.1202 
Model 4 0.0444 0.0455 0.0308 0.0535 0.0637 0.0335 -0.0091 -1.97** 0.0499 0.3019 
 
Panel D: Post-Unification: One-to-One Control: MJones Models 
 Dual=152 Single=152 Test of Difference between Mean 
(Dual-Single) 
Test of Difference between Median 
ACCRUAL Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean Diff t-statistics p –value 
(t-test) 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
(p-value) 
Model 1 0.0688 0.0778 0.0451 0.0692 0.0618 0.0467 -0.0004 -0.05 0.9584 0.4559 
Model 2 0.0696 0.0790 0.0439 0.0690 0.0651 0.0418 0.0006 0.07 0.9432 0.6327 
Model 3 0.0689 0.0786 0.0443 0.0699 0.0619 0.0485 -0.0009 -0.12 0.9009 0.3405 
Model 4 0.0635 0.0715 0.0425 0.0679 0.0590 0.0465 -0.0044 -0.64 0.5202 0.1628 
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Panel E: Difference-in-Differences Approach: Unification Sample: One-to-One Control: MJones Models 
  Dual (Unified) Single Diff (Single-Dual) 
Model 1 Pre-Unification 0.0457 0.0593 0.0137* 
(0.0074) 
 Post-Unification 0.0688 0.0692 0.0004 
(0.9584) 
 Diff (Post-Pre) 0.0232* 
(0.0002) 
0.0099 
(0.1655) 
-0.0133 
(0.1287) 
 
Model 2 Pre-Unification 0.0478 0.0680 0.0202* 
(0.0004) 
 Post-Unification 0.0696 0.0690 -0.0006 
(0.9432) 
 Diff (Post-Pre) 0.0218* 
(0.0004) 
0.00104 
(0.8999) 
-0.0207** 
(0.0318) 
 
Model 3 Pre-Unification 0.0456 0.0597 0.0141* 
(0.0068) 
 Post-Unification 0.0689 0.0699 0.0009 
(0.9009) 
 Diff (Post-Pre) 0.0233* 
(0.0002) 
0.0102 
(0.1592) 
-0.0131 
(0.1397) 
 
Model 4 Pre-Unification 0.0444 0.0535 0.0091** 
(0.0499) 
 Post-Unification 0.0635 0.0679 0.0044 
(0.5202) 
 Diff (Post-Pre) 0.0191* 
(0.0011) 
0.0144** 
(0.0244) 
-0.0047 
(0.5552) 
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Table 1.9 Regression Analysis: Original Sample 
This table presents the results of the following two models: 
0 1 2 3 4 1
5 6 7
( ) /it it it it it it
it it it
ACCRUAL Ln TotalAssets DebtRatio BM EBIT Assets
Salesgrowth DUAL Loss
α α α α α
α α α ε
−
= + + + + +
+ + + +
                                                                                        (1) 
0 1 2 3 4 1
5 1 5 6 7
( ) /
/
it it it it it it
it it it it it
ACCRUAL Ln TotalAssets DebtRatio BM EBIT Assets
CAPX Assets Salesgrowth DUAL Loss
α α α α α
α α α α ε
−
−
= + + + + +
+ + + + +
                                                                                        (2)  
Where dependent variables are the measures of discretionary accruals using MJones models, DD models, and McDD models. The control variables are 
ln(Total Assets), Debt Ratio, BM, EBIT/Assets, Salesgrowth, Loss and a dummy variable, DUAL. Ln(Total Assets) is a natural log of firm’s total assets 
from COMPUSTAT at the end of fiscal year t. Debt Ratio  is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. BM is the ratio of book value of equity to market 
value. EBIT/ASSETS is earnings before interest and taxes for fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the end of fiscal year t-1. SALESGROWTH is total sales 
for fiscal year t scaled by total sales in fiscal year t-1. Loss is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if earnings are negative and zero otherwise. DUAL is 
equal to 1 for a dual-class firm, and is equal to 0, otherwise. The symbols *, **, and *** stand for statiscial significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  level, 
respectively. 
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Panel A: Original Sample: Main Control: MJones Models :Regression #1 
Regression 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1146* 39.66 <.0001 0.1214* 39.95 <.0001 0.1185* 40.62 <.0001 0.1237* 45.70 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0078* -28.13 <.0001 -0.0077* -26.61 <.0001 -0.0082* -29.30 <.0001 -0.0081* -31.24 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0268* 11.75 <.0001 0.0285* 11.91 <.0001 0.0271* 11.79 <.0001 0.0200* 9.36 <.0001 
BM -0.0363* -22.41 <.0001 -0.0347* -20.38 <.0001 -0.0372* -22.76 <.0001 -0.0376* -24.79 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets -0.0992* -27.11 <.0001 -0.0981* -25.51 <.0001 -0.0965* -26.15 <.0001 -0.0596* -17.39 <.0001 
Salesgrowth 0.0290* 24.86 <.0001 0.0289* 23.61 <.0001 0.0288* 24.47 <.0001 0.0250* 22.94 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0045** -2.23 0.0256 -0.0054** -2.55 0.0107 -0.0043** -2.11 0.0348 -0.0067* -3.52 0.0004 
Loss -0.0151* -10.49 <.0001 -0.0255* -16.80 <.0001 -0.0156* -10.73 <.0001 -0.0200* -14.80 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.1713 0.1778 0.1712 0.1586 
# Obs 25,824 
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Panel B: Original Sample: One-to-One Control: MJones Models :Regression #1 
Regression 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1098* 13.93 <.0001 0.1148* 13.86 <.0001 0.1148* 14.38 <.0001 0.1184* 16.17 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0074* -9.01 <.0001 -0.0072* -8.40 <.0001 -0.0077* -9.34 <.0001 -0.0079* -10.46 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0152* 2.71 0.0068 0.0219* 3.71 0.0002 0.0149* 2.61 0.0090 0.0132** 2.54 0.0112 
BM -0.0394* -10.34 <.0001 -0.0406* -10.14 <.0001 -0.0404* -10.48 <.0001 -0.0385* -10.91 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets -0.0877* -8.09 <.0001 -0.0971* -8.53 <.0001 -0.0819* -7.46 <.0001 -0.0533* -5.30 <.0001 
Salesgrowth 0.0371* 11.68 <.0001 0.0378* 11.31 <.0001 0.0363* 11.29 <.0001 0.0288* 9.76 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0017 -0.72 0.4707 -0.0024 -0.95 0.3428 -0.0016 -0.67 0.5051 -0.0038*** -1.70 0.0892 
Loss -0.0178* -5.17 <.0001 -0.0276* -7.62 <.0001 -0.0187* -5.36 <.0001 -0.0186* -5.83 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.1548 0.1720 0.1518 0.1425 
# Obs 3,321 
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Panel C: Original Sample: Main Control: DD and McDD Models: Regression #1 
Regression 1 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.0873* 31.16 <.0001 0.0719* 29.41 <.0001 0.0836* 21.40 <.0001 0.0663* 20.62 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0065* -23.57 <.0001 -0.0050* -21.07 <.0001 -0.0069* -17.99 <.0001 -0.0050* -15.87 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0088* 3.85 0.0001 0.0084* 4.19 <.0001 0.0214* 6.68 <.0001 0.0176* 6.71 <.0001 
BM -0.0260* -16.31 <.0001 -0.0222* -15.98 <.0001 -0.0216* -9.71 <.0001 -0.0154* -8.45 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets -0.0048 -1.38 0.1684 -0.0189* -6.25 <.0001 0.0093*** 1.92 0.0550 -0.0243* -6.12 <.0001 
Salesgrowth 0.0126* 10.78 <.0001 0.0092* 9.01 <.0001 0.0287* 17.57 <.0001 0.0181* 13.47 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0048** -2.53 0.0115 -0.0035** -2.10 0.0356 -0.0049*** -1.83 0.0667 -0.0032 -1.47 0.1424 
Loss -0.0105* -7.33 <.0001 -0.0055* -4.44 <.0001 -0.0189* -9.45 <.0001 -0.0083* -5.06 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.1435 0.1326 0.1167 0.1017 
# Obs 8,602 
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Panel D: Original Sample: Main Control: DD and McDD Models: Regression #2 
Regression 2 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.0889* 31.28 <.0001 0.0734* 29.58 <.0001 0.0846* 21.37 <.0001 0.0671* 20.58 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0066* -23.73 <.0001 -0.0051* -21.17 <.0001 -0.0070* -18.23 <.0001 -0.0051* -16.08 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0088* 3.81 0.0001 0.0083* 4.10 <.0001 0.0214* 6.67 <.0001 0.0176* 6.65 <.0001 
BM -0.0266* -16.49 <.0001 -0.0228* -16.22 <.0001 -0.0218* -9.67 <.0001 -0.0157* -8.46 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets -0.0043 -1.23 0.2202 -0.0189* -6.24 <.0001 0.0109** 2.25 0.0246 -0.0236* -5.90 <.0001 
CAPX/Assets -0.0157** -2.57 0.0101 -0.0177* -3.31 0.0009 -0.0042 -0.49 0.6252 -0.0036 -0.52 0.6064 
Salesgrowth 0.0130* 10.92 <.0001 0.0097* 9.33 <.0001 0.0288* 17.30 <.0001 0.0183* 13.32 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0046** -2.41 0.0160 -0.0035** -2.09 0.0364 -0.0051*** -1.89 0.0582 -0.0034 -1.52 0.1275 
Loss -0.0104* -7.19 <.0001 -0.0053* -4.23 <.0001 -0.0190* -9.45 <.0001 -0.0083* -5.02 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.1448 0.1343 0.1178 0.1027 
# Obs 8,507 
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Panel E: Original Sample: One-to-One Control: DD and McDD Models: Regression #1 
Regression 1 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.0711* 10.34 <.0001 0.0560* 8.88 <.0001 0.0541* 5.04 <.0001 0.0329* 3.53 0.0004 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0056* -7.62 <.0001 -0.0045* -6.68 <.0001 -0.0063* -5.50 <.0001 -0.0046* -4.60 <.0001 
Debt Ratio -0.0072 -1.41 0.1581 -0.0007 -0.14 0.8855 0.0189** 2.38 0.0174 0.0252* 3.67 0.0003 
BM -0.0156* -4.69 <.0001 -0.0166* -5.44 <.0001 -0.0160* -3.07 0.0022 -0.0135* -3.00 0.0028 
EBIT/Assets 0.0003 0.03 0.9749 -0.0218** -2.47 0.0138 -0.0115 -0.76 0.4464 -0.0567* -4.34 <.0001 
Salesgrowth 0.0177* 5.88 <.0001 0.0158* 5.72 <.0001 0.0457* 9.70 <.0001 0.0361* 8.83 <.0001 
DUAL 0.0002 0.08 0.9348 0.0010 0.53 0.5929 -0.0017 -0.52 0.6016 0.0003 0.11 0.9091 
Loss -0.0103* -3.33 0.0009 -0.0038 -1.35 0.1777 -0.0157* -3.25 0.0012 -0.0024 -0.56 0.5750 
Adj R-Sq 0.1289 0.1137 0.1316 0.1184 
# Obs 1,218 
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Panel F: Original Sample: One-to-One Control: DD and McDD Models: Regression #2 
Regression 2 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.0786* 7.76 <.0001 0.0665* 7.12 <.0001 0.0714* 4.71 <.0001 0.0460* 3.70 0.0002 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0049* -4.12 <.0001 -0.0041* -3.74 0.0002 -0.0061* -3.44 0.0006 -0.0050* -3.41 0.0007 
Debt Ratio -0.0122 -1.61 0.1076 -0.0081 -1.16 0.2448 0.0293* 2.59 0.0097 0.0291* 3.13 0.0018 
BM -0.0231* -4.86 <.0001 -0.0221* -5.04 <.0001 -0.0294* -4.13 <.0001 -0.0240* -4.11 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets 0.0061 0.44 0.6577 -0.0181 -1.43 0.1526 -0.0059 -0.29 0.7734 -0.0419** -2.49 0.0131 
CAPX/Assets -0.0511** -2.24 0.0257 -0.0619* -2.94 0.0035 -0.0659** -1.93 0.0544 -0.0905* -3.22 0.0013 
Salesgrowth 0.0204* 4.25 <.0001 0.0170* 3.86 0.0001 0.0440* 6.14 <.0001 0.0414* 7.03 <.0001 
DUAL 0.0007 0.22 0.8295 0.0010 0.34 0.7335 -0.0066 -1.33 0.1825 -0.0042 -1.05 0.2958 
Loss -0.0102** -2.19 0.0291 -0.0031 -0.71 0.4803 -0.0180** -2.56 0.0106 -0.0070 -1.22 0.2237 
Adj R-Sq 0.1307 0.1246 0.1408 0.1748 
# Obs 627 
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Table 1.10 Regression Analysis: Extended Sample 
Panel A: Extended Sample: Main Control: MJones Models: Regression #1 
Regression 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1055* 45.90 <.0001 0.1151* 47.75 <.0001 0.1088* 46.95 <.0001 0.1122* 52.30 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0076* -36.58 <.0001 -0.0076* -35.15 <.0001 -0.0079* -37.83 <.0001 -0.0078* -40.14 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0273* 15.85 <.0001 0.0283* 15.62 <.0001 0.0274* 15.77 <.0001 0.0202* 12.55 <.0001 
BM -0.0275* -21.20 <.0001 -0.0272* -19.99 <.0001 -0.0282* -21.52 <.0001 -0.0297* -24.49 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets -0.0767* -26.17 <.0001 -0.0725* -23.59 <.0001 -0.0746* -25.25 <.0001 -0.0459* -16.80 <.0001 
Salesgrowth 0.0289* 29.50 <.0001 0.0286* 27.84 <.0001 0.0287* 29.09 <.0001 0.0260* 28.43 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0070* -3.43 0.0006 -0.0071* -3.33 0.0009 -0.0071* -3.47 0.0005 -0.0077* -4.03 <.0001 
Loss -0.0187* -16.77 <.0001 -0.0297* -25.41 <.0001 -0.0192* -17.04 <.0001 -0.0207* -19.88 <.0001 
R-Square 0.1633 0.1736 0.1638 0.1541 
# Obs 37,857 
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Panel B: Extended Sample: Main Control: MJones Models: Regression #2 
Regression 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1023* 35.32 <.0001 0.1119* 36.79 <.0001 0.1061* 36.40 <.0001 0.1118* 41.50 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0077* -29.27 <.0001 -0.0075* -27.38 <.0001 -0.0080* -30.37 <.0001 -0.0080* -32.76 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0305* 14.01 <.0001 0.0319* 14.00 <.0001 0.0308* 14.07 <.0001 0.0232* 11.45 <.0001 
BM -0.0265* -15.72 <.0001 -0.0265* -14.96 <.0001 -0.0273* -16.07 <.0001 -0.0293* -18.69 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets -0.0711* -19.92 <.0001 -0.0661* -17.64 <.0001 -0.0690* -19.20 <.0001 -0.0432* -13.01 <.0001 
CAPX/Assets 0.0442* 5.69 <.0001 0.0330* 4.05 <.0001 0.0407* 5.20 <.0001 0.0340* 4.70 <.0001 
Salesgrowth 0.0277* 21.21 <.0001 0.0276* 20.18 <.0001 0.0272* 20.75 <.0001 0.0246* 20.24 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0084* -2.85 0.0044 -0.0081* -2.61 0.0089 -0.0084* -2.83 0.0046 -0.0094* -3.43 0.0006 
Loss -0.0190* -13.19 <.0001 -0.0311* -20.61 <.0001 -0.0194* -13.36 <.0001 -0.0207* -15.43 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.1674 0.1767 0.1678 0.1605 
# Obs 24,530 
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Panel C: Extended Sample: One-to-One Control: MJones Models: Regression #1 
Regression 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1132* 13.46 <.0001 0.1259* 14.30 <.0001 0.1170* 13.81 <.0001 0.1138* 14.76 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0071* -9.27 <.0001 -0.0073* -9.17 <.0001 -0.0073* -9.47 <.0001 -0.0070* -10.03 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0062 1.12 0.2639 0.0130** 2.24 0.0253 0.0053 0.94 0.3448 0.0013 0.25 0.8059 
BM -0.0231* -6.05 <.0001 -0.0275* -6.87 <.0001 -0.0237* -6.17 <.0001 -0.0246* -7.03 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets 0.0085 0.67 0.5035 0.0007 0.06 0.9560 0.0125 0.97 0.3298 -0.0046 -0.40 0.6914 
Salesgrowth 0.0210* 5.02 <.0001 0.0202* 4.61 <.0001 0.0200* 4.76 <.0001 0.0204* 5.32 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0022 -0.99 0.3207 -0.0026 -1.12 0.2618 -0.0023 -1.00 0.3170 -0.0029 -1.41 0.1597 
Loss -0.0278* -8.35 <.0001 -0.0379* -10.87 <.0001 -0.0284* -8.45 <.0001 -0.0244* -7.98 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.0927 0.1179 0.0935 0.1061 
# Obs 2,766 
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Panel D: Extended Sample: One-to-One Control: MJones Models: Regression #2 
Regression 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1305* 10.89 <.0001 0.1369* 10.81 <.0001 0.1330* 10.99 <.0001 0.1218* 10.86 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0074* -6.35 <.0001 -0.0074* -6.03 <.0001 -0.0078* -6.67 <.0001 -0.0074* -6.81 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0011 0.13 0.8965 0.0146 1.63 0.1025 0.0021 0.25 0.8047 0.0001 0.01 0.9915 
BM -0.0296* -5.63 <.0001 -0.0347* -6.23 <.0001 -0.0306* -5.76 <.0001 -0.0303* -6.16 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets 0.0469* 2.82 0.0049 0.0305*** 1.73 0.0831 0.0475* 2.83 0.0048 0.0269*** 1.73 0.0839 
CAPX/Assets -0.1052* -3.43 0.0006 -0.0826** -2.55 0.0108 -0.1099* -3.55 0.0004 -0.0864* -3.02 0.0026 
Salesgrowth 0.0233* 3.97 <.0001 0.0237* 3.82 0.0001 0.0243* 4.09 <.0001 0.0286* 5.20 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0064*** -1.94 0.0529 -0.0050 -1.43 0.1527 -0.0064*** -1.91 0.0561 -0.0072** -2.33 0.0201 
Loss -0.0336* -6.96 <.0001 -0.0450* -8.80 <.0001 -0.0334* -6.85 <.0001 -0.0294* -6.50 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.1141 0.1365 0.1176 0.1332 
# Obs 1,443 
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Panel E: Extended Sample: Main Control: DD and McDD Models: Regression #1 
Regression 1 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.0825* 31.71 <.0001 0.0685* 30.18 <.0001 0.0834* 23.24 <.0001 0.0656* 21.96 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0066* -26.57 <.0001 -0.0052* -24.04 <.0001 -0.0073* -21.49 <.0001 -0.0053* -18.77 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0109* 5.30 <.0001 0.0107* 5.95 <.0001 0.0194* 6.84 <.0001 0.0166* 7.01 <.0001 
BM -0.0239* -16.20 <.0001 -0.0202* -15.69 <.0001 -0.0181* -8.92 <.0001 -0.0125* -7.37 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets -0.0074** -2.33 0.0199 -0.0173* -6.21 <.0001 0.0101** 2.29 0.0223 -0.0182* -4.97 <.0001 
Salesgrowth 0.0138* 12.17 <.0001 0.0102* 10.31 <.0001 0.0274* 17.56 <.0001 0.0182* 14.00 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0063* -2.96 0.0031 -0.0049* -2.64 0.0083 -0.0057*** -1.93 0.0532 -0.0043*** -1.76 0.0778 
Loss -0.0096* -7.25 <.0001 -0.0056* -4.89 <.0001 -0.0179* -9.79 <.0001 -0.0090* -5.93 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.1541 0.1417 0.1200 0.1049 
# Obs 9,562 
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Panel F: Extended Sample: Main Control: DD and McDD Models: Regression #2 
Regression 2 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.0849* 26.42 <.0001 0.0730* 26.02 <.0001 0.0914* 21.15 <.0001 0.0724* 20.05 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0070* -22.64 <.0001 -0.0058* -21.32 <.0001 -0.0076* -18.28 <.0001 -0.0059* -17.03 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0143* 5.56 <.0001 0.0138* 6.11 <.0001 0.0242* 6.97 <.0001 0.0208* 7.18 <.0001 
BM -0.0255* -13.09 <.0001 -0.0218* -12.83 <.0001 -0.0205* -7.83 <.0001 -0.0156* -7.14 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets -0.0108* -2.82 0.0049 -0.0178* -5.32 <.0001 0.0090*** 1.75 0.0802 -0.0144* -3.35 0.0008 
CAPX/Assets 0.0249* 2.90 0.0038 0.0153** 2.04 0.0417 0.0377* 3.25 0.0012 0.0228** 2.35 0.0187 
Salesgrowth 0.0113* 8.10 <.0001 0.0080* 6.56 <.0001 0.0192* 10.24 <.0001 0.0146* 9.32 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0028 -0.87 0.3830 -0.0025 -0.89 0.3713 -0.0047 -1.08 0.2788 -0.0068*** -1.88 0.0603 
Loss -0.0066* -3.96 <.0001 -0.0034** -2.33 0.0196 -0.0164* -7.34 <.0001 -0.0085* -4.55 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.1593 0.1504 0.1156 0.1143 
# Obs 6,519 
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Panel G: Extended Sample: One-to-One Control: DD and McDD Models: Reg #1 
Regression 1 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.0617* 7.11 <.0001 0.0605* 7.66 <.0001 0.0530* 4.00 <.0001 0.0476* 4.25 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0058* -6.83 <.0001 -0.0051* -6.60 <.0001 -0.0076* -5.86 <.0001 -0.0059* -5.38 <.0001 
Debt Ratio -0.0060 -1.02 0.3088 0.0022 0.40 0.6859 0.0171*** 1.91 0.0571 0.0213* 2.80 0.0052 
BM -0.0081** -2.12 0.0346 -0.0113* -3.24 0.0013 -0.0056 -0.96 0.3374 -0.0048 -0.98 0.3288 
EBIT/Assets 0.0502* 3.97 <.0001 0.0284** 2.47 0.0136 0.0630* 3.27 0.0011 0.0221 1.36 0.1753 
Salesgrowth 0.0216* 5.18 <.0001 0.0093** 2.45 0.0146 0.0444* 6.98 <.0001 0.0240* 4.46 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0021 -0.95 0.3446 0.0013 0.61 0.5411 -0.0039 -1.14 0.2541 0.0011 0.36 0.7162 
Loss -0.0167* -4.51 <.0001 -0.0113* -3.36 0.0008 -0.0203* -3.59 0.0003 -0.0121** -2.52 0.0118 
Adj R-Sq 0.1401 0.0871 0.1254 0.0690 
# Obs 880 
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Panel H: Extended Sample: One-to-One Control: DD and McDD Models: Reg #2 
Regression 2 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.0677* 5.05 <.0001 0.0877* 7.25 <.0001 0.0852* 4.28 <.0001 0.0817* 5.10 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0051* -3.66 0.0003 -0.0049* -3.88 0.0001 -0.0096* -4.65 <.0001 -0.0068* -4.09 <.0001 
Debt Ratio -0.0162 -1.61 0.1072 -0.0128 -1.42 0.1572 0.0276*** 1.85 0.0648 0.0122 1.01 0.3111 
BM -0.0130** -2.31 0.0212 -0.0191* -3.79 0.0002 -0.0189** -2.28 0.0232 -0.0152** -2.27 0.0234 
EBIT/Assets 0.0727* 3.96 <.0001 0.0418** 2.53 0.0117 0.0814* 2.99 0.0029 0.0461** 2.10 0.0362 
CAPX/Assets -0.0700** -2.19 0.0290 -0.0839* -2.91 0.0038 -0.0457 -0.96 0.3352 -0.0935** -2.45 0.0147 
Salesgrowth 0.0273* 3.99 <.0001 0.0017 0.27 0.7855 0.0356* 3.52 0.0005 0.0183** 2.23 0.0260 
DUAL -0.0044 -1.16 0.2465 0.0013 0.37 0.7121 -0.0096*** -1.72 0.0870 -0.0046 -1.02 0.3097 
Loss -0.0183* -3.27 0.0011 -0.0125** -2.48 0.0136 -0.0171** -2.06 0.0399 -0.0163** -2.45 0.0148 
Adj R-Sq 0.1486 0.1037 0.1151 0.0839 
# Obs  446 
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Table 1.11 Regression Analysis: Restricted Sample 
Panel A: Restricted Sample: Main Control: MJones Models: Regression #1 
Regression 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1037* 42.86 <.0001 0.1137* 44.72 <.0001 0.1069* 43.86 <.0001 0.1114* 49.51 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0074* -33.77 <.0001 -0.0075* -32.38 <.0001 -0.0077* -34.96 <.0001 -0.0076* -37.47 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0272* 14.99 <.0001 0.0281* 14.75 <.0001 0.0272* 14.90 <.0001 0.0198* 11.72 <.0001 
BM -0.0258* -18.84 <.0001 -0.0255* -17.71 <.0001 -0.0264* -19.14 <.0001 -0.0285* -22.37 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets -0.0780* -25.51 <.0001 -0.0734* -22.85 <.0001 -0.0758* -24.62 <.0001 -0.0452* -15.89 <.0001 
Salesgrowth 0.0288* 28.14 <.0001 0.0285* 26.46 <.0001 0.0287* 27.80 <.0001 0.0257* 26.97 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0109* -4.51 <.0001 -0.0105* -4.14 <.0001 -0.0110* -4.50 <.0001 -0.0120* -5.33 <.0001 
Loss -0.0186* -15.77 <.0001 -0.0300* -24.28 <.0001 -0.0191* -16.05 <.0001 -0.0207* -18.89 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.1626 0.1729 0.1631 0.1521 
# Obs 34,133 
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Panel B: Restricted Sample: Main Control: MJones Models: Regression #2 
Regression 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1001* 33.04 <.0001 0.1098* 34.45 <.0001 0.1038* 34.03 <.0001 0.1105* 39.35 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0074* -26.86 <.0001 -0.0073* -24.96 <.0001 -0.0078* -27.92 <.0001 -0.0078* -30.46 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0295* 12.99 <.0001 0.0309* 12.92 <.0001 0.0298* 13.05 <.0001 0.0220* 10.46 <.0001 
BM -0.0246* -13.86 <.0001 -0.0244* -13.11 <.0001 -0.0253* -14.18 <.0001 -0.0279* -17.00 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets -0.0739* -19.95 <.0001 -0.0688* -17.68 <.0001 -0.0718* -19.26 <.0001 -0.0443* -12.92 <.0001 
CAPX/Assets 0.0505* 6.15 <.0001 0.0386* 4.47 <.0001 0.0478* 5.78 <.0001 0.0399* 5.24 <.0001 
Salesgrowth 0.02718* 20.01 <.0001 0.0270* 19.00 <.0001 0.0267* 19.61 <.0001 0.0238* 19.00 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0139* -3.98 <.0001 -0.0135* -3.68 0.0002 -0.0139* -3.94 <.0001 -0.0150* -4.63 <.0001 
Loss -0.0184* -12.17 <.0001 -0.0310* -19.49 <.0001 -0.0188* -12.35 <.0001 -0.0201* -14.38 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.1665 0.1758 0.1669 0.1583 
# Obs 22,289 
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Panel C: Restricted Sample: One-to-One Control: MJones Models: Regression #1 
Regression 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1133 11.97 <.0001 0.1219 12.38 <.0001 0.1170 12.21 <.0001 0.1149 13.15 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0063 -7.20 <.0001 -0.0067 -7.36 <.0001 -0.0066 -7.55 <.0001 -0.0065 -8.08 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0038 0.59 0.5521 0.0115 1.74 0.0812 0.0032 0.50 0.6191 0.0016 0.27 0.7864 
BM -0.0219 -5.07 <.0001 -0.0219 -4.87 <.0001 -0.0219 -5.00 <.0001 -0.0273 -6.84 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets 0.0127 0.88 0.3816 0.0089 0.59 0.5525 0.0194 1.32 0.1855 -0.0179 -1.34 0.1790 
Salesgrowth 0.0164 3.48 0.0005 0.0165 3.36 0.0008 0.0161 3.36 0.0008 0.0163 3.74 0.0002 
DUAL -0.0054 -2.21 0.0274 -0.0055 -2.16 0.0307 -0.0058 -2.32 0.0202 -0.0073 -3.21 0.0014 
Loss -0.0290 -7.78 <.0001 -0.0391 -10.08 <.0001 -0.0297 -7.86 <.0001 -0.0207 -6.00 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.0937 0.1208 0.0954 0.1098 
# Obs 1,999 
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Panel D: Restricted Sample: One-to-One Control: MJones Models: Regression #2 
Regression 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1224 9.23 <.0001 0.12667 9.16 <.0001 0.1241 9.24 <.0001 0.1171 9.27 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0063 -4.98 <.0001 -0.00645 -4.86 <.0001 -0.0069 -5.34 <.0001 -0.0061 -5.06 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0005 0.05 0.9617 0.0096 0.97 0.3319 0.0022 0.23 0.8201 -0.0023 -0.25 0.7990 
BM -0.0282 -4.76 <.0001 -0.02751 -4.44 <.0001 -0.0288 -4.78 <.0001 -0.0316 -5.60 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets 0.0421 2.22 0.0265 0.0329 1.66 0.0964 0.0446 2.32 0.0205 -0.0022 -0.12 0.9015 
CAPX/Assets -0.0722 -2.19 0.029 -0.04883 -1.42 0.1564 -0.0756 -2.26 0.0240 -0.0618 -1.97 0.0495 
Salesgrowth 0.0200 3.15 0.0017 0.01952 2.94 0.0033 0.0218 3.39 0.0007 0.0233 3.86 0.0001 
DUAL -0.0094 -2.62 0.0089 -0.00857 -2.30 0.0215 -0.0095 -2.63 0.0086 -0.0116 -3.43 0.0006 
Loss -0.0326 -6.16 <.0001 -0.0426 -7.71 <.0001 -0.0327 -6.09 <.0001 -0.0235 -4.66 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.1099 0.1290 0.1142 0.1279 
# Obs 1,057 
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Panel E: Restricted Sample: One-to-One Control: DD and McDD Models: Reg#1 
Regression 1 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.0570* 6.16 <.0001 0.0400* 4.79 <.0001 0.0496* 3.22 0.0014 0.0364* 2.74 0.0063 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0040* -4.10 <.0001 -0.0029* -3.24 0.0012 -0.0067* -4.09 <.0001 -0.0060* -4.28 <.0001 
Debt Ratio -0.0126*** -1.93 0.0535 -0.0041 -0.70 0.4870 0.0166 1.53 0.1270 0.0214** 2.28 0.0231 
BM -0.0075*** -1.77 0.0770 -0.0101* -2.63 0.0089 -0.0149** -2.11 0.0349 -0.0091 -1.48 0.1385 
EBIT/Assets 0.0212 1.44 0.1513 0.0132 0.99 0.3236 0.0228 0.93 0.3540 0.0077 0.36 0.7161 
Salesgrowth 0.0150* 3.44 0.0006 0.0141* 3.58 0.0004 0.0385* 5.30 <.0001 0.0303* 4.83 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0037 -1.53 0.1254 -0.0014 -0.62 0.5379 -0.0037 -0.92 0.3585 -0.0005 -0.15 0.8783 
Loss -0.0108** -2.55 0.0111 -0.0074*** -1.92 0.0555 -0.0060 -0.85 0.3947 -0.0032 -0.53 0.5981 
Adj R-Sq 0.0958 0.0695 0.0909 0.0752 
# Obs 595 
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Panel F: Restricted Sample: One-to-One Control: DD and McDD Models: Reg #2 
Regression 2 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.0506* 3.58 0.0004 0.0695* 5.58 <.0001 0.0663* 2.88 0.0043 0.0652* 3.32 0.0010 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0025*** -1.69 0.0919 -0.0029** -2.26 0.0243 -0.0065* -2.71 0.0072 -0.0069* -3.37 0.0008 
Debt Ratio -0.0232** -2.10 0.0368 -0.0185*** -1.90 0.0588 0.0221 1.22 0.2218 0.0152 0.99 0.3226 
BM -0.0141** -2.22 0.0270 -0.0192* -3.41 0.0007 -0.0266** -2.57 0.0107 -0.0172*** -1.94 0.0533 
EBIT/Assets 0.0351*** 1.71 0.0886 0.0198 1.09 0.2745 0.0237 0.71 0.4802 0.0222 0.77 0.4395 
CAPX/Assets -0.0481 -1.42 0.1580 -0.0651** -2.17 0.0308 -0.0670 -1.21 0.2280 -0.1204* -2.54 0.0115 
Salesgrowth 0.0254* 3.45 0.0006 0.0028 0.44 0.6634 0.0307** 2.56 0.0109 0.0240** 2.34 0.0200 
DUAL -0.0032 -0.80 0.4215 -0.0007 -0.20 0.8441 -0.0072 -1.10 0.2702 -0.0045 -0.81 0.4167 
Loss -0.0105*** -1.72 0.0858 -0.0060 -1.12 0.2639 0.0023 0.23 0.8180 -0.0019 -0.23 0.8198 
Adj R-Sq 0.1132 0.0912 0.0678 0.0728 
# Obs 314 
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Table 1.12 Regression Analysis: Unification Sample 
Panel A: Pre-Unification: Main Control: MJones Models: Regression #1 
Regression 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.0943* 25.42 <.0001 0.1067* 26.71 <.0001 0.0971* 26.07 <.0001 0.1027* 31.06 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0069* -20.25 <.0001 -0.0068* -18.75 <.0001 -0.0071* -20.90 <.0001 -0.0070* -23.24 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0254* 9.39 <.0001 0.0259* 8.92 <.0001 0.0256* 9.45 <.0001 0.0190* 7.89 <.0001 
BM -0.0148* -6.92 <.0001 -0.0147* -6.35 <.0001 -0.0155* -7.20 <.0001 -0.0196* -10.27 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets -0.0982* -22.06 <.0001 -0.0921* -19.22 <.0001 -0.0949* -21.25 <.0001 -0.0572* -14.42 <.0001 
Salesgrowth 0.0271* 16.44 <.0001 0.0270* 15.17 <.0001 0.0269* 16.23 <.0001 0.0239* 16.21 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0127** -2.49 0.0128 -0.0124** -2.25 0.0245 -0.0132** -2.57 0.0103 -0.0127* -2.79 0.0053 
Loss -0.0138* -7.73 <.0001 -0.0286* -14.87 <.0001 -0.0144* -8.03 <.0001 -0.0171* -10.70 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.1629 0.1713 0.1618 0.1484 
# Obs 15,383 
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Panel B: Pre-Unification: Main Control: MJones Models: Regression #2 
Regression 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.0884* 20.47 <.0001 0.1001* 21.62 <.0001 0.0915* 21.11 <.0001 0.0988* 25.76 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0067* -16.59 <.0001 -0.0064* -14.97 <.0001 -0.0069* -17.22 <.0001 -0.0071* -20.05 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0286* 8.86 <.0001 0.0303* 8.78 <.0001 0.0290* 8.97 <.0001 0.0216* 7.53 <.0001 
BM -0.0121* -4.59 <.0001 -0.0118* -4.16 <.0001 -0.0128* -4.85 <.0001 -0.0171* -7.32 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets -0.0971* -18.89 <.0001 -0.0921* -16.70 <.0001 -0.0943* -18.27 <.0001 -0.0555* -12.14 <.0001 
CAPX/Assets 0.0713* 4.92 <.0001 0.0582* 3.74 0.0002 0.0688* 4.73 <.0001 0.0594* 4.61 <.0001 
Salesgrowth 0.0248* 12.51 <.0001 0.0242* 11.39 <.0001 0.0244* 12.29 <.0001 0.02288* 12.96 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0151** -2.41 0.0161 -0.0129*** -1.91 0.0557 -0.0154** -2.44 0.0149 -0.0139** -2.48 0.0130 
Loss -0.0135* -6.28 <.0001 -0.0285* -12.34 <.0001 -0.0139* -6.45 <.0001 -0.0164* -8.58 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.1657 0.1729 0.1646 0.1528 
# Obs 11,422 
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Panel C: Post-Unification: Main Control: MJones Models: Regression #1 
Regression 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1094* 40.02 <.0001 0.1121* 40.02 <.0001 0.1113* 40.17 <.0001 0.1135* 42.51 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0073* -26.27 <.0001 -0.0074* -26.02 <.0001 -0.0075* -26.68 <.0001 -0.0071* -26.23 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0166* 7.65 <.0001 0.0184* 8.28 <.0001 0.0163* 7.41 <.0001 0.0114* 5.38 <.0001 
BM -0.0213* -13.22 <.0001 -0.0191* -11.60 <.0001 -0.0218* -13.35 <.0001 -0.0239* -15.21 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets -0.0280* -9.05 <.0001 -0.0252* -7.95 <.0001 -0.0270* -8.61 <.0001 -0.0195* -6.46 <.0001 
Salesgrowth 0.0192* 17.46 <.0001 0.0206* 18.25 <.0001 0.0199* 17.85 <.0001 0.0196* 18.17 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0009 -0.19 0.8487 0.0002 0.04 0.9649 -0.0015 -0.31 0.7560 -0.0059 -1.22 0.2209 
Loss -0.0147* -10.47 <.0001 -0.0230* -15.99 <.0001 -0.0152* -10.69 <.0001 -0.0180* -13.11 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.1480 0.1656 0.1498 0.1532 
# Obs 13,654 
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Panel D: Post-Unification: Main Control: MJones Models: Regression #2 
Regression 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1075* 33.84 <.0001 0.1096* 33.58 <.0001 0.1097* 34.02 <.0001 0.1140* 36.71 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0072* -22.24 <.0001 -0.0071* -21.58 <.0001 -0.0074* -22.54 <.0001 -0.0072* -22.92 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.0173* 6.76 <.0001 0.0195* 7.43 <.0001 0.0172* 6.62 <.0001 0.0115* 4.59 <.0001 
BM -0.0201* -10.32 <.0001 -0.0177* -8.84 <.0001 -0.0207* -10.43 <.0001 -0.0228* -11.93 <.0001 
EBIT/Assets -0.0271* -7.69 <.0001 -0.0251* -6.96 <.0001 -0.0262* -7.34 <.0001 -0.0174* -5.05 <.0001 
CAPX/Assets 0.0438* 4.24 <.0001 0.0513* 4.85 <.0001 0.0428* 4.08 <.0001 0.0493* 4.88 <.0001 
Salesgrowth 0.0167* 12.51 <.0001 0.0171* 12.53 <.0001 0.0171* 12.66 <.0001 0.0165* 12.68 <.0001 
DUAL 0.0093 1.40 0.1607 0.0084 1.23 0.2186 0.0085 1.26 0.2087 0.0049 0.76 0.4496 
Loss -0.0144* -8.60 <.0001 -0.0225* -13.08 <.0001 -0.0150* -8.82 <.0001 -0.0178* -10.85 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.1502 0.1647 0.1513 0.1554 
# Obs 9,840 
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Panel E: Pre-Unification: One-to-One Control: MJones Models: Reg #1 
Regression 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-
test 
P-
value 
Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1018* 5.55 <.0001 0.1215* 5.84 <.0001 0.1072* 5.75 <.0001 0.1173* 6.79 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0060* -3.49 0.0005 -0.0065* -3.34 0.0009 -0.0062* -3.56 0.0004 -0.0046* -2.86 0.0045 
Debt Ratio -0.0131 -1.20 0.2307 -0.0119 -0.95 0.3406 -0.0140 -1.26 0.2099 0.0001 0.01 0.9940 
BM -0.0053 -0.51 0.6137 -0.0054 -0.45 0.6534 -0.0075 -0.71 0.4808 -0.0154 -1.56 0.1186 
EBIT/Assets -0.0553** -2.33 0.0201 -0.0353 -1.31 0.1902 -0.0585** -2.43 0.0155 -0.0344 -1.54 0.1243 
Salesgrowth 0.0315* 3.21 0.0014 0.0359* 3.23 0.0013 0.0310* 3.12 0.0019 -0.0018 -0.20 0.8453 
DUAL -0.0098*** -1.91 0.0567 -0.0161* -2.75 0.0062 -0.0102*** -1.95 0.0515 -0.0081*** -1.66 0.0975 
Loss -0.0275* -3.74 0.0002 -0.0469* -5.63 <.0001 -0.0286 -3.83 0.0001 -0.0211* -3.05 0.0024 
Adj R-Sq 0.1166 0.1446 0.1214 0.0601 
# Obs 502 
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Panel F: Pre-Unification: One-to-One Control: MJones Models: Reg #2 
Regression 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1046* 4.65 <.0001 0.1268* 4.92 <.0001 0.1107* 4.85 <.0001 0.1252* 6.00 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0062* -2.90 0.0040 -0.0071* -2.92 0.0038 -0.0065* -3.02 0.0027 -0.0054* -2.72 0.0070 
Debt Ratio -0.0128 -0.90 0.3698 -0.0146 -0.89 0.3749 -0.0143 -0.98 0.3254 0.0009 0.07 0.9481 
BM -0.0102 -0.75 0.4561 -0.0077 -0.49 0.6249 -0.0122 -0.87 0.3830 -0.0193 -1.51 0.1311 
EBIT/Assets -0.0628** -2.16 0.0312 -0.0382 -1.15 0.2523 -0.0698** -2.37 0.0183 -0.0345 -1.28 0.2010 
CAPX/Assets 0.0846 1.39 0.1659 0.0249 0.36 0.7223 0.0857 1.39 0.1667 0.1260** 2.23 0.0266 
Salesgrowth 0.0331* 2.66 0.0081 0.0414* 2.91 0.0039 0.0322** 2.56 0.0110 -0.0067 -0.58 0.5602 
DUAL -0.0152** -2.25 0.0251 -0.0194** -2.51 0.0127 -0.0154** -2.25 0.0250 -0.0094 -1.51 0.1328 
Loss -0.0300* -3.07 0.0023 -0.0508* -4.54 <.0001 -0.0297* -2.99 0.0030 -0.0231** -2.54 0.0114 
Adj R-Sq 0.1532 0.1660 0.1592 0.0882 
# Obs 341 
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Panel G: Post-Unification: One-to-One Control: MJones Models: Reg #1 
Regression 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1291* 5.38 <.0001 0.1236* 5.06 <.0001 0.1311* 5.42 <.0001 0.1211* 5.42 <.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0078* -2.74 0.0066 -0.0079* -2.74 0.0065 -0.0083* -2.91 0.0039 -0.0068** -2.57 0.0107 
Debt Ratio -0.0044 -0.21 0.8349 0.0144 0.68 0.4983 -0.0016 -0.07 0.9410 -0.0054 -0.28 0.7803 
BM -0.0354** -2.52 0.0121 -0.0364** -2.55 0.0113 -0.0346** -2.45 0.0150 -0.0426* -3.26 0.0012 
EBIT/Assets -0.0213 -0.87 0.3830 -0.0108 -0.44 0.6633 -0.0185 -0.75 0.4532 -0.0058 -0.25 0.8000 
Salesgrowth 0.0376* 4.18 <.0001 0.0407* 4.43 <.0001 0.0376* 4.14 <.0001 0.0382* 4.56 <.0001 
DUAL -0.0030 -0.41 0.6787 -0.0010 -0.13 0.8938 -0.0035 -0.48 0.6326 -0.0074 -1.09 0.2759 
Loss -0.0385* -3.38 0.0008 -0.0488* -4.20 <.0001 -0.0387* -3.37 0.0009 -0.0336* -3.16 0.0017 
Adj R-Sq 0.1999 0.2179 0.1974 0.2051 
# Obs 304 
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Panel H: Post-Unification: One-to-One Control: MJones Models: Reg #2 
Regression 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1394* 3.66 0.0003 0.1430* 3.73 0.0003 0.1459* 3.82 0.0002 0.1411* 3.98 0.0001 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0074*** -1.81 0.0717 -0.0085** -2.08 0.0395 -0.0081** -1.98 0.0495 -0.0071*** -1.86 0.0649 
Debt Ratio -0.0005 -0.02 0.9862 0.0161 0.51 0.6117 0.0022 0.07 0.9436 -0.0168 -0.58 0.5648 
BM -0.0486** -2.25 0.0259 -0.0527** -2.42 0.0166 -0.0483** -2.22 0.0274 -0.0438** -2.18 0.0310 
EBIT/Assets 0.0075 0.22 0.8271 0.0211 0.62 0.5389 0.0130 0.38 0.7037 0.0191 0.60 0.5471 
CAPX/Assets -0.1042 -1.23 0.2212 -0.0572 -0.67 0.5037 -0.1228 -1.44 0.1512 -0.1165 -1.48 0.1420 
Salesgrowth 0.0455* 3.20 0.0016 0.0456* 3.19 0.0017 0.0453* 3.18 0.0017 0.0479* 3.63 0.0004 
DUAL 0.0030 0.26 0.7937 0.0021 0.18 0.8573 0.0017 0.15 0.8833 -0.0038 -0.35 0.7278 
Loss -0.0496* -2.71 0.0075 -0.0588* -3.19 0.0017 -0.0514* -2.80 0.0058 -0.0491* -2.88 0.0045 
Adj R-Sq 0.1918 0.2133 0.1933 0.2099 
# Obs 176 
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CHAPTER 2: EARNINGS INFORMATIVENESS IN DUAL-CLASS FIRMS 
2.1. Introduction 
 Dual-class stock structure is characterized by the segregation of voting rights and 
cash flow rights. This deviation from a “one share-one vote” principal leads to conflicts 
of interest between controlling insiders (the holders of voting rights) and remaining 
shareholders (Villalonga and Amit, 2009). Dual-class share structure creates an ideal 
setting for the owners of voting rights to extract private benefits and act in their own 
interest, at the expense of cash flow rights holders. As a result, dual-class firms are often 
perceived to have low transparency and high information asymmetry. Thus, the amount 
and quality of accounting information released to the public by firms with two classes of 
stocks is questioned by academicians. For instance, Tinaikar (2006) suggest that dual-
class firms voluntarily release less information compared to single-class firms. Francis, 
Schipper, and Vincent (2005) document that dual-class firms’ earnings are less 
informative compared to single-class firms. Jiraporn (2005) finds that dual-class firms 
engage in earnings management. However, research also suggested that insiders with 
voting rights have incentives to disclose large amounts of high quality information to 
attract investors and reduce the perception of low credibility (Warfield et al., 1995). As 
further corroboration, Nguyen and Xu (2010) document that dual-class firms have lower 
discretionary accruals then single-class firms. The main implication is that dual-class 
firms are less likely to engage in earnings management activities. In the first chapter of 
this dissertation, I found evidence in support of this line of thinking. But one very 
important question remains unanswered: how do market participants perceive dual-class 
firms? In this chapter, I investigate earnings informativeness for dual-class firms by 
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examining the explanatory power of earnings for returns. Particularly, I examine the 
earnings informativeness of three different samples of dual-class firms that extend to 
2009. In addition, I expand upon Francis, Schipper, and Vincent (2005) by analyzing 
changes in earnings informativeness after elimination of dual-class share structure. In 
particular, I investigate possible improvement in earnings informativeness for dual-class 
firms after unification. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to consider 
earnings informativeness for a sample of unified firms. 
I find that earnings informativeness is lower for dual-class firms compared to 
single-class firms. Moreover, firms that abolish their dual-class share structure have the 
same earnings informativeness as single-class firms. This suggests that investors’ 
perception of earnings credibility in dual-class firms is low and that this perception 
improves once dual-class firms unify their shares. These results contribute to the ongoing 
debate about the benefits and disadvantages of dual-class share structure. 
2.2. Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
Prior dual-class firm research investigates whether dual-class structure actually 
harms or benefits shareholders. It is suggested that the separation of voting right and cash 
flow rights creates incentives to extract private benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Nenova (2003) finds a premium for voting shares which implies the existence of private 
benefits of control. A study by Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009) documents the channels 
through which the holders of voting rights can extract private benefits and divert 
company resources. As a result, dual-class share structure is often perceived as an inferior 
form of ownership.  Jarell and Poulsen (1988) document a negative market reaction 
(significant negative abnormal returns) to the announcement of dual-class share structure 
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formation. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) explore the effect of dual-class share 
structure on firm value and find that the deviation from a “one share-one vote” principal 
decreases value. Additional research provides evidence that reinforces the negative 
relation between firm value and dual-class share structure (Claessens et al. (2002) and 
Lins (2003)). Smart, Thirumalai, and Zutter (2008) document positive and significant 
abnormal returns after the announcement of unification. Therefore, dual-class firms are 
commonly associated with conflicts of interest, lower firm value, asymmetric 
information, and extraction of private benefits. Li, Ortiz-Molina, and Zhao (2009) 
document a lower level of institutional ownership in dual-class firms compared to single-
class firms, implying that institutional investors avoid dual-class firms.  
Market participants often lack trust in dual-class share structure and academicians 
question the quality of accounting information in dual-class firms. For instance, Fan and 
Wong (2002) examine a sample of East Asian firms and show that concentrated 
ownership is associated with lower earnings informativeness. Francis, Schipper, and 
Vincent (2005) study the earnings informativeness of dual-class firms in the U.S. and 
document that earnings are less informative in dual-class firms compared to single-class 
firms. Prior studies suggest that dual-class firms are often associated with low quality 
accounting information. Thus, based in previous findings, I state the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Earnings informativeness is worse for dual-class stocks than for 
single-class stocks. 
Hypothesis 2: There is no difference in earnings informativeness between unified 
firms and single-class firms. 
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2.3. Data and Sample Selection 
 In this study, I analyze U.S. listed dual-class firms. Utility (two digit SIC code 
from 40 to 49) and financial companies (two digit SIC code between 60 and 69) are 
excluded from my sample. Four different samples of dual-class firms are investigated in 
this study. 
 The first sample (original sample) includes 246 dual-class firms (1,011 firm-
years) that exhibit dual-class share structure for at least two years during the time period 
from 1994 to 2002. The second sample investigated is the extended sample. I manually 
examine each dual-class firm’s 10-K annual report filing at the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) beginning in 2003 and ending in 2009. I identify 105 dual-class 
stocks (613 firm-years) that maintain dual-class share structure beyond 2002. To be 
included in the sample, a firm must exhibit dual-class share structure for at least two 
years during the time period from 1994 to 2002 and at least one year from 2003 to 2009. 
 The third sample is called the restricted sample and features 71 dual-class firms 
(414 firm-years) that stay dual for the entire period from 1995 to 2009. The fourth sample 
consists of dual-class firms that “unify” their shares, i.e., they abolish their dual-class 
share structure and become single-class companies. I examine dual-class firms’ proxy 
statements from 1994 to 2009 and identify 65 firms that unified their shares during the 
period. I delete firms with missing data required data for my analysis. The final 
unification sample consists of 30 firms and is partitioned into a pre-unification and post-
unification period. Furthermore, I exclude the year of unification from the analysis. 
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I collect all accounting variables from COMPUSTAT. Returns are calculated 
using the CRSP database. Institutional ownership data is obtained from the Thompson 
Reuters database. All continuous variables used in my analysis are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% level. 
2.3.1. Matching Procedure
 
 I follow two matching procedures for dual-class and single-class firms. The first 
matching procedure, named “main control”, involves matching each dual-class company 
to a portfolio of single-class companies in the same industry (based on a two digit SIC 
code) and in the same fiscal year. The second matching procedure is termed the “one-to-
one control” and is based on a one-to-one matching principle. Each dual-class firm is 
only matched to one single-class firm based on the same industry (measured by a two 
digit SIC code), fiscal year, and size (measured as natural logarithm of price multiplied 
by shares outstanding). 
2.4. Methodology 
 
 Based on prior literature, I construct and test the following null hypothesis: 
H0: Earnings are equally informative for dual-class shares and single-class shares. 
In order to test the hypothesis, I follow Francis, Schipper, and Vincent (2005) and 
estimate the following two regressions: 
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where  
 RETit =the 12-month cumulative raw return for firm i in fiscal year t (the 12-
month period starts from three months before the end of fiscal year t-1 and ends 
three months after the end of fiscal year t) 
EARNit =earnings before extraordinary items for firm i in fiscal year t, scaled by 
market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 
ICit =a dummy variable equal to 1 if stock i is a dual-class stock and equal to 0 
otherwise 
LOSSit =a dummy variable equal to 1 if EARNit is less than zero and is equal to 0 
otherwise 
 SIZEit =natural logarithm of sales for firm i in l year t-1 
 MBit =market-to-book ratio for firm i in year t 
 LEVGit =the ratio of long-term debt to total assets for firm i in year t-1 
 INSTITit =percent of firm’s i shares held by institutions in year t-1 
DIVit =total common stock dividends for firm i in year t divided by market value 
of equity at the end of year t-1 
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∆EARNit =change in EARNit from year t-1 to year t scaled by market value of 
equity at the end of year t-1 
 Equations (1) and (2) are estimated using panel data. I am interested in the sign of 
the coefficient of β2. A positive coefficient would imply greater earnings informativeness 
for dual-class stocks while a negative coefficient would imply less earnings 
informativeness for dual-class stocks. I am also interested in the sum of the coefficients:  
β2+ β10.  If the sum of the coefficients is positive, then earnings are more informative for 
dual-class stocks. If the sum of the coefficients is negative, then earnings are less 
informative for dual-class stocks. Using the F-test, I test the following null hypothesis: 
H0: β2+ β10=0.  
 I expect to document a positive sign on EARNit and ∆EARNit implying a positive 
relation between earnings (or change in earnings) and returns. Based on the results of 
prior studies, (for example, Freeman (1987), Imhoff and Lobo (1992), and Francis, 
Schipper, and Vincent (2005)), I also expect to document a negative relation between size 
and informativeness, a negative relation between market-to-book ratio and 
informativeness, a negative relation between leverage and informativeness, and a positive 
relation between institutional ownership and informativeness. 
2.5. Empirical Results 
2.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2.1, Panels A through D, provide summary statistics for the control 
variables used in regressions (1) and (2) for the four different data samples. The p-values 
for the t-test and Wilcoxon sum rank test are provided in the last two columns of each 
panel.   Panel A contains results for the original sample of dual-class firms and matching 
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single-class firms based on industry and fiscal year (main control). I find that average 
returns are statistically significant and higher in single-class firms (0.08) than in dual-
class firms (0.05). Earnings scaled by lagged market value (EARN) are higher in dual-
class firms (0.04) compared to single-class firms (0.02). I also find that dual-class firms 
have larger size (6.23), smaller market-to-book ratio (2.32), and smaller dividends 
(11.82) compared to single-class firms. In addition, I document that dual-class firms have 
higher leverage (0.23) compared to single-class firms (0.21) which is consistent with 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010). Panel A also shows that the percent of institutional 
ownership in firms with two classes of shares is smaller (0.40) than firms with a single-
class of shares (0.44). This result is consistent with Li, Ortiz-Molina, and Zhao (2009) 
where they document that institutional investors “shy away” from firms with dual-class 
share structure. 
 Panel B documents results for the original sample of dual-class firms matched 
one-to-one to single firms. The matched samples have very similar characteristics. There 
is no statistically significant difference in means between dual-class firms and single-
class firms for the following variables: RETURN, ∆EARN, SIZE, ASSETS, SALES, and 
MB. However, earnings (EARN) are larger in dual-class firms (0.04) compared to single-
class firms (0.02). The percent of institutional ownership (0.40) and dividends (11.82) are 
smaller in dual-class firms than in single-class firms (0.50 and 18.65, respectively). 
 Panel C and Panel D show summary statistics for the extended sample with the 
main and one-to-one control. Panels E and F show the results for the restricted sample. 
The results are similar to the original sample results. When the main control is used as a 
matching technique, dual-class firms, on average, have larger earnings, larger size, larger 
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leverage, smaller sales, smaller market-to-book ratios, and smaller dividends compared to 
single-class firms. In the one-to-one control case, the sample of dual-class firms (both 
extended sample and restricted sample) and the sample of single-class firms have similar 
characteristics. However, the percent of institutional ownership is significant and 
statistically smaller in dual-class firms than in single-class firms (the average difference 
is -0.09 in the extended sample, and -0.06 in the restricted sample). 
  Panel E presents summary statistics for the unification sample in the pre-
unification and post-unification periods. In the pre-unification sample, dual-class firms 
have higher earnings, larger size, and smaller dividends compared to single-class firms. 
In the post-unification period, the sample of newly unified firms has similar 
characteristics to the sample of single-class firms that never instituted a dual-class share 
structure. 
2.5.2. Regression Analysis 
 The results of regressions (1) and (2) are provided in Table 2.2. Panel A shows 
the results for the original sample (main control and one-to-one control). For model 1, I 
document a positive and statistically significant coefficient on EARN (3.3408 for the 
main control, and 5.2339 for the one-to-one control) and a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient on EARN*LOSS (-3.3274 for the main control, and -3.6134 for the 
one-to-one control). Both of these findings are consistent with prior research. I find 
mixed results for EARN*SIZE and EARN*INSTIT. The coefficients on EARN*MB and 
EARN*LEVG are negative. However, the coefficient for EARN*IC is my main concern. 
I document a negative and statistically significant coefficient for EARN*IC for both the 
main control (-0.2551 with a p-value =0.0735) and the one-to-one control (-0.466 with a 
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p-value =0.0757). This implies that dual-class firms have lower earnings informativeness 
compared to single-class firms. For model 2, I am interested in the sum of coefficients for 
EARN*IC and ∆EARN*IC. I find a negative and statistically significant coefficient for 
EARN*IC+∆EARN*IC (-0.3317 with a p-value =0.0376) for the main control group. 
This also implies less earnings informativeness for dual-class firms.  
 Panel B presents results for the extended sample and Panel C for the restricted 
sample, respectively. I document negative coefficients for EARN*IC for both samples. 
For the extended sample, the coefficient on EARN*IC is -0.4136 with a p-value of 
0.0329 for the main control, and the coefficient is -0.6824 with a p-value of 0.0017 for 
the one-to-one control group. For the restricted sample, the coefficient is -0.6824 with a 
p-value of 0.0101 for the main control, and the coefficient is -0.6816 with a p-value of 
0.0120 for the one-to-one control. The results also show a negative value for the sum of 
coefficients for EARN*IC and ∆EARN*IC. For the extended sample, the value of β2+ β10 
is -0.4347 with a p-value of 0.0414 for the main control group, and the value is -0.6694 
with a p-value of 0.0060 for the one-to-one control group. I also document a negative 
value of β2 + β10 for the restricted sample but the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Overall, these results imply lower earnings informativeness for dual-class stocks than for 
single-class stocks. 
 The regression results for the unification sample are given in Panel D. In the pre-
unification period (Panel 1D), dual-class firms are matched to single-class firms. The 
coefficient for EARN*IC for the main control group in pre-unification is -1.3136 with a 
p-value of 0.0022. In the post-unification period, unified firms are matched to single-
class firms that never had a dual-class share structure. For the main control group, the 
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coefficient for EARN*IC is positive but not statistically significant (0.2308 and a p-value 
=0.6371), while the coefficient for EARN*IC +∆EARN*IC is also positive and not 
statistically significant (0.407 and a p-value=0.9365). The result for the one-to-one match 
group is similar. My findings suggest there is no difference in earnings informativeness 
between unified firms and single-class firms.  
2.6. Conclusions 
Firms with dual-class share structure are heavily scrutinized and debated in 
finance literature. Does dual-class share structure benefit or harm shareholders? Does 
dual-class share structure improve or destroy firm value? Prior studies point out that 
holders of voting rights have incentives to engage in inefficient behavior and can 
potentially avoid negative consequences due to the separation of cash flow rights and 
voting rights. Alternatively, it is suggested that dual-class share structure creates a proper 
alignment of interest between controlling insiders and other shareholders because 
controlling insiders have an opportunity to concentrate on long-term firm goals without 
worrying about daily share price fluctuations. As a result of these opposite forces 
influencing the behavior of owners of voting rights, dual-class firms are associated with 
information asymmetry and low transparency. In this study I examine market 
participants’ perception of the quality of earnings in dual-class firms by studying the 
earnings response coefficient. I find that the perception of low credibility of earnings in 
dual-class firms is common among market participants. I also document lower earnings 
informativeness for dual-class firms compared to single-class firms. In the sample of 
firms that eliminate dual-class share structure, I find no difference in earnings 
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informativeness compared to single-class firms. This implies that abolishing dual-class 
share structure leads to an improvement in the quality of earnings 
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics 
The table presents summary statistics for the sample of dual-class firms and matching single-class firms based on industry and fiscal year (main control) and based on size, 
industry and year (one-to-one control). RETURN is calculated as a 12-month cumulative raw return. EARN is firm’s earnings before extraordinary items scaled by lagged 
value of market value of equity. ∆EARN is the change in earnings from year t-1 to year t scaled by lagged market value of equity. SIZE is number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by price at the end of year t. ASSETS is a firm’s total assets from COMPUSTAT at the end of fiscal year t. SALES is a firm’s net sales from COMPUSTAT at the 
end of fiscal year t. MB is a firm’s market-to-book ratio at the end of fiscal year t. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long term debt to total assets at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
%INSTIT is the percent of institutional ownership measured by percent of firm’s shares held by institutions in year t-1. DIV is total common dividends paid in year t. The p-
values for t-test to test the difference between means and p-values for Wilcoxon sum rank test to test the difference between medians are given in the last two columns of each 
panel. Panels A, B shows summary statistics of original sample. Panels C, D provide summary statistics for extended sample. Panel E, F illustrate summary statistics for 
restricted sample. The results of the unification sample in pre-unification and post-unification periods are given in Panels G through J. 
Panel A: Original Sample: Main Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of Difference between 
Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of Difference between 
Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon sum rank test  
RETURN 0.05 0.00 0.08 -0.02 -0.04 0.0437 0.5818 
EARN 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.0068 <.0001 
∆EARN 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.4111 0.2907 
SIZE 6.23 6.31 5.84 5.75 0.39 <.0001 <.0001 
ASSETS (MM$) 1,058.94 535.54 2,325.81 308.05 -1,266.90 <.0001 <.0001 
SALES (MM$) 1,192.18 617.32 2,434.06 347.27 -1,241.90 <.0001 <.0001 
MB 2.32 1.63 2.80 1.98 -0.48 <.0001 <.0001 
LEVERAGE 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.02 0.0002 <.0001 
%INSTIT 0.40 0.39 0.44 0.44 -0.04 <.0001 0.0004 
DIV (MM$) 11.82 0.90 38.71 0.00 -26.90 <.0001 <.0001 
# OBS  1,011 12,020  
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Panel B: Original Sample: One-to-One Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of Difference 
between Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of Difference 
between Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test  
RETURN 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.6684 0.1510 
EARN 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.0093 0.0067 
∆EARN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.4541 0.9957 
SIZE 6.23 6.31 6.24 6.32 -0.01 0.8655 0.9148 
ASSETS(MM$) 1,058.94 535.54 1,049.70 458.01 9.25 0.8929 0.0389 
SALES(MM$) 1,192.18 617.32 1,206.48 573.99 -14.30 0.8607 0.9273 
MB 2.32 1.63 2.54 1.68 -0.22 0.1023 0.0960 
LEVERAGE 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.23 -0.01 0.2748 0.3444 
%INSTIT 0.40 0.39 0.50 0.53 -0.10 <.0001 <.0001 
DIV(MM$) 11.82 0.90 18.65 0.00 -6.83 0.0006 0.0001 
# OBS 1,011 1,011  
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Panel C: Extended Sample: Main Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of Difference 
between Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of Difference 
between Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test  
RETURN 0.05 0.00 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.2231 0.0911 
EARN 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02 <.0001 <.0001 
∆EARN 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.5053 0.5293 
SIZE 6.26 6.44 5.79 5.68 0.47 <.0001 <.0001 
ASSETS(MM$) 1,025.39 532.02 2,218.30 291.23 -1,192.90 <.0001 <.0001 
SALES(MM$) 1,123.03 644.01 2,263.58 322.98 -1,140.60 <.0001 <.0001 
MB 2.24 1.64 2.83 1.99 -0.59 <.0001 <.0001 
LEVERAGE 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.02 0.0012 <.0001 
%INSTIT 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.44 -0.02 0.2140 0.4570 
DIV(MM$) 13.51 2.37 35.26 0.00 -21.75 <.0001 <.0001 
# OBS 613  10,458   
 93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Extended Sample: One-to-One Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of Difference 
between Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of Difference between 
Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon sum rank test  
RETURN 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.8671 0.0232 
EARN 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.0003 0.0009 
∆EARN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.5634 0.9641 
SIZE 6.26 6.44 6.21 6.33 0.05 0.5230 0.4285 
ASSETS(MM$) 1,025.39 532.02 1,032.78 474.93 -7.39 0.9333 0.0343 
SALES(MM$) 1,123.03 644.01 1,091.43 604.71 31.60 0.7296 0.4438 
MB 2.24 1.64 3.03 1.73 -0.80 0.0077 0.0675 
LEVERAGE 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.21 -0.01 0.3747 0.9830 
%INSTIT 0.43 0.44 0.52 0.55 -0.09 <.0001 <.0001 
DIV(MM$) 13.51 2.37 16.67 0.00 -3.15 0.1860 <.0001 
# OBS 613 613  
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Panel E: Restricted Sample: Main Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of Difference 
between Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of Difference 
between Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon sum rank test  
RETURN 0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.4613 0.0658 
EARN 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.03 <.0001 <.0001 
∆EARN 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.7037 0.8437 
SIZE 6.42 6.52 5.78 5.68 0.64 <.0001 <.0001 
ASSETS(MM$) 1,203.41 646.65 2,335.99 298.36 -1,132.60 0.0003 <.0001 
SALES(MM$) 1,286.83 721.50 2,347.06 318.87 -1,060.20 0.0007 <.0001 
MB 2.30 1.71 2.91 2.02 -0.60 0.0006 <.0001 
LEVERAGE 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.02 0.0039 0.0003 
%INSTIT 0.48 0.49 0.45 0.44 0.03 0.0370 0.0125 
DIV(MM$) 16.33 5.17 38.50 0.00 -22.17 0.0009 <.0001 
# OBS 414 8,985  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 95 
 
Panel F: Restricted Sample: One-to-One Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of Difference 
between Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of Difference 
between Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon sum rank test  
RETURN 0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.5824 0.0257 
EARN 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.03 <.0001 0.0003 
∆EARN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.4979 0.7077 
SIZE 6.42 6.52 6.39 6.46 0.04 0.6729 0.5901 
ASSETS(MM$) 1,203.41 646.65 1,183.91 535.81 19.50 0.8744 0.0218 
SALES(MM$) 1,286.83 721.50 1,280.75 698.54 6.08 0.9638 0.5026 
MB 2.30 1.71 2.83 1.65 -0.53 0.0621 0.9007 
LEVERAGE 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.23 -0.02 0.2051 0.4875 
%INSTIT 0.48 0.49 0.54 0.56 -0.06 0.0005 0.0004 
DIV(MM$) 16.33 5.17 19.64 0.00 -3.31 0.3127 <.0001 
# OBS 414 414  
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Panel G:Unification Sample:  Pre-Unification: Main Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of Difference 
between Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of Difference 
between Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon sum 
rank test  
RETURN 0.15 0.14 0.12 -0.01 0.04 0.6519 0.1491 
EARN 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.2577 0.0472 
∆EARN 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.6367 0.4247 
SIZE 5.95 5.97 5.76 5.66 0.18 0.4234 0.2231 
ASSETS(MM$) 784.17 528.31 2,137.42 272.57 -1,353.30 0.0661 0.1363 
SALES(MM$) 1,660.48 403.22 2,266.88 312.90 -606.40 0.4287 0.2047 
MB 2.95 2.06 2.74 1.96 0.21 0.5921 0.1096 
LEVERAGE 0.16 0.10 0.19 0.16 -0.02 0.2243 0.2050 
%INSTIT 0.42 0.35 0.46 0.46 -0.04 0.2315 0.3361 
DIV(MM$) 2.94 0.00 20.26 0.00 -17.31 0.0464 0.0644 
# OBS 176 6,097  
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Panel H:Unification Sample:  Pre-Unification: One-to-One Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of Difference 
between Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of Difference between 
Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon sum rank test  
RETURN 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.6606 0.4468 
EARN 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.9653 0.5962 
∆EARN 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.7471 0.3398 
SIZE 5.95 5.97 5.97 6.01 -0.02 0.9293 0.7871 
ASSETS(MM$) 784.17 528.31 628.94 235.24 155.20 0.4541 0.1543 
SALES(MM$) 1,660.48 403.22 1,153.98 394.35 506.50 0.5016 0.8999 
MB 2.95 2.06 1.74 1.38 1.20 0.0283 0.0002 
LEVERAGE 0.16 0.10 0.23 0.20 -0.07 0.0163 0.0090 
%INSTIT 0.42 0.35 0.47 0.44 -0.05 0.2682 0.4370 
DIV(MM$) 2.94 0.00 2.67 0.00 0.27 0.7829 0.0685 
# OBS 176  176 
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Panel I:Unification Sample:  Post-Unification: Main Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of Difference between 
Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of Difference 
between Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test  
RETURN 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.03 -0.03 0.4655 0.7658 
EARN 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.0440 0.0762 
∆EARN 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.4783 0.4626 
SIZE 7.05 6.84 6.40 6.41 0.65 <.0001 <.0001 
ASSETS(MM$) 3,830.13 1,315.80 5,084.02 670.24 -1,253.90 0.2135 <.0001 
SALES(MM$) 3,686.32 1,001.82 4,602.18 645.43 -915.90 0.2991 <.0001 
MB 3.44 1.93 2.79 2.07 0.65 0.0325 0.6948 
LEVERAGE 0.24 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.05 0.0003 0.1541 
%INSTIT 0.79 0.81 0.59 0.65 0.20 <.0001 <.0001 
DIV(MM$) 28.84 0.00 97.47 0.00 -68.63 0.0069 0.9265 
# OBS 71 4,213   
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Panel J:Unification Sample:  Post-Unification: One-to-One Control 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of Difference 
between Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of Difference 
between Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon sum rank test 
RETURN 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.9660 0.4904 
EARN 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.1802 0.1831 
∆EARN 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.7251 0.1452 
SIZE 7.05 6.84 7.11 6.92 -0.06 0.6685 0.5956 
ASSETS(MM$) 3,830.13 1,315.80 4,679.11 910.04 -849.00 0.4012 0.0801 
SALES(MM$) 3,686.32 1,001.82 3,796.91 1,050.25 -110.60 0.8880 0.7304 
MB 3.44 1.93 3.00 2.19 0.44 0.6086 0.5351 
LEVERAGE 0.24 0.17 0.23 0.22 0.01 0.6934 0.1858 
%INSTIT 0.79 0.81 0.73 0.81 0.05 0.1431 0.3749 
DIV(MM$) 28.84 0.00 34.38 0.00 -5.54 0.5727 0.8501 
# OBS 71 71  
 
 
 
 
 
 100 
 
Table 2.2 Regressions  
This table presents the results of the following two regressions: 
Model 1: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
 * * * *
      * * *
it it it it it it it it it it
it it it t it it it
RET EARN EARN IC EARN LOSS EARN SIZE EARN MB
EARN LEVG EARN INSTIT EARN DIV
β β β β β β
β β β ε
= + + + + +
+ + + +
  
Model 2: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13
  * * * *
* * *
  * * *
it it it it it it it it it it
it it it t it it
it it it it it it it
RET EARN EARN IC EARN LOSS EARN SIZE EARN MB
EARN LEVG EARN INSTIT EARN DIV EARN
EARN IC EARN LOSS EARN SIZE EARN
β β β β β β
β β β β
β β β β
= + + + + +
+ + + + Δ
+ Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ
14 15 16
*
  * * *
it
it it it it it it it
MB
EARN LEVG EARN INSTIT EARN DIVβ β β ε+ Δ + Δ + Δ +
 
Variable definitions: RETit =the 12-month cumulative raw return for firm i in fiscal year t (the 12-month period starts from three months before the end of 
fiscal year t-1 and ends three months after the end of fiscal year t). EARNit =earnings before extraordinary items for firm i in fiscal year t, scaled by market 
value of equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. ICit = a dummy variable is equal to 1 if stock i is a dual-class stock and is equal to 0 otherwise. LOSSit =a dummy 
variable is equal to 1 if EARNit is less than zero and is equal to 0 otherwise. SIZEit =natural logarithm of sales for firm i in l year t-1. MBit =market-to-book 
ratio for firm i in year t. LEVGit =the ratio of long-term debt to total assets for firm i in year t-1. INSTITit =percent of firm’s i shares held by institutions in 
year t-1. DIVit =total common stock dividends for firm i in year t divided by market value of equity at the end of year t-1. ∆EARNit =change in EARNit from 
year t-1 to year t scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1. The sum of the coefficients EARN*IC+∆EARN*IC and the results of F-test to test 
whether the sum is different from zero are also given in the table. Panel A shows the results for original sample of dual-class firms. Panels B provides results 
for extended sample. Panel C illustrates the results for restricted sample. The results of the unification sample in pre-unification and post-unification periods 
are given in Panels D and E.  
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Panel A: Original Sample 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
  Main Control One-to-One Control Main Control One-to-One Control 
 Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept -0.0650 -8.22 <.0001 -0.1421 -6.93 <.0001 -0.0524 -6.49 <.0001 -0.1236 -5.77 <.0001 
EARN 3.3408 23.29 <.0001 5.2339 8.10 <.0001 2.2607 13.57 <.0001 3.8382 4.84 <.0001 
EARN*IC -0.2551 -1.79 0.0735 -0.4667 -1.78 0.0757 -0.0428 -0.26 0.7986 -0.6610 -2.16 0.0308 
EARN*LOSS -3.3274 -29.05 <.0001 -3.6143 -8.25 <.0001 -2.9540 -22.63 <.0001 -3.1083 -6.14 <.0001 
EARN*SIZE 0.0485 1.92 0.0554 -0.2476 -2.39 0.0169 0.1475 4.96 <.0001 -0.0361 -0.28 0.7775 
EARN*MB -0.0143 -1.13 0.2586 -0.0233 -0.73 0.4630 -0.0016 -0.12 0.9019 -0.0051 -0.15 0.8777 
EARN*LEVG -0.3675 -1.92 0.0547 -0.5775 -0.80 0.4233 -0.3140 -1.41 0.1586 -0.4613 -0.53 0.5941 
EARN*INSTIT -0.2660 -1.73 0.0839 0.6401 1.24 0.2158 -0.5665 -3.10 0.0020 -0.3240 -0.53 0.5935 
EARN*DIV -3.5821 -0.91 0.3604 30.7195 2.75 0.0060 1.0114 0.21 0.8301 36.3297 2.95 0.0033 
∆EARN       1.5225 10.70 <.0001 2.3542 2.79 0.0053 
∆EARN*IC       -0.2889 -1.75 0.0796 0.8249 2.18 0.0296 
∆EARN*LOSS       -0.2174 -2.62 0.0088 -0.3353 -0.91 0.3641 
∆EARN*SIZE       -0.1851 -6.36 <.0001 -0.4298 -2.89 0.0039 
∆EARN*MB       -0.0068 -0.61 0.5390 0.0031 0.09 0.9264 
∆EARN*LEVG       -0.1707 -0.86 0.3907 -0.6781 -0.74 0.4587 
∆EARN*INSTIT       0.7327 4.17 <.0001 2.1943 3.18 0.0015 
∆EARN*DIV       -2.0455 -0.47 0.6409 -11.0924 -0.66 0.5064 
EARN*IC+∆EARN*IC       -0.3317 4.33 0.0376 0.1639 0.22 0.6374 
Adj R-Sq 0.1197 0.1544 0.1393 0.1705 
# Obs 12,870 1,917 12,870 1,917 
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Panel B: Extended Sample 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
  Main Control One-to-One Control Main Control One-to-One Control 
 Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept -0.1665 -21.48 <.0001 -0.1811 -8.33 <.0001 -0.1512 -19.10 <.0001 -0.1685 -7.38 <.0001 
EARN 4.0643 29.75 <.0001 5.2339 9.14 <.0001 3.2557 20.84 <.0001 4.9379 6.68 <.0001 
EARN*IC -0.4136 -2.13 0.0329 -0.6824 -3.14 0.0017 -0.3160 -1.37 0.1708 -0.6763 -2.51 0.0122 
EARN*LOSS -4.2287 -37.39 <.0001 -3.9484 -11.62 <.0001 -3.8456 -29.86 <.0001 -3.4867 -8.70 <.0001 
EARN*SIZE 0.0338 1.37 0.1712 -0.0505 -0.53 0.5990 0.0844 2.97 0.0030 -0.0496 -0.41 0.6798 
EARN*MB -0.0329 -2.80 0.0051 -0.0194 -0.69 0.4909 -0.0232 -1.93 0.0538 -0.0172 -0.49 0.6215 
EARN*LEVG -0.2772 -1.51 0.1323 -0.9589 -1.70 0.0891 -0.2803 -1.34 0.1803 -1.4757 -2.18 0.0294 
EARN*INSTIT -0.0136 -0.09 0.9284 -1.3700 -3.06 0.0022 -0.2552 -1.47 0.1409 -1.6938 -3.14 0.0017 
EARN*DIV -14.9977 -3.85 0.0001 6.0648 0.58 0.5597 -9.9321 -2.11 0.0347 19.7396 1.64 0.1018 
∆EARN       1.0198 7.80 <.0001 0.2598 0.38 0.7017 
∆EARN*IC       -0.1187 -0.54 0.5921 0.0069 0.03 0.9795 
∆EARN*LOSS       -0.1749 -2.22 0.0262 -0.4529 -1.67 0.0949 
∆EARN*SIZE       -0.1030 -3.79 0.0002 -0.0187 -0.16 0.8762 
∆EARN*MB       0.0012 0.12 0.9078 -0.0078 -0.24 0.8093 
∆EARN*LEVG       -0.0085 -0.05 0.9625 0.7261 1.14 0.2528 
∆EARN*INSTIT       0.5968 3.70 0.0002 0.9656 1.69 0.0915 
∆EARN*DIV       -2.6892 -0.63 0.5290 -19.5939 -1.72 0.0851 
EARN*IC+∆EARN*IC       -0.4347 4.16 0.0414 -0.6694 7.58 0.006 
Adj R-Sq 0.1890 0.1810 0.1998 0.1974 
# Obs 11,071 1,168 11,071 1,168 
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Panel C: Restricted Sample 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
  Main Control One-to-One Control Main Control One-to-One Control 
 Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept -0.1749 -20.93 <.0001 -0.1986 -7.77 <.0001 -0.1634 -19.12 <.0001 -0.1662 -6.11 <.0001 
EARN 4.0022 27.04 <.0001 4.6000 6.34 <.0001 3.2050 18.97 <.0001 4.6342 5.02 <.0001 
EARN*IC -0.6824 -2.57 0.0101 -0.6816 -2.52 0.0120 -0.6569 -2.18 0.0295 -0.7458 -2.30 0.0215 
EARN*LOSS -4.2772 -34.97 <.0001 -3.9486 -10.24 <.0001 -3.9571 -28.40 <.0001 -3.4925 -7.38 <.0001 
EARN*SIZE 0.0411 1.54 0.1233 0.0044 0.04 0.9695 0.1026 3.33 0.0009 -0.0430 -0.30 0.7656 
EARN*MB -0.0377 -3.12 0.0018 0.0036 0.07 0.9440 -0.0260 -2.11 0.0352 -0.0903 -1.53 0.1268 
EARN*LEVG -0.2224 -1.13 0.2582 -0.9340 -1.47 0.1410 -0.3168 -1.42 0.1561 -1.5547 -2.09 0.0369 
EARN*INSTIT 0.1067 0.66 0.5066 -1.2326 -2.41 0.0160 -0.1055 -0.58 0.5651 -1.5749 -2.64 0.0084 
EARN*DIV -12.7763 -2.87 0.0041 31.4063 2.24 0.0254 -6.4640 -1.23 0.2198 43.4255 2.71 0.0069 
∆EARN       1.0168 7.27 <.0001 -0.7879 -0.80 0.4226 
∆EARN*IC       0.1815 0.51 0.6131 0.2848 0.78 0.4350 
∆EARN*LOSS       -0.0952 -1.13 0.2596 -0.2361 -0.67 0.5022 
∆EARN*SIZE       -0.1169 -3.88 0.0001 0.1068 0.66 0.5102 
∆EARN*MB       -0.0047 -0.45 0.6502 0.2350 2.88 0.0041 
∆EARN*LEVG       0.1777 0.91 0.3605 0.8908 1.16 0.2450 
∆EARN*INSTIT       0.4980 2.90 0.0037 0.7960 1.23 0.2197 
∆EARN*DIV       -5.5931 -1.13 0.2582 -14.8439 -0.94 0.3495 
EARN*IC+∆EARN*IC       -0.4754 2.00 0.157 -0.4610 1.95 0.1629 
Adj R-Sq 0.1799 0.1821 0.1982 0.2005 
# Obs 9,399 800 9,399 800 
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Panel D: Unification Sample: Pre-Unification 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
  Main Control One-to-One Control Main Control One-to-One Control 
 Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept -0.1314 -12.90 <.0001 -0.1398 -3.21 0.0014 -0.1140 -11.21 <.0001 -0.0995 -2.16 0.0311 
EARN 4.4958 24.01 <.0001 6.2791 3.64 0.0003 3.8857 18.98 <.0001 3.6320 1.68 0.0937 
EARN*IC -1.3136 -3.06 0.0022 -0.8452 -1.52 0.1299 -1.1473 -2.36 0.0185 -0.0630 -0.10 0.9222 
EARN*LOSS -4.8210 -30.75 <.0001 -4.7408 -5.21 <.0001 -4.3542 -25.21 <.0001 -3.8854 -3.72 0.0002 
EARN*SIZE 0.0468 1.65 0.0993 -0.1832 -0.80 0.4260 0.0393 1.32 0.1881 -0.0102 -0.04 0.9715 
EARN*MB -0.0567 -3.39 0.0007 -0.0324 -0.84 0.4027 -0.0493 -2.84 0.0045 -0.0752 -1.02 0.3070 
EARN*LEVG -1.2901 -5.00 <.0001 -2.7450 -2.50 0.0127 -0.8825 -3.26 0.0011 -3.8221 -2.78 0.0058 
EARN*INSTIT 0.0716 0.49 0.6261 -0.4120 -0.52 0.6028 -0.2584 -1.63 0.1025 -0.2375 -0.23 0.8183 
EARN*DIV -17.2597 -4.04 <.0001 24.0699 1.20 0.2308 -11.0834 -2.37 0.0180 20.7787 0.87 0.3826 
∆EARN       0.7561 4.90 <.0001 2.9069 1.32 0.1894 
∆EARN*IC       -0.0447 -0.07 0.9460 -0.7091 -0.99 0.3222 
∆EARN*LOSS       0.0064 0.07 0.9456 -0.6848 -1.06 0.2905 
∆EARN*SIZE       -0.0263 -0.96 0.3360 -0.1276 -0.44 0.6600 
∆EARN*MB       -0.0046 -0.35 0.7290 -0.0095 -0.14 0.8900 
∆EARN*LEVG       -0.6086 -2.70 0.0069 0.4781 0.44 0.6568 
∆EARN*INSTIT       0.6837 4.94 <.0001 -0.3705 -0.39 0.7004 
∆EARN*DIV       -6.5438 -1.50 0.1330 23.0251 0.68 0.4998 
EARN*IC+∆EARN*IC       -1.1920 4.12 0.0424 -0.7721 1.27 0.2608 
Adj R-Sq 0.1792 0.1236 0.2189 0.1697 
# Obs 6,273 351 6,273 351 
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Panel E: Unification Sample: Post-Unification 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
  Main Control One-to-One Control Main Control One-to-One Control 
 Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept -0.1519 -10.72 <.0001 -0.1207 -1.47 0.1444 -0.1304 -9.16 <.0001 -0.1016 -1.26 0.2096 
EARN 4.6674 17.77 <.0001 2.8188 1.17 0.2444 3.8537 13.22 <.0001 6.1437 2.17 0.0321 
EARN*IC 0.2308 0.47 0.6371 1.0611 1.23 0.2226 -1.0806 -1.22 0.2242 0.3821 0.30 0.7629 
EARN*LOSS -5.2873 -24.28 <.0001 -5.4966 -3.26 0.0014 -4.7892 -19.60 <.0001 -6.3890 -3.47 0.0007 
EARN*SIZE 0.0325 0.69 0.4922 0.0085 0.02 0.9845 0.0558 1.10 0.2710 -0.1022 -0.18 0.8606 
EARN*MB 0.0341 1.52 0.1292 -0.1663 -0.62 0.5366 0.0273 1.16 0.2454 -0.8452 -2.26 0.0256 
EARN*LEVG -0.4859 -1.41 0.1572 2.7072 1.02 0.3094 -0.1830 -0.49 0.6213 -0.1012 -1.96 0.0528 
EARN*INSTIT 0.1748 0.65 0.5143 0.9827 0.46 0.6493 -0.2475 -0.87 0.3850 2.5057 0.77 0.4415 
EARN*DIV -25.2384 -2.80 0.0051 -49.9289 -1.26 0.2097 -19.6014 -1.86 0.0629 -67.2992 -1.47 0.1453 
∆EARN       0.9861 4.15 <.0001 -5.3850 -1.59 0.1153 
∆EARN*IC       1.1213 1.24 0.2155 0.3020 0.21 0.8334 
∆EARN*LOSS       -0.0739 -0.52 0.6012 2.3258 1.34 0.1820 
∆EARN*SIZE       -0.0813 -1.51 0.1313 0.5615 0.88 0.3783 
∆EARN*MB       0.0255 1.19 0.2352 0.9160 2.84 0.0053 
∆EARN*LEVG       -0.6311 -1.79 0.0741 0. 1010 2.06 0.0417 
∆EARN*INSTIT       1.1418 4.20 <.0001 -2.0897 -0.60 0.5498 
∆EARN*DIV       0.3243 0.03 0.9722 10.0845 0.19 0.8525 
EARN*IC+∆EARN*IC       0.0407 0.01 0.9365 0.6841 0.41 0.5255 
Adj R-Sq 0.1628 0.0806 0.1960 0.2136 
# Obs 4,284 141 4,284 141 
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CHAPTER 3: THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT OF DUAL-CLASS FIRMS 
3.1. Introduction 
 Dual-class firms have typically two classes of stock.  The “inferior” class has little 
or no voting rights and the “superior” class has a disproportionally larger number of votes 
per share. Dual-class share structure creates the ideal setting for owners of voting rights 
to act in their own interest and extract private benefits at the expense of cash flow rights 
holders. In addition, owners of voting rights have often superior information about firm 
performance and incentives to limit the information available to the rest of shareholders. 
As a result, dual-class firms are often perceived to have low transparency and high 
information asymmetry. Higher information asymmetry and the lack of high quality 
information lead to a higher cost of capital and to stock prices that do not reflect correct 
firm value.  
 In this chapter I investigate the information environment of dual-class firms. 
Particularly, I examine four information environment measures: analyst forecast 
dispersion, analyst forecast error, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio, and bid-ask spread. 
To assure that my results are not sample-specific, I investigate four different samples of 
dual-class firms including a hand-collected sample of dual-class firms that unify their 
shares. 
 I document that the information environment for dual-class firms is worse than for 
single-class firms. In addition, dual-class firms that unify their shares show an improved 
information environment in the post-unification period. These results have an important 
implication for market participants and provide explanation as to why market participants 
mistrust information provided by dual-class firms.  
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3.2. Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
 Dual-class stock structure creates a divergence between voting rights and cash 
flow rights. This segregation leads to an agency problem and conflicts of interest between 
controlling insiders with voting rights and the rest of shareholders. Controlling insiders 
can act in their own interest and extract private benefits at the expense of the rest of 
shareholders. The holders of voting rights often have superior information about firm 
performance and investment opportunities, and have incentive to limit the availability of 
this superior information to the rest of shareholders and other market participants. The 
amount of information available and the quality of this information has been the focal 
point of previous studies. For instance, Tinaikar (2006) suggests that dual-class firms 
voluntarily release less information compared to single-class firms. Francis, Schipper, 
and Vincent (2005) document lower quality of earnings in dual-class firms compared to 
single-class firms. Low earnings quality is shown to be associated with information 
asymmetry (for example, Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman, 2008) which creates a 
higher dispersion of beliefs, larger spreads, and more illiquidity. A higher level of 
information asymmetry is often associated with a decrease in liquidity as evidenced by 
the widening of the bid-ask spread (Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Therefore, 
I hypothesize that dual-class firms exhibit higher information asymmetry than single-
class firms. In particular, my research hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 1: Dual-class firms have larger dispersion of beliefs among analysts 
compared to single-class firms. 
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Hypothesis 2: Dual-class firms have larger illiquidity and larger spreads than single-class 
firms. 
Hypothesis 3: Within the sample of dual-class firms, the largest separation between 
voting and cash flow rights is associated with higher information asymmetry. 
Hypothesis 4: The information environment of dual-class firms improves after 
unification. 
3.3. Data and Sample Selection 
In this study, I examine four different samples of U.S. listed dual-class firms. The 
“original sample” consists of 385 firms with two classes of stock termed the “inferior 
class” and “superior class”. After the collection of necessary data items to construct the 
variables of interest, my sample size decreases to 336 firms (1,465 firm-years). The 
sample period starts in 1994 and ends in 2002. In order to be included in the sample, a 
firm must exhibit dual-class share structure for at least two years during the time period 
from 1994 to 2002.  Firms in utility (two digit SIC code from 40 to 49) and financial 
industries (two digit SIC code between 60 and 69) are excluded from the sample. 
I build the “extended sample” based on the “original sample”. I manually examine 
each dual-class firm’s 10-K annual report filing at the SEC for each year from 2003 to 
2009. I identify 122 dual-class stocks (1,301 firm-years) from the original sample that 
maintain dual-class share structure beyond 2002 and have enough data to construct the 
analyzed variables. To be included in the sample, a firm must exhibit dual-class share 
structure for at least two years during the time period from 1994 to 2002 and at least one 
year from 2003 to 2009.  
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The third sample I examine is called the “restricted sample” and is restricted to 
dual-class firms that maintain dual-class share structure for the entire period from 1995 to 
2009. The sample consists of 83 dual-class firms (961 firm-years). I include a firm only if 
it has a dual-class share structure for each and every year from 1995 to 2009. 
The fourth sample consists of dual-class firms that “unify” their shares, i.e., they 
abolish their dual-class share structure and become single-class companies. I initially 
identify 65 firms that unify their shares by examining dual-class firms’ proxy statements 
from 1994 to 2009. After deleting firms with missing data, the unification sample 
includes 42 firms. The sample is divided into a pre-unification period and post-
unification period. I delete the year of unification.  
Data on analysts’ dispersion is obtained from the Institutional Brokers Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S). Stock returns, trading volume, and bid-ask spreads are obtained from 
the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP). Furthermore, I collect accounting 
variables to control for different firm characteristics from the COMPUSTAT database. I 
winsorize all accounting variables at the 1% and 99% level.  
3.4. Methodology 
3.4.1. Information Environment Measures 
 To examine the information environment of dual-class companies, I construct 
four measures: analyst forecast dispersion (Disp), analyst forecast errors (FErr), 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure (Illiq), and bid-ask spread (Spread). These measures 
are used to investigate the degree of information asymmetry in dual-class firms and are 
compared to single-class firms. 
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Following Zhang (2006), I compute analyst forecast dispersion as: 
 -4
t-1
Stdev
t PriceDisp =                                                                                                      (1) 
Where Stdev-4 is the standard deviation of analyst forecast made four months prior to 
fiscal year-end and Pricet-1 is the prior year-end stock price. A higher ratio implies a 
higher level of dispersion in analyst forecasts which corresponds to greater information 
uncertainty. 
 The next measure I employ is analyst forecast error which is calculated as the 
absolute value of the difference between mean estimate and actual earnings scaled by 
prior year-end stock price: 
 -4 t
t-1
abs(MeanEst -Actual )
t PriceFErr =                                                                                   (2) 
Where MeanEst-4 is the average of estimated earnings per share forecasts four months 
prior to fiscal year-end, Actualt  is announced earnings per share at the fiscal-year end, 
and Pricet-1 is the prior year-end stock price. 
 Following Amihud (2002), I estimate daily illiquidity ratio as: 
 d
d d
abs(Ret )
d VOL * PriceIlliq =                                                                                               (3) 
Where Retd is daily return, VOLd is trading volume on day d, and Priced is stock closing 
price on day d. For each stock i in year t, I then calculate the average Illiq as the sum of 
Illiqd divided by the number of trading days in year t for which data on daily return, daily 
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trading volume, and closing price is available. A lower ratio implies higher liquidity 
which corresponds to lower information asymmetry. 
 The final measure of information uncertainty is bid-ask spread defined as: 
 d d dSpread =ClosingAsk -ClosingBid                                                                      (4) 
Where Closing Ask is the closing ask price on day d in year t and Closing bid is the 
closing bid price on day d in year t. For each stock i in year t, I calculate the average 
spread using the sum of daily closing Spreadd divided by the number of trading days in 
year t.A higher spread is associated with higher information asymmetry. 
 Each dual-class firm in my sample is matched to one single-class firm based on 
industry (measured by the two digit SIC code), fiscal year, and size (measured by taking 
the natural logarithm of price multiplied by shares outstanding). 
 In order to test for the difference between each information environment measure 
for dual-class companies and matched single-class companies, I perform a t-test for the 
difference in means and non-parametric Wilcoxon sum rank test for the difference in 
medians. 
3.4.2. Within-Sample Analysis 
Using the “original sample” of dual-class stocks2, I follow Francis, Schipper, and 
Vincent (2005) and identify stocks with high and low ownership concentration to further 
                                                            
2 Required data to construct the Voting/Cash Flow Rights Ratio is only available for the 
“original” sample. 
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examine the relation between information asymmetry and concentrated ownership. I 
achieve this by constructing two variables defined as follows: 
    (5) 
                       (6) 
In each year, I rank dual-class firms based on the voting flow rights to cash flow 
rights ratio. Dual-class firms with the highest (lowest) ratio have the highest (lowest) 
level of separation between the classes and thus possess more (less) concentrated 
ownership. I divide the sample based on the ratio into three groups, High, Medium, and 
Low, with an equal number of firms in each group. I analyze the difference between the 
High (firms with the most separation between voting and cash flow rights) and Low 
(firms with the least separation between voting and cash flow rights) group. 
3.4.3. Regression Analysis 
 Following prior studies, I control for factors previously shown to influence the 
information environment and ownership structure. These factors include Size (defined as 
the number of shares outstanding multiplied by price), Debt ratio, book-to-market (BM) 
ratio, return on assets (ROA), and Pastgrowth (defined as Book-to-Market ratio in 
previous year).Therefore, I estimate the following four models using panel data: 
 Model 1: 
 
0 1 2 3
4 5
_it it it it it
it it it
Disp Size Debt Ratio BM ROA
Pastgrowth DUAL
α β β β β
β β ε
= + + + +
+ + +                                         
(7) 
Number of Inferior Class Shares Outstanding
(%)
Number of Inferior Class Shares Outstanding+Number of Superior Class Shares Outstanding
RightsCashFlow =
Number of Votes Per Inferior Share Number of Inferior Shares Outstanding
(%)
Number of Votes Per Superior Share Number of Superior Shares Outstanding
RightsVotingFlow
×
=
×
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Where DUALit is equal to 1 if it is a dual-class firm, and is equal to 0 otherwise. 
 Model 2: 
0 1 2 3
4 5
_it it it it it
it it it
FErr Size Debt Ratio BM ROA
Pastgrowth DUAL
α β β β β
β β ε
= + + + +
+ + +
                                         (8) 
 Model 3: 
0 1 2 3
4 5
_it it it it it
it it it
Illiq Size Debt Ratio BM ROA
Pastgrowth DUAL
α β β β β
β β ε
= + + + +
+ + +
                                           (9) 
 Model 4: 
0 1 2 3
4 5
_it it it it it
it it it
Spread Size Debt Ratio BM ROA
Pastgrowth DUAL
α β β β β
β β ε
= + + + +
+ + +
                                    (10) 
 I am interested in the coefficient on the dummy variable DUAL. A positive and 
statistically significant coefficient implies higher information asymmetry for dual-class 
firms than for single-class firms. 
3.5.Empirical Results 
3.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 3.1, Panel A through E present summary statistics for the four samples used 
in analysis of the information environment measures. The sample characteristics are 
MCAP, TOTAL ASSETS, SIZE, LEVERAGE, PASTGROWTH, SALESGROWTH, 
DEBT RATIO, BM, ROE, and ROA. MCAP is the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by fiscal year-end price plus the difference between total assets and total 
common equity at the end of fiscal year t. TOTAL ASSETS is a firm’s total assets from 
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COMPUSTAT at the end of fiscal year t. SIZE is the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by price at the end of year t. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long term debt to total 
assets at the end of fiscal year t-1. PASTGROWTH is the book-to-market ratio in prior 
year t-1. SALESGROWTH is the total sales for fiscal year t scaled by total sales in fiscal 
year t-1. DEBT RATIO is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. BM is the ratio of the 
book value of equity to market value. ROE is the return on equity measured as income 
before extraordinary items in year t scaled by total stockholder’s equity in year t. ROA is 
the return on assets measured as earnings before extraordinary items in year t scaled by 
total assets. Panel A shows results for the original sample of dual-class firms. The p-
values for the tests of difference in means and medians are displayed in the last two 
columns of each panel.  Dual-class firms from the original sample matched to single-class 
firms based on industry, fiscal year, and size share similar characteristics. However, dual-
class firms on average have higher past growth, higher book-to-market ratio, lower sales 
growth, and higher return on equity than single-class firms. 
 Panel B reports summary statistics for the extended sample. The means and 
medians of most variables are similar to those values from the original sample of dual-
class firms. Dual-class firms have similar size and return on assets (ROA) compared to 
single-class firms. 
 Table C presents summary statistics for the restricted sample. The restricted 
sample is represented by dual-class firms that are larger in size, have larger market 
capitalization, and larger total assets than dual-class firms in the original sample. These 
firms maintain dual-class share structure for the entire period from 1995 to 2009 and it is 
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reasonable that these dual-class firms are larger and more financially sound than firms in 
the original sample. 
 Summary statistics for the unification sample are provided in Panel D (pre-
unification period) and Panel E (post-unification period). The pre-unification sample of 
dual-class firms has similar characteristics to the original sample of dual-class firms. In 
addition, dual-class firms in the pre-unification period have lower leverage and lower 
sales growth than matching single-class firms. After unification, dual-class firms have 
larger market capitalization (an increase from 2,188.35 to 5,933.97), higher total assets 
(an increase from 1,476.37 to 3,238.25), and more leverage (an increase from 0.1822 to 
0.223) than dual-class firms in the pre-unification period. 
3.5.2. Information Environment Measures 
 Table 3.2, Panels A through E, present results for the univariate analysis of the 
following information environment measures: Disp, FErr, Illiq, and Spread. The results 
of the t-test for the difference between means (dual minus single) and the results of 
Wilcoxon sum rank test for the difference between medians are given in the last two 
columns of each panel. Panel A reports univariate results for the original sample. The 
mean analyst forecast dispersion measure (Disp) is 0.1071 for dual-class firms and 
0.0619 for single-class firms. The difference (dual minus single) is positive (0.0452) and 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The difference in means of analyst forecast 
error is also positive (0.0272) and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The 
illiquidity ratio and spreads are higher in dual-class firms than in single-class firms. I find 
evidence supporting my hypothesis that information asymmetry is higher in dual-class 
firms than in single-class firms. 
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 Panel B presents univariate analysis of information asymmetry variables for the 
extended sample while Panel C shows the results for the restricted sample of dual-class 
firms. Both tables document higher analyst forecast dispersion, higher illiquidity, and 
higher bid-ask spreads implying higher information uncertainty and more dispersion of 
beliefs for firms with two classes of stock. 
 The analysis of information environment measures for the unification sample is 
given in Panel D (pre-unification period) and Panel E (post-unification period). The 
differences in means and medians between dual-class firms and single-class firms are 
positive and statistically significant in pre-unification. However, the differences in means 
and medians between information asymmetry variables of dual-class firms and single-
class firms in the post-unification period are not statistically significant. This implies that 
the dispersion of beliefs in dual-class firms after unification is the same as in single-class 
firms. In addition, Panels D and E document that analyst forecast dispersion of dual-class 
companies, on average, decrease from 0.0612 in pre-unification to 0.0398 after 
unification. Analyst forecast error (FErr) also shows a decline from 0.0342 before 
unification to 0.0076 after unification.  
3.5.3. Within -Sample Analysis 
 The within-sample analysis of measures of information asymmetry is given in 
Table 3.3. Group “High” represents dual-class firms with the most separation between 
voting and cash flow rights while group “Low” consists of dual-class firms with the least 
separation between voting and cash flow rights. The mean difference, median difference, 
and tests of difference between mean and median for four measures (Disp, FErr, Illiq, and 
Spread) are given in the last four columns. The differences in Disp, Illiq, and Spread 
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between “High” and “Low” groups (High minus Low) are positive and statistically 
significant. This implies that dual-class firms with the most concentrated ownership 
exhibit the most information asymmetry.  
3.5.4. Regression Analysis 
 The results of four regression models are provided in Table 3.4. The dependent 
variables in Model 1 through Model 4 are the following information environment 
measures: analyst forecast dispersion (Disp), analyst forecast error (FErr), Amihud’s 
illiquidity ratio (Illiq), and bid-ask spread (Spread). I include control variables to control 
for firm characteristics that are previously shown to affect firm information environment 
and stock ownership structure. Panel A shows the results for the original sample. The 
coefficient for DUAL is my main concern. For all four models, I document a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for DUAL which suggests higher information 
asymmetry in dual-class firms compared to single-class firms. For instance, the 
regression coefficient for DUAL in Model 1 is 0.0459 (significant at the 10% level) and 
the regression coefficient is 0.0274 (significant at the 5% level) for Model 2. The 
regression coefficients for Model 3 and Model 4 are 0.6869 (significant at the 1% level), 
and 0.0771 (significant at the 1% level), respectively. Panel B introduces the results for 
the extended sample. The restricted sample results are given in Panel C. The results for 
these two samples are also similar to the original sample results. The coefficient on 
DUAL is positive and statistically significant in most cases, which is in accordance with 
my hypothesis that dual-class firms exhibit higher information uncertainty than single-
class firms. Panel D and Panel E show the regression analysis results for the pre-
unification and post-unification periods, respectively. I document that in the post-
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unification period, the coefficient for DUAL in all four models is not statistically 
significant. This result suggests that there is no difference in the information environment 
between unified and matching single-class firms after unification.  
3.6.Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I examine the information environment of dual-class firms and 
compare it to single-class firms. In addition, I investigate changes in the information 
environment after dual-class firms abolish this structure by unifying shares. I employ four 
different measures of information environment: analyst forecast dispersion, analyst 
forecast error, Amihud’s illiquidity ratio, and bid-ask spread. To assure that my results 
are not sample-specific, I investigate four different samples of dual-class firms: the 
original sample, the extended sample, the restricted sample, and the unified sample. I 
document higher analyst forecast dispersion, higher analyst forecast error, higher 
illiquidity ratio, and higher bid-ask spread in dual-class firms compared to single-class 
firms. I also find that there is no statistically significant difference in the measures of 
information asymmetry between unified firms and single-class firms in the post-
unification period. These results imply that the information environment is worse for 
dual-class firms than for single-class firms. In addition, dual-class firms that unify their 
shares enjoy a better information environment in the post-unification period. The results 
of this chapter provide some explanation into the contradictory results of the first and 
second chapters. In the first chapter, I document that the quality of accruals is better in 
dual-class firms than in single-class firms. In the second chapter, I conclude that earnings 
informativeness is worse for dual-class firms than that for single-class firms which is 
contrary to the results of the first chapter. In this chapter, my findings of higher 
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information asymmetry in dual-class firms explain my prior contradicting results.  Dual-
class firms’ inferior information environment results in uncertainty about the quality of 
information provided by dual-class firms to the public. Even though, my analysis 
suggests that the quality of accruals is higher in dual-class firms, the market perceives the 
credibility of this information as low. 
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
The table presents summary statistics for the sample of dual-class firms and matching single-class firms based on industry, fiscal year and size. MCAP is the 
number of shares outstanding multiplied by fiscal year-end price plus the difference between total assets and total common equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
TOTAL ASSETS is a firm’s total assets from COMPUSTAT at the end of fiscal year t. SIZE is number of shares outstanding multiplied by price at the end 
of year t . LEVERAGE is the ratio of long term debt to total assets at the end of fiscal year t-1. PASTGROWTH is book-to-market ratio in prior year t-1. 
SALESGROWTH is total sales for fiscal year t scaled by total sales in fiscal year t-1. DEBT RATIO is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. BM is the 
ratio of book value of equity to market value. ROE is return on equity measured as income before extraordinary items in year t scaled by total stockholder’s 
equity in year t. ROA is return on assets measured as earnings before extraordinary items in year t scaled by total assets. The p-values for t-test to test the 
difference between means and p-values for Wilcoxon sum rank test to test the difference between medians are given in the last two columns of each panel. 
Panels A shows summary statistics of original sample. Panels B provide summary statistics for extended sample. Panel C illustrate summary statistics for 
restricted sample. The results of the unification sample in pre-unification and post-unification periods are given in Panels D and E. 
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Panel A: Original Sample  
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of 
Difference 
between 
Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of 
Difference 
between 
Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank test  
MCAP (MM$) 1,961.57 278.87 820.28 1,901.08 1,893.94 264.78 750.20 1,783.55 67.6313 0.6100 0.2755 
ASSETS (MM$) 1,207.39 204.04 553.91 1,353.53 1,176.14 175.91 470.96 1,124.78 31.2565 0.7144 0.0057 
SIZE 5.9518 4.8301 6.0296 6.9540 5.9584 4.8514 6.0181 6.9338 -0.0066 0.9063 0.9039 
LEVERAGE 0.2336 0.0775 0.2147 0.3452 0.2342 0.0883 0.2197 0.3412 -0.0006 0.9274 0.6947 
PASTGROWTH 0.7249 0.5043 0.7133 0.9217 0.6723 0.4671 0.6751 0.8691 0.0525* <.0001 <.0001 
SALESGROWTH 1.1374 0.9993 1.0791 1.1881 1.1974 1.0006 1.0953 1.2541 -0.0600* <.0001 0.0012 
DEBT RATIO 0.5402 0.3954 0.5364 0.6696 0.5470 0.4136 0.5486 0.6736 -0.0068 0.3771 0.2814 
BM 0.7516 0.5227 0.7474 0.9584 0.6990 0.4977 0.6931 0.8959 0.0526* <.0001 <.0001 
ROE 0.0496 0.0286 0.0963 0.1517 0.0165 0.0022 0.0949 0.1584 0.0330** 0.0280 0.3170 
ROA 0.1200 0.0886 0.1274 0.1714 0.1241 0.0897 0.1349 0.1803 -0.0042 0.3376 0.0334 
# Obs 1,465 1,465    
*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level 
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Panel B: Extended Sample  
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
  
 Test of 
Difference 
between 
Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of 
Difference 
between 
Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank test  
MCAP (MM$) 2,387.91 334.45 1,081.67 2,584.34 2,409.44 326.44 1,020.31 2,622.19 -21.5301 0.8872 0.4334 
ASSETS (MM$) 1,451.85 265.56 738.76 1,795.59 1,601.41 224.84 598.88 1,507.52 -149.6000 0.1351 0.0041 
SIZE 6.2219 5.0417 6.3176 7.3406 6.2138 5.0362 6.3137 7.3325 0.0081 0.8948 0.9135 
LEVERAGE 0.2157 0.0887 0.2041 0.3213 0.2300 0.0831 0.2138 0.3302 -0.0142** 0.0324 0.4291 
PASTGROWTH 0.7591 0.5333 0.7552 0.9589 0.6829 0.4935 0.6753 0.8689 0.0762* <.0001 <.0001 
SALESGROWTH 1.0752 0.9969 1.0632 1.1385 1.1284 0.9853 1.0694 1.2009 -0.0532* <.0001 0.0234 
DEBT RATIO 0.5212 0.3964 0.5221 0.6452 0.5525 0.4046 0.5498 0.6752 -0.0314* <.0001 0.0022 
BM 0.7673 0.5436 0.7643 0.9647 0.6988 0.4995 0.6845 0.8833 0.0685* <.0001 <.0001 
ROE 0.0801 0.0451 0.0961 0.1465 0.0241 0.0054 0.0970 0.1602 0.0560* 0.0002 0.2332 
ROA 0.1280 0.0948 0.1267 0.1675 0.1280 0.0919 0.1320 0.1791 0.0000 0.9995 0.1355 
# Obs 1,301 1,301    
*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level 
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*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Restricted Sample  
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of 
Difference 
between 
Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of 
Difference 
between 
Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank 
test  
MCAP (MM$) 2,650.13 396.33 1,314.75 2,858.86 2,823.13 434.75 1,180.75 3,277.52 -173.00 0.3508 0.9148 
ASSETS (MM$) 1,629.95 322.70 874.46 2,040.68 1,889.98 290.79 735.50 1,933.57 -260.00** 0.0413 0.1345 
SIZE 6.4325 5.3997 6.5657 7.5345 6.4278 5.3761 6.5581 7.5332 0.0047 0.9468 0.9214 
LEVERAGE 0.2158 0.0966 0.2069 0.3133 0.2306 0.0924 0.2175 0.3280 -0.0148** 0.0499 0.3384 
PASTGROWTH 0.7523 0.5353 0.7457 0.9392 0.6828 0.4937 0.6798 0.8631 0.0696* <.0001 <.0001 
SALESGROWTH 1.0755 0.9991 1.0615 1.1317 1.1208 0.9812 1.0700 1.1956 -0.0453* <.0001 0.0728 
DEBT RATIO 0.5094 0.3969 0.5121 0.6322 0.5615 0.4163 0.5589 0.6826 -0.0522* <.0001 <.0001 
BM 0.7593 0.5356 0.7572 0.9507 0.6991 0.5017 0.6919 0.8734 0.0602* <.0001 <.0001 
ROE 0.0825 0.0506 0.0973 0.1432 0.0129 0.0037 0.0987 0.1589 0.0696* 0.0001 0.2389 
ROA 0.1291 0.0986 0.1275 0.1666 0.1273 0.0887 0.1304 0.1753 0.0017 0.6618 0.6625 
# Obs 961 961    
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*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Pre-Unification Sample  
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of 
Difference 
between 
Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of 
Differen
ce 
between 
Median 
(p-
values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Media
n 
Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcox
on sum 
rank test 
MCAP (MM$) 2,183.35 490.65 935.95 1,543.33 2,186.22 511.68 991.40 1,902.29 -2.8774 0.9956 0.3670 
ASSETS (MM$) 1,476.37 183.24 553.83 1,002.97 1,231.07 257.13 598.40 1,385.70 245.30 0.5470 0.2827 
SIZE 6.3164 5.5684 6.4139 6.9647 6.3164 5.5441 6.3695 6.9471 0.0001 0.9996 0.9099 
LEVERAGE 0.1822 0.0627 0.1609 0.2813 0.2220 0.0658 0.2045 0.3432 -0.0398** 0.0402 0.1213 
PASTGROWTH 0.5930 0.4254 0.6046 0.7979 0.6088 0.3997 0.5860 0.8114 -0.0158 0.6299 0.8546 
SALESGROWTH 1.1968 1.0287 1.1104 1.2666 1.2913 1.0263 1.1249 1.3707 -0.0945*** 0.0782 0.2891 
DEBT RATIO 0.5075 0.4005 0.5064 0.6084 0.5450 0.4036 0.5292 0.6947 -0.0375 0.1321 0.1923 
BM 0.5984 0.4018 0.5749 0.7979 0.6405 0.4410 0.6060 0.8197 -0.0420 0.2136 0.3246 
ROE 0.0141 0.0196 0.1121 0.1621 -0.0259 -0.0068 0.0904 0.1611 0.0399 0.4894 0.5384 
ROA 0.1180 0.0841 0.1431 0.2049 0.1061 0.0876 0.1225 0.1883 0.0118 0.5253 0.2659 
# Obs 256 256    
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Panel E: Post-Unification Sample  
 UNIFIED SINGLE 
 
 Test of 
Difference 
between 
Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of 
Differen
ce 
between 
Median 
(p-
values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxo
n sum 
rank test 
MCAP (MM$) 5,933.97 936.56 1,905.21 4,965.40 6,130.65 795.35 1,954.99 4,756.56 -196.70 0.8777 0.6721 
ASSETS (MM$) 3,238.25 554.14 1,193.50 2,935.53 3,443.98 461.88 1,286.69 2,903.62 -205.70 0.7274 0.4851 
SIZE 7.0829 6.2993 7.1054 8.0199 7.0821 6.2759 7.1319 7.9812 0.0008 0.9953 0.9702 
LEVERAGE 0.2223 0.0724 0.1623 0.3057 0.1905 0.0554 0.1738 0.2965 0.0318*** 0.0701 0.4082 
PASTGROWTH 0.6531 0.4544 0.6502 0.8641 0.6362 0.4053 0.6435 0.8248 0.0169 0.4765 0.3872 
SALESGROWTH 1.0886 0.9832 1.0854 1.1786 1.1361 0.9887 1.0839 1.2111 -0.0474 0.0425 0.4102 
DEBT RATIO 0.5397 0.3796 0.5104 0.6230 0.5074 0.3998 0.4986 0.6160 0.0323 0.1059 0.6535 
BM 0.6660 0.4637 0.6572 0.8641 0.6481 0.4599 0.6589 0.8204 0.0179 0.4331 0.4400 
ROE 0.0549 0.0126 0.0914 0.1447 0.0051 0.0161 0.0945 0.1580 0.0498 0.1751 0.9084 
ROA 0.1334 0.0847 0.1254 0.1791 0.1124 0.0796 0.1186 0.1615 0.0210** 0.0224 0.2318 
# Obs 133 133    
*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level 
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Table 3.2 Univariate Analysis of Information Environment Measures 
This table presents the univariate analysis results of the following variables: Disp, FErr, Illiq, and Spread. Disp is defined at the standard deviation of analyst 
forecast made four month prior to fiscal year-end scaled by the prior year-end stock price. FErr is defined as the absolute value of the difference between 
mean estimate of earnings per share four month prior to fiscal year-end and actual earnings per share at the fiscal year-end divided by prior year-end stock 
price. Illiq is the average of daily Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio in year t defined as the ratio of absolute value of daily return to daily trading dollar 
volume. Spread is defined as the average of daily closing spread (closing ask minus closing bid) in year t. The p-values for t-test to test the difference 
between means and p-values for Wilcoxon sum rank test to test the difference between medians are given in the last two columns of each panel. Panel A 
shows Univariate analysis results of original sample. Panels B provide Univariate analysis for extended sample. Panel C illustrate univariate analysis for 
restricted sample. The Univariate results of the unification sample in pre-unification and post-unification periods are given in Panels D and E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 127 
 
Panel A: Original Sample 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE  Test of Difference 
between Mean 
(p-values) 
Test of Difference 
between Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank 
test  
Disp 0.1071 0.0112 0.0246 0.0627 0.0619 0.0059 0.0128 0.0381 0.0452*** 
 
0.0985 <.0001 
FErr 0.0524 0.0018 0.0066 0.0245 0.0252 0.0004 0.0014 0.0059 0.0272** 
 
0.0398 <.0001 
Illiq 3.9136 0.0833 0.5061 2.6499 3.4098 0.0592 0.3082 2.2593 0.5038*** 
 
0.0946 0.0008 
Spread 0.4457 0.2037 0.344 0.4727 0.3786 0.1876 0.3155 0.4427 0.0671* 
 
0.0090 0.0010 
# obs 1,465 1,465 
*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level 
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Panel B: Extended Sample 
 DUAL SINGLE 
 
 Test of Difference 
between Mean 
(p-values) 
Test of Difference 
between Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank 
test  
Disp 0.0998 0.0104 0.0226 0.0552 0.0492 0.005 0.0118 0.0338 0.0505*** 
 
0.0591 <.0001 
FErr 0.0454 0.0017 0.0057 0.0172 0.0205 0.0005 0.0014 0.0046 0.0249*** 
 
0.0564 <.0001 
Illiq 3.0873 0.0304 0.1886 1.4745 2.1652 0.0267 0.1715 1.1027 0.9222* 
 
0.0002 0.1508 
Spread 0.3520 0.0602 0.1993 0.4068 0.2591 0.0515 0.1698 0.3703 0.0928* 
 
0.0010 0.0013 
# obs 1,301 1,301 
*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level 
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Panel C: Restricted Sample 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE  Test of Difference 
between Mean 
(p-values) 
Test of Difference 
between Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank 
test  
Disp 0.0607 0.0095 0.0213 0.0485 0.0389 0.0046 0.0106 0.029 0.0218* 
 
0.0022 <.0001 
FErr 0.0299 0.0015 0.0054 0.0160 0.0195 0.0004 0.0013 0.0043 0.0105 
 
0.1638 <.0001 
Illiq 2.2242 0.0223 0.1093 0.8469 1.7096 0.0199 0.1130 0.7517 0.5146** 
 
0.0281 0.7082 
Spread 0.2714 0.0521 0.1627 0.3891 0.2446 0.0430 0.1370 0.3460 0.0268 
 
0.1432 0.0084 
# obs 961 961 
*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level 
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*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Pre-Unification Sample 
 DUAL 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of Difference 
between Mean 
(p-values) 
Test of Difference 
between Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank 
test  
Disp 0.0612 0.0113 0.0224 0.0588 0.0428 0.0042 0.0095 0.0261 0.0184 
 
0.1477 <.0001 
FErr 0.0342 0.0023 0.0056 0.0148 0.0064 0.0004 0.0014 0.0044 0.0277** 
 
0.0287 <.0001 
Illiq 0.7242 0.0062 0.0240 0.1272 0.4401 0.0078 0.0300 0.1354 0.2841*** 
 
0.0949 0.2537 
Spread 0.1444 0.0236 0.0421 0.0821 0.0765 0.0218 0.0359 0.0801 0.0680** 
 
0.0214 0.2401 
# obs 256 256 
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Panel E: Post-Unification Sample 
 UNIFIED 
 
SINGLE 
 
 Test of Difference 
between Mean 
(p-values) 
Test of Difference 
between Median 
(p-values) 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Diff t-test  
 
 
Wilcoxon 
sum rank 
test  
Disp 0.0398 0.007 0.0164 0.0518 0.0646 0.0042 0.0100 0.0209 -0.0248 
 
0.4301 0.0277 
FErr 0.0076 0.0003 0.0009 0.0043 0.0187 0.0002 0.0009 0.0055 -0.0111 
 
0.3238 0.9541 
Illiq 1.2858 0.0797 0.2616 0.8528 1.3173 0.0492 0.1728 0.6577 -0.0315 
 
0.9392 0.0663 
Spread 0.3648 0.171 0.3455 0.5074 0.3259 0.1345 0.3076 0.4532 0.0389 
 
0.1934 0.0768 
# obs 133 133 
*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level 
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Table 3.3 Within-Sample Analysis 
This table provides the within-sample analysis of measures of information environment: Disp, FErr, Illiq, Spread. . Disp is defined at the standard deviation 
of analyst forecast made four month prior to fiscal year-end scaled by the prior year-end stock price. FErr is defined as the absolute value of the difference 
between mean estimate of earnings per share four month prior to fiscal year-end and actual earnings per share at the fiscal year-end divided by prior year-end 
stock price. Illiq is the average of daily Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio in year t defined as the ratio of absolute value of daily return to daily trading dollar 
volume. Spread is defined as the average of daily closing spread (closing ask minus closing bid) in year t. Dual-class firms from the original sample are 
ranked based on the VotingFlowRights(%)/CashFlowRights(%) ratio into three groups: High, Medium, and Low. The results for groups High and Low are 
given in table. Group “High” represent the highest separation between voting rights and cash flow rights while group “Low” represents the lowest separation 
between cash flow and voting rights. The CashFlowRights(%) variable is defined as: 
Number of Inferior Class Shares Outstanding
(%)
Number of Inferior Class Shares Outstanding+Number of Superior Class Shares Outstanding
RightsCashFlow =                                                                                               (1) 
. The VotingFlowRights(%) variable is defined as: 
Number of Votes Per Inferior Share Number of Inferior Shares Outstanding
(%)
Number of Votes Per Superior Share Number of Superior Shares Outstanding
RightsVotingFlow
×
=
×
                                                                                                            (2) 
The p-values for t-test to test the difference between means and p-values for Wilcoxon sum rank test to test the difference between medians are given in the 
last two columns of each panel. 
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Original Sample with VotingFlowRight(%)/CashFlowRight (% ) Ratio 
 HIGH LOW 
 
 Test of Difference 
between Mean  
(p-values) 
Test of Difference 
between Median 
(p-values) 
VAR Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean  
Diff 
Median 
Diff 
t-test  Wilcoxon 
sum rank 
test  
Disp 0.2015 0.0145 0.0296 0.0889 0.0654 0.0095 0.0236 0.0574 0.1362** 0.0060* 
 
0.0168 0.0044 
FErr 
 
0.0265 0.0003 0.0012 0.0048 0.0141 0.0004 0.0015 0.0056 0.0125 -0.0003 
 
0.2004 0.3200 
Illiq 
 
9.6610 0.1126 0.6287 4.8935 6.6551 0.0589 0.4778 1.6573 3.0059* 0.1509* 
 
0.0014 <.0001 
Spread 
 
0.4901 0.2189 0.3551 0.4906 0.3345 0.1486 0.2728 0.4085 0.1556*** 0.0206* 0.0639 0.0002 
#obs 481 481 
*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level 
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Table 3.4 Regression Analysis 
This table presents the results of the following four models 
0 1 2 3 4 5_it it it it it it it itDisp Size Debt Ratio BM ROA Pastgowth DUALα β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +                                                                    (1) 
0 1 2 3 4 5_it it it it it it it itFErr Size Debt Ratio BM ROA Pastgowth DUALα β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +                                                                    (2) 
0 1 2 3 4 5_it it it it it it it itIlliq Size Debt Ratio BM ROA Pastgowth DUALα β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +                                                                    (3) 
0 1 2 3 4 5_it it it it it it it itSpread Size Debt Ratio BM ROA Pastgowth DUALα β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +                                                               (4) 
Where dependent variables are the measures of information environment: Disp, FErr, Illiq, and Spread. Disp is defined at the standard deviation of analyst 
forecast made four month prior to fiscal year-end scaled by the prior year-end stock price. FErr is defined as the absolute value of the difference between 
mean estimate of earnings per share four month prior to fiscal year-end and actual earnings per share at the fiscal year-end divided by prior year-end stock 
price. Illiq is the average of daily Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio in year t defined as the ratio of absolute value of daily return to daily trading dollar 
volume. Spread is defined as the average of daily closing spread (closing ask minus closing bid) in year t.  The control variables are Size, Debt Ratio, Book-
to-Market (BM), Return on Assets (ROA) and Pastgrowth. Size is number of shares outstanding multiplied by price at the end of year t. Debt Ratio is the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets. . BM is the ratio of book value of equity to market value. ROA is return on assets measured as earnings before 
extraordinary items in year t scaled by total assets. Pastgrowth  is book-to-market ratio in prior year t-1. DUAL is equal to 1 for a dual-class firm, and is 
equal to 0, otherwise. Panels A shows regression results of original sample. Panels B provide regression results for extended sample. Panel C illustrate 
regression results for restricted sample. The results of the regression analysis of the unification sample in pre-unification and post-unification periods are 
given in Panels D and E. 
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Panel A: Original Sample  
 Model 1  
Disp 
Model 2 
Ferr 
Model 3 
Illiq 
Model 4 
Spread 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.3118* 2.93 0.0035 0.1502* 2.94 0.0033 17.3752* 21.88 <.0001 0.0732 0.88 0.3793 
Size -0.0380* -3.29 0.0010 -0.0234* -4.24 <.0001 -2.6842* -29.20 <.0001 0.0236** 2.47 0.0136 
Debt Ratio 0.3163* 4.43 <.0001 0.2069* 6.05 <.0001 0.4165 0.72 0.4714 0.1923* 3.17 0.0016 
BM -0.2295* -2.78 0.0055 -0.1016* -2.59 0.0097 -1.0754 -1.57 0.1169 -0.1016 -1.41 0.1576 
ROA -1.1227* -7.19 <.0001 -0.5258* -7.04 <.0001 3.0081* 2.85 0.0044 0.2662** 2.43 0.0153 
Pastgrowth 0.1999** 2.52 0.0119 0.0819** 2.17 0.0302 2.8301* 4.19 <.0001 0.1307*** 1.86 0.0636 
DUAL 0.0459*** 1.72 0.0851 0.0274** 2.15 0.0315 0.6869* 2.87 0.0041 0.0771* 3.05 0.0023 
Adj R-Sq 0.0574 
 
0.0722 0.3016 0.0127 
# Obs 1,834 2,928 
*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level 
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Panel B: Extended Sample  
 Model 1  
Disp 
Model 2 
FErr 
Model 3 
Illiq 
Model 4 
Spread 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.2654** 2.47 0.0137 0.1431* 2.58 0.0099 14.7913* 19.45 <.0001 0.2845* 3.03 0.0025 
Size -0.0457* -4.00 <.0001 -0.0293* -5.00 <.0001 -2.3927* -29.09 <.0001 -0.0175*** -1.72 0.0859 
Debt Ratio 0.3051* 4.29 <.0001 0.2056* 5.62 <.0001 1.4885* 2.69 0.0072 0.2425* 3.50 0.0005 
BM -0.1944** -2.22 0.0262 -0.0874*** -1.95 0.0514 -0.3845 -0.57 0.5715 -0.1244 -1.47 0.1413 
ROA -0.6969* -4.27 <.0001 -0.3445* -4.06 <.0001 5.9063* 4.66 <.0001 0.3148** 2.07 0.0390 
Pastgrowth 0.2262* 2.61 0.0092 0.1084** 2.43 0.0154 1.8029* 2.74 0.0062 -0.0184 -0.22 0.8228 
DUAL 0.0616** 2.31 0.0212 0.0276** 2.02 0.0439 0.5775* 2.61 0.0091 0.1184* 4.22 <.0001 
Adj R-Sq 0.0456 0.0595 0.3186 0.0110 
# Obs 1,740 2,602 
*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level 
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Panel C: Restricted Sample  
 Model 1  
Disp 
Model 2 
FErr 
Model 3 
Illiq 
Model 4 
Spread 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.1316* 4.52 <.0001 0.1126* 2.76 0.0058 11.4442* 16.24 <.0001 0.4875* 7.69 <.0001 
Size -0.0213* -7.25 <.0001 -0.0219* -5.33 <.0001 -1.8683* -24.84 <.0001 -0.0292* -4.33 <.0001 
Debt Ratio 0.1134* 6.14 <.0001 0.1445* 5.58 <.0001 1.1871** 2.33 0.0197 -0.0874*** -1.91 0.0568 
BM 0.0479** 2.10 0.0364 0.0096 0.30 0.7631 -0.0806 -0.13 0.8966 -0.1163** -2.08 0.0381 
ROA -0.2081* -4.30 <.0001 -0.1862* -2.76 0.0059 5.3722* 4.46 <.0001 0.7561* 6.90 <.0001 
Pastgrowth -0.0182 -0.81 0.4196 0.0042 0.13 0.8951 1.4353** 2.34 0.0193 -0.0392 -0.71 0.4798 
DUAL 0.0243* 3.59 0.0003 0.0093 0.98 0.3265 0.4809** 2.43 0.0153 0.0373** 2.06 0.0399 
Adj R-Sq 0.1334 0.0651 0.3201 0.0399 
# Obs 1,364 1,922 
*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level 
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Panel D: Pre-Unification Sample  
 Model 1  
Disp 
Model 2 
FErr 
Model 3 
Illiq 
Model 4 
Spread 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept -0.0960** -2.05 0.0415 0.0306 0.61 0.5443 4.2717* 8.39 <.0001 0.5147* 5.35 <.0001 
Size 0.0098** 2.18 0.0296 -0.0039 -0.81 0.4157 -0.5624* -10.90 <.0001 -0.0423* -4.34 <.0001 
Debt Ratio -0.0364 -1.19 0.2341 -0.0146 -0.45 0.6553 0.5924*** 1.75 0.0815 -0.1233*** -1.92 0.0550 
BM 0.3252* 8.48 <.0001 0.1304* 3.19 0.0015 -1.2751* -2.82 0.0051 -0.0642 -0.75 0.4530 
ROA -0.1236 -1.64 0.1025 -0.1580*** -1.96 0.0507 -0.5060 -0.66 0.5080 0.5592* 3.88 0.0001 
Pastgrowth -0.1682* -4.76 <.0001 -0.0776** -2.08 0.0382 1.1538* 2.68 0.0075 -0.1535*** -1.89 0.0594 
DUAL 0.0112 0.96 0.3366 0.0243*** 1.95 0.0517 0.2793*** 1.84 0.0659 0.0640** 2.24 0.0257 
Adj R-Sq 0.1685 0.0442 0.2201 0.0811 
# Obs 418 512 
*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level 
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Panel E: Post-Unification Sample  
 Model 1  
Disp 
Model 2 
FErr 
Model 3 
Illiq 
Model 4 
Spread 
  Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value Coeff. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.4902* 3.70 0.0003 0.1956* 4.11 <.0001 10.8235* 7.02 <.0001 0.2874* 3.06 0.0025 
Size -0.0575* -3.65 0.0004 -0.0227* -4.02 <.0001 -1.3661* -6.72 <.0001 0.0044 0.36 0.7175 
Debt Ratio 0.1048 1.30 0.1955 0.0264 0.91 0.3634 -3.6171* -2.94 0.0036 0.0006 0.01 0.9932 
BM 0.0164 0.16 0.8756 0.0343 0.92 0.3580 -0.8726 -0.58 0.5637 -0.1075 -1.18 0.2383 
ROA -0.4463* -2.91 0.0043 -0.1633* -2.96 0.0036 1.2551 0.78 0.4386 0.3909* 4.05 <.0001 
Pastgrowth -0.0805 -0.82 0.4115 -0.0644*** -1.84 0.0680 3.2029** 2.07 0.0390 0.0466 0.50 0.6201 
DUAL -0.0263 -0.92 0.3611 -0.0024 -0.24 0.8133 -0.2956 -0.63 0.5280 0.0391 1.37 0.1716 
Adj R-Sq 0.1721 0.2124 0.2084 0.0661 
# Obs 138 278 
*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level
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